Spirit of the Press.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 6, Issue 318, 26 October 1865, Page 1

Spirit of the Press.

THE STAFFORD MINISTRY - AND THE STAFFORD POLICY. prom the Wellington ludepsndent, Octobsr 17.] He Stafford, if report speaks truly, lias surmounted one great obstacle winch would probably have proved fatal to his success in forming a Ministry. Members were likely to be shy of helping to construct a Cabinet that would in all probability tumble to pieces •even before the close of the present Session, but such a contingency has been guarded against by Mr Stafford, who, it is alleged, lias required and received a pledge from bis Excellency the Governor, that in the event of his Ministry being formed and afterwards defeated by an adverse vote, there is to be an immediate dissolution of Parliament and an appeal to the country. It is not surprising that Mr Stafford should have insisted on this very important stipulation, but it is surprising that the Governor should have conceded it. By this arrangement, Mr Stafford had the game in his own hands, and his efforts have therefore been more successful than was anticipated. He went to seek the co-operation of other members, ready with an answer to the most serious objection that could be urged. “ I can't join your Ministry,” any hou. member might say, “ because you will be turned out directly,” to which Mr Staff ml would rejoin, “ Not a bit of it; we can't be turned out by the present Parliament, because on the first show of opposition I am ready to threaten them with a discolution, to which the Governor has agreed. If they beat us, then we will go to the country, and with capital cries too, —“ No Stamp Duties,” —“ No additional taxation,” —and ask the people to strengthen the hands of a Ministry pledged to economy.” Under these circumstances, Mr Stafford lias not been without success in Ids negotiations. As we stated before, he first sought the aid of Mr Croshie Ward, but that gentleman was proof against his allurements. Sir Ward has become a convert to Separation, on financial grounds, and as Separation was not a part of Sir Stafford’s programme, he could not join him. This was discouraging, but Sir Stafford still persevered. After some consideration, a list cf nine gentlemen was prepared, from 'which a Slinistry might be selected and overtures Were made to several of them, the result being that Sir Stafford succeeded in forming a Slinistry, and will announce the fact to-day. Whoever may have consented, it is certain that the lion. John Johnston and Sir Pharazyn were both asked to take office, and declined. Sir Johnston had the position of Colonial Treasurer placed at his disposal, but would not accept it, on private grounds, while Sir Pharazyn declined to be Postmaster General in a Slinistry whose policy, more especially with reference to Native Affairs, he could not approve. The hon. member for Rangitikei lias acted wisely in thus deciding. As a firm supporter of Sir "Weld's Native Policy, he could not act with its opponents. Sir Pharazyn will sooner or later have an opportunity of doing good service to the Colony in office, and can bide Iks tune, 'lo join Sir Stafford’s party at the present moment—a party which will abandon the policy of self reliance, sacrifice ; Colonial .'independence, and truckle again to Imperial rule—would have been a suicidal act uh the part of a young politician, whose principles have been plainly expressed as those of Sir Fox’s successor. “ It is melancholy,” said Sir Pharazyn in his recent address to the llangifikei electors, “ to find the Imperial Government so ready to take advantage of its own wrong, and so little inclined to treat the Colony generously, or

even with bare justice. But this only proves the necessity of adopting a policy of selfreliance. England was bound in honor to finish a war which had its origin in the mismanagement of the Colonial office and its deputies; but she lias failed to do so. It remains then for the Colony to do the “ possible best.” It is useless to discuss the past, but the future lies before us. I wish that the policy of 1833 had been carried cut. I think that Mr Weld's policy is good, chiefly because it is the nearest practicable approach to that policy. To carry it out effectually, it is necessary to do without the troops, because so long as they remain, the Colonial office insists upon its right to control the Colonial Government. I belong neither to a war, nor to a peace party, but the Colonial Party. I maintain that for the safety of the Colony it is necessary to enforce law and order. I do not approve of any attempt to do more than is necessary to render life and property secure, but am prepared to support any measures that will practically place natives and Europeans on the same footing. For the past I believe that tiie Imperial Government is responsible, and I am strmgly opposed to the Colony paying any part of the expenses of a war, in the conduct of which it had has no effective influence.” We wonder that Mr Stafford could have asked a gentleman holding opinion such as these, to join his Minsitry. Mr Stafford proposes to sacrifice all that Mr Fox struggled for—all that Mr Weld has stirven to gain. He has no Native Policy worthy of the name. He will, if the fates and the Assembly permit, try to keep the troops, at the cost of admitting the right of Imperial interference, and he has the unparalleled credulity to hope he can do so without [laying for them. Mr Stafford’s policy, so far as it has been foreshadowed during recent negotiations, is of a twofold character. Like all political quacks, bis first object is to gull the public and secure popularity. This be will do by offering the tempting baits of no additional burdens, no Stamp Duties, no costly Defence Force, and no official extravagance. “ Vote for Stafford and Financial Reform” will be the watchword of Ids party at the hustings, and doubtless many dupes believe it. This will be the declared un i prominent part of bis policy, the other and less attractive features, being kept in the background. But they must nevertheless be indicated. Mr Stafford will attain those benefits-—if lie does attain them—at a cost far exceeding what they are worth. He will secure economy at the cost of Colonial honor, he will save some thousands of pounds at the cost of Colonial independence, ho will gain a present reduction of expenditure at the cost of future bankruptcy. Let us estimate what is the real value of a reduction of expenditure. The Colony after a struggle of several years, has secured the right to manage its own affairs to construct and carry out its own native Policy, to fight its own difficulties uninlerfered with. The past has clearly taught this lesson ; that so long as the system of double Government existed, a successfully Native Policy was impossible, and that so Img as England lent the Colony aid, the system of double Government would continue. Mr Weld accepted the lesson, ami surmounted the difficulty by offering to dispense with Imperial aid, if lie could at the same time get rid of Imperial interference, and the Home Government gladly agreed to the proposal. Mr Weld’s policy of course involved expense, because the Internal Defence of the Colony had to be entrusted to a Colonial Force, which would replace the Imperial troops. The estimated cost of this force was ,£89,705, a very moderate sum, bearing in mind that it was the price to be paid for a policy which involved making the Colony independent oflmperial aid, and freed

