Spirit of the Press. NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 6, Issue 320, 2 November 1865, Page 1

Spirit of the Press. NEW ZEALAND AFFAIRS.

(From the Times.)

The news we have received from New Zealand is far more interestingand more checkered than any one could have gathered from the curt telegram which informed us merely that William Thompson bad surrendered, and that the war might be considered at end. The surrender of William Thompson is undoubtedly an event of much importance. The personal character of this chief is very remarkable. He was slow to Join the insurrection, and, as Junius said of the wily Wedderbnrn, “ though he drew the sword, he has been careful not to throw away the scabbard.” William Thompsm has always appeared to us somewhat of a trimmer. Even while in arms against the Government he kept up a communication by letter, and led them to suppose that his hostility was by no means irreconcilable. He makes great profession of religion, and in theory, at least, has always advocated peace, and censured violent counsels. He has plainly no wish to sacrifice himself to the losing cause. The accession of such a man is doubly valuable, both for the actual support it gives, and as an evidence of the conviction of the more intelligent natives that a further prosecution of the war is likely to end in the ruin of all who adhere it. One is glad of the support of a man who is always on the winning side, and so we accept with pleasure the news from New Zealand, although it is checkered with the announcement that no progress has yet been made in the attempt to gain possession of the murderers of Mr Yolkner. But Thompson has not merely surrendered—he has surrendered both in the name of the Maori King anil in his own. The requssts that he made for himself are that the Governor will appoint a commission to inquire into his character, and that he should know as soon as possible what the Governor thought of his submission. That he felt himself entitled to make such requests as these seems to show that he did not consider himself in any danger of being treated as a criminal, but felt well assured that he would be much too welcome to be harshly dealt with. Thompson signed a paper in the presence of Brigadier Carey, to whom he surrendered, which was also signed by five other chiefs, containing the following words : —“ We consent that the laws of the Queen be laws for the Maori King, to be a protection for us all for ever and ever. This is the sign of making peace by coming into the presence of my fighting friend, General Carey.” This document appears to us to amount to something like an unconditional submission on the part of the Maori King and his representative. We may be excused if it turns out that we have misinterpreted it, for the New Zealand Ministry themselves do not profess to know the real meaning and import of the transaction we have detailed. We trust sincerely that we rightly interpret it as the inauguration of peace, and are the more inclined to think so, as we are informed that Rewi, a very warlike and turbulent chief, who was the real author of the present war, is about to tender bis submission.

One thing is quite certain that, if peace be not already made, it should be concluded without loss of time, and that for the simple reason that affairs have come to a dead lock. General Cameron appears some time ago to have brought charges against the New Zealand Ministry, in the scope of which the Governor is virtually included, of protracting the war for unworthy motives and disregarding the lives of British soldiery. The Ministry retort by a document in which they decline to accept services so unwillingly rendered, and thus break off all communication between themselves and General Cameron. The General seems for some months to have done little or nothiug in the prosecution of tho war, but his supiueness has been in some degree compensated by the energy of his district commanders, who are said to have seized on valuable posts, and to have gained important successes. It is sufficiently provoking that this quarrel should be added to all our other difficulties. We do not pre-

sume to give judgment on a controversy in which the Governor and Ministry are on one side, and the Commander-in-Chief on the other ; hut we feel more than ever that when this war is terminated it is the absolute duty of our Government to take care that we are never involved in another. It is very unlikely that this is the last time in which the natives of New Zealand will take up arms. The Indian war which now menaces United States should serve to prove to us how difficult it is to preserve permanent peaceful relations with savages, although we trust the New Zealanders will never experience at the bauds of our colonists a provocation at all similar to that fearful crime which has so deeply wrought on the mind of the Western Indians of America. There will doubtless be other wars. What we have a right to expect from our Government is that we at least shall be no party to them. In order to effect this two things are necessary. The first is to withdraw our troops from New Zealand; the second, to hand over to the colonial authorities the entire management of their relations with the natives. So long as we have troops in the colony we can never feel secure that they may not be called upon to take part in operations against the natives, and when once they have done so our honor is concerned in fighting out a struggle in which we have taken part. It ought besides to be made quite clear that in the case of a future war the whole weight will fall on the colonists, and that there will be no possibility of again obtaining that object which a large portion of the mercantile classes in a colony always so earnestly desire a great Commissariat expenditure. If, however, we no longer discharge the duty of protecting by British force the white settlers of New Zealand against the natives, it is obviously only just and reasonable that we should leave them the most ample power of protecting themselves. So long as the burden of an unsuccessful native policy was sure to fall upon us, we had obviously a right to direct what that policy should be for which we rendered ourselves thus responsible; but with the responsibility goes, as we think, the right to intermeddle with the policy. It must never be said again, as has been repeatedly asserted in the course of this war, that England by an absurd meddling first involves her colonies in hostilites, and then reproaches them with having got up the war for their own selfish purposes. We make no great sacrifice in giving up the enviable privilege of regulating from Downing-street affairs which it is impossible for us tc understand; and without forming an exaggerated estimate of those on whom we devolve this difficult and responsible duty, we have sufficient confidence in local knowledge and free discussion in the Assembly and the press to believe that our colonists will be found capable of managing the affairs of their aboriginal neighbours much better than ourselves.

What we principally wish to urge, however, is not ,so much these general principles, which very few persons who have given any attention to colonial matters will be disposed to dispute, as the necessity of acting upon them speedily and thoroughly. What we fear is, not the denial of the soundness of these views in the abstract, but the tendency to compromise which leads men to admit the principle, hut only to give half effect to it. In-the present instance a half compliance with the principle would be very little better than no compliance at all. We are considering our future relations not so much with the aborigines of New Zealand as with our own colonists, and the problem we have to solve is how to manage those relations so as to emancipate ourselves altogether from auy claim upon us to take part in future wars. For this purpose dur conduct cannot possibly be too ex| .'icit Qr too unambiguous. The least interference with the management of native affairs will give the colonists an excuse for saying that we have involved them in war, and the greatest* can do no more. In the same way the presence of a single regiment will be accepted as a proof that England still considers herself bound to take part in a quarrel whenever one shall arise between the settlers and the natives, and thus cast upon us the duty of reinforcing that single regiment with a whole army. In

many cases a temporizing policy, which stops halfway in giving effect to the principles which it indicates, may be wisdom ; in this case it would be the most short-sighted folly. We may reasonably congratulate ourselves on the approaching conclusion of the New Zealand war, but only on the condition that the war has lasted long enough to give us the experience which it is calculated to teach. Anxious as we are to see it terminated, we do not wish to see it closed till it has impressed upon Parliament and Government a firm and unalterable resolution never to take part in another.

(From the Spectator.) There is official anarchy in the Britain of the South, Whatever may be the good fortune of other Ministers, Mr Cardwell must be singularly constituted if he can “ rest and be thankful” after receiving his recent despatches from Governor Grey, together with certain missives which Lord de Grey has no doubt forwarded from Pall Mall to the Colonial Office. If the Colonial Secretary, after reading, marking, and inwardly digesting these documents, does not wake up out of that dozing frame of mind in -which seems to deal with the affairs of New Zealand, and put a little vigor and statesmanship into his despatches, it will be high time that Lord Palmerston contrived to find a Colonial Secretary capable of bringing order out of chaos. For plainly it was chaos and not order that when the lust mail left characterized the political life of New Zealand, The double or triple Government had become a quadruple or quintuple Government. The Governor, the General, the Ministry, the Maoris, and we suppose the Colonial Secretary, were all striving to act independently. All idea of subordination seems to have come to an end. The General condemned the Ministers and the Governor, the Governor and the General were not on speaking terms, the Governor gave no information of what was going on to the Ministers, the General did not communicate with them, and had it not been for the newspapers no one set apparently would have known what the other set were about. In modern colonial history we do not remember to have read anything at all analogous to this state of affairs. Politics and soldiering had been put into hotch-potch, and had become a “ mingled mass, a confused mixture of many ingredients,” as the dictionary hath it. The condition of New Zealand politically in the middle of June was a practical reductio ad absurdum of the existing system, or rather no system, of Government, and we make bold to say that this is merely the fault of the Colonialoffice, which ought to have intervened with a steady, wise, and determined hand at least two years ago.

As it is, all the authorities were in open disagreement. When the two Houses resolved to move the seat of Government to Wellington, the Governor marked his sense of that step by remaining in Auckland, near his island paradise, and by fomenting, or at least not checking, the selfish agitation of the Aucklanders for secession. When the troops had captured prisoners- whom the Ministry wanted to keep, the Governor took charge of them and let them go, and now he has sent them home. When the Governor and Ministry, agreeing for once, directed General Cameron to undertake military operations with the object of opening the coast between Wanganui and Taranaki, in order that a road might be made and the mail service by land be renewed. General Cameron obeyed, but grumbled, and practically frustrated the policy of the Colonial Government by the singular mode in' which he carried on the campaign. He crept along the shores, fought only when attacked, “turned” pas by stealing round, them, harassed the troops, but did not haiass the Maoris —the worst lot of Maoris in the Island—and finally halted and went to Auckland without completing the march to Taranaki, Nor was this all. At the outset he allowed it to be known that he disapproved of the course adopted by the Government. As early as the first week in March somebody said that the war was carried on “ for tiie profit and gratification of the colonists,” and the somebody, or “ some quarters,” to use the phrase of Governor Grey, was.