it irom the enormous liability of .£4O ahead for the services of Imperial troops, with which it was threatened to be saddled. Now we have it in Sir Stafford’s own words and figures, which recently appeared in the Nelson Colonist, that he proposes to effect a saving on this item of £77,300, leaving the sum of <£12,405 us the money available to repress outrages, protect the settlers, and establish the supremacy of the Queen's law. 4 here is but one Stafford, and the Colonist is his prophet. Hear what the prophet says ; “ Probably a considerable change in the policy ol the Government might have been necessitated by a re-arrangement of the Estimates ; but what are to ha (lie fruits of this self-reliant policy it is not easy to foresee except that one certain result will be an enormous expenditure and a heavy burden on the colonists. Without going at present into that part or the question, we shall quote heie Mr Stafford s figures, and as Ids knowledge of colonial finance is second to that of no oilier man in New Zealand, they are such as merit attention and consideration.” Of course “ there would require- to be a considerable change in the policy of the Government,” if Mr Stafford’s savings are to he effected, and it would be of this nature. Mr Stafford would raise no additional Colonial Force and reduce that already existing ; lie would cling to the Imperial troops, write whining despatches stating that the colonists were lend fled for their lives, which lay at the mercy of a bloodthirsty foe, and he would implore the Imperial Government not to withdraw lus aid, but to leave ibe troops on any terms. We know pretty well what would almost certainly be the result. Delays would ensue, and the troops would leave hut slowly. Meantime the natives encouraged hy the cowardice and vacillation of onr rulers, would proceed to fresh acts of rapine and murder. Our fiontier setthmenis would be attacked, and outbreaks would occur all over the Is.and, while the troops lived an easy life in garrison, fulfilling Mr Cardwell's in • struetions to protect the centres of population.” Amidst all these terrible disasters, the Colony, thanks to Mr Stafford’s policy. Would bo unprepared either for retaliation or self-defence. The cost of bringing about such a state of affairs cannot he estimated, hut it would at least far exceed the price which Mr Weld lias asked the Colony to pay fci a policy, whirl) would soon not only rentier such occurrences impossible, but in time secure a teal and lasting peace. The other results ol Mr Staffords policy would be equally disastrous. Is any man, except this profound financier “ wbo stands second to none in New Zealand,” credulous enough (o suppose that the Lnjieriul Government would abate one shilling of its demand upon the Colony if the troops be retained? And if they are so retained for several years, if the old system of double Government is resumed, and Native Affairs are again managed from Downing-street, who can estimate the depth of that gulf of min into which the Colony will be plunged ? With Mr Weld’s policy and a Colonial i'orce, a heavy expense would be incurred, hit the burden of the Native difficulty would he taken off cur shoulders; with Mr Stafford s policy and an Imperial Force, we should still incur a heavy expense, but the burden of the Native difficulty would be rendered greater than ever. If Mr Stafford asks proof, let him look at the events of the last three years. What has caused the failure of the policy of 18G3 ?—what lias saddled the Colony with an enormous debt ?—what has aggravated the Native difficulty aud lessened our means of surmounting it ? The answer will spring to the lips of every taxpaying colonist, in the stereotyped, yet meaning words—“ Double Government and Imperial Interference.” This is what Mr Stafford will reproduce in

the Colony, if ]jo is allowed time and opportunity—this is the policy that may be expected from the men who will assume the management of affairs to-day.

A STAFFORD MINISTRY FORMED. [Wellington Independent, October 17.] ■Mr Stafford has formed a Ministry, and for this Parliament at least, Sir Ward is out of office. We cannot give a complete list of the gentleman composing the new Cabinet, as in the interval before the House meets to-day, some changes may b • made