thought to be of sufficient importance for him, to make a memorandum on the subject, and send it to the Ministers. These gentlemen replied in terms that leave nd doubt that the somebody was General Cameron, since their memorandum of March 20 is directed at the General. They vindicate, and on the strongest grounds, the policy adopted in Wanganui. It was between that place and 1 aranaki that the land league arose. There is the seat and birth-place of sedition and fanaticism. Thence issued those marauders who plundered the settlements in 1861, who now parade the cooked heads of Europeans through the native districts. There arose the new superstition. No mail could cross that region. A mail steamer was wrecked on that coast, and it could not be reached by land. In this Maori Alsatia criminals found refuge, and here cannibals had their haunts. If any natives required chastising those were they. If any district wanted opening this was the district. But for some reason General Cameron did not like the work—most unpleasant work at best —and no doubt he allowed it to be known. The Ministers were nettled, not at his disapproval, but at his insinuations of improper motives. As long ago as the 20th March they thought it would be better to do without the Imperial soldiers. They advised Governor Grey to oppose the General’s demand for reinforcements, they declared they would not “ advise any operations to be taken which might involve the retention of the Imperial forces in the colony,” and they expressed their opinion that the colonial forces and the loyal natives would be “ sufficient to undertake and execute all operations that were requisite.” Such was the state of the quarrel in March. In April, as we now learn, Mr Weld went a step farther. Governor Grey had officially brought under his notice a “ private ” letter from General Cameron. In this letter the General charged the Colonial Ministers with prosecuting the war for purposes of aggrandizement, and with showing a culpable disregard for the lives of British officers and men. Thereupon the Ministers retorted. Eegretting that General Cameron should have imputed to them base and unworthy motives, an imputation which in this case fell on the Governor as well as the Ministers, they said that self respect and public duty would not permit them to “ any longer accept assistance so unwillingly rendered.” Governor Grey, as we infer, agreed perfectly with the Ministers, and terminated all relations wite General Cameron, “excepting those strictly official,” while the Ministers, as we have seen, cut the General altogether To add to the confusion and set everybody by the ears, the Ministerial memorandum got into the papers, and General Cameron is said to have read it there for the first time. If this were so, the fault would rest not with the Ministers, but with the Governor. Thereupon arose a further quarrel between the General and the Governor, and the former took upon himself to send a special steamer with despatches to Melbourne, and an officer to Galle to transmit the General’s complaints to England by telegraph. Virtually, it seems. General Cameron lias been deposed, for we are toll that without him, at least without his presence, the troops ha\ e been again set in motion, and that two colonels were engaged in completing the work he left undone. Meanwhile, it is positively stated that the Ministers were entirely ignorant of the movement of the troops, and dependent for information upon the newspapers ! “ If the war were being prosecuted in China,” says a letter from Wellington, “ the Ministry could scarcely know less.” If this is not anarchy, what is ? Mr Cardwell governs from Downing-street, Sir George Grey governs from Auckland, Mr Weld governs from Wellington, General Cameron acts as her Majesty’s Opposition. The Secretary of State deals with a Cerberus—each head hostile to its fellow. Mr Weld is nominally responsible, but as the Governor controls the Imperial forces, and as the Imperial forces were the vital element in the policy, Mr Weld was responsible lor the irresponsible conduct of Governor Grey. General Cameron had two or three masters — the Governor, the Secretary of State, ami the Minister of War. Mr Weld complains to Governor Grey, Governor Grey complains

to Mr Cardwell, General Cameron appeals to Lord de Grey. Two colonels carry on the war, we suppose under the Governor. The Colonial Rangers do a little independent fighting, we suppose under the Defence Minister. General Cameron standing aloof apparently, sends a special envoy home. A greater mess could not well be, unless the “ authorities” fought a main, with the Maoris for umpires. Surely now is the time for the Colonial Office to prove that it is an institution of public utility by adopting a policy, and sending a capable and honest man to set the colony in order.

Nevertheless, in spite of this political and military imbroglio, the object of the war is getting itself accomplished. William Thompson has surrendered and has signed a paper on behalf of the Maori King, who has all along been a tool in the hands of the leading men. Thompson made bis submission to Brigadier Carey, his “ fighting friend,” as he insisted on calling the Brigadier, on the 27th of May, Now, Thompson is a man of much influence —he was the brain of the king party, the statesman of the war—that his submission is at least equivalent to peace in the whole country north of the head waters of the Thames, the Horotiu, and Waipa. The Maoris were found almost utterly destitute of provisions, even of potatoes; and the fact that four days later none of them could have put in any claim to land in Waikato, no doubt, helped to bring about the surrender. Even here, however, we stumble on an indication of the prevailing anarchy among the departments. Brigadier Carey, on the 28th May, reported this important political fact to General Cameron. Yet on the 14tb June the Ministry actually knew nothing of Thompson’s surrender except “ from newspaper report.” Really one is tempted to come to the conclusion that the authorities only communicate with each other through the public press ! The surrender of Thompson is regarded as the end of the war, but that may well he doubted, considering that Rewi had not come in, and that the Maoris were as well acquainted as we are with the discord in the camp of the pakeha. Thompson never liked the war; Rewi thirsted for it, and provoked it. Thompson desired to set up his Maori kingdom and mark out its boundaries by dint of diplomacy and state craft; Rewi desired to fight the Europeans —to “do the work of his king with the spear.” Until, Rewi and William King submitted the war could not end. With the Pai Mari re superstition gaining ground among the savages, and anarchy in the high places of the colony, and Rewi and his fiery friends still at large, there were still abundant materials for the prolongation of this miserable conflict.

The remedy for the mischief must be discovered and applied by the Colonial Office. To us it seems to involve the recall both of General Cameron, who in his methodical way has done much service, and deserves to be respected, and of Governor Grey, who has done no service, and who commands respect neither from natives nor Europeans. Next it would be desirable that a man of capacity, straightforwardness, and good temper should be sent out to look after Imperial interests, but with instructions to have the colonists to the management of their own affairs. How far a large force of European soldiers should be detained in the colony it is more difficult to decide, but considering that the colonists ere ready and able to maintain a force of their own, to he applied as they please, in accordance with the conditions of warfare in New Zealand, and not in accordance with the conditions of warfare in Europe, as is too ranch the fashion, it may be inferred that comparatively few British soldiers would suffice. Left to themselves the colonists would know how to deal with the Maoris. They would fight them in their own fashion, and aided by friendly natives would bring them to reason. But we suppose Exeter Hall, and the Aborigines’ Protection Society, and the philanthropists, who love savages better than they love their own countrymen, are powers which, combined with the traditions of the Colonial Office, Mr Cardwell will not have the courage to affront and overcome. Whatever he may do, he cannot alter the result. A colony of Englishmen will be masters at whatever cost, and it would be much wiser to give them such support as would enable them to secure a future for the Maori race than to thwart them and secure that race’s certain destruction. In any case Mr Cardwell is bound to remove the scandalous anarchy existing in New Zealand. *

MEETING- OP THE ALLIED FLEETS OF ENGLAND AND PRANCE. (Prom the Home News.) The long-talked-of meeting between the British and French fleets has at length taken place. The English fleet left Portland Roads on the 13th August, and arrived in the offing at Cherbourg on the 14th, and its reception by the French squadron was of the most gratifying character. Fort Roule, the citadel on the heights overhanging the commercial pert, the batteries on Digue, and the guns of the ships, poured forth a thundering welcome, which was taken up and repeated to the echo by the masses of people who clustered on the piers, the jetties the quays, the steamboats, and every available craft that could float upon the water. Only three ironclads—the Magenta, the Heroine, and Flandre—were assembled to meet their allies; but it was expected that a much larger display of force would be made when the combined squadrons reached Brest. Meanwhile, and until their departure, Cherburg was en fete ; dinners and receptions were the order of the day, and illuminations and balls the order of the night. At a banquet given on the 15th, the Duke of Somerset proposed, as a toast, “ The Emperor Napoleon and the Navy;” and the French admiral replied with one a little more expressive : “ Queen Victoria, the English Navy, and the entente cordiale between the two Governments.”

The British ironclads arrived at Brest on the forenoon of August 21, after a detention at Jersey in consequence of injuries susnained by two of the fleet. There will be no manoeuvres, the object of the trip being merely a cruise and a visit. The Moniteur of the 16th describes in its bulletin the circumstances which led to the mutual visits of the French and English squadrons, and adds :—“ England desired that her fleet should be present at Cherbourg on the 15th of August, and France cannot but congratulate herself upon the sentiments of friendship and courtesy which suggested this thought to the British Government.”

It is understood that the French fleet will arrive at Spithead on the 28th August, and its stay will extend to the 2nd of September, during which time the flag officers will be entertained on board the Osborne by the Duke of Somerset, as First Lord of Admiralty General invitations will be issued for a dinner at the Port Admiral’s and also on board the Duke of Wellington. A review of the troops will take place on Southsea common, on the evening of which day the French officers will be the guests of Lieut.-Gcnend Sir C. Duller, aud a banquet on a grand scale, to be followed by a ball from the mayor, town council, and inhabitants of the borough generally, will probably close the festivities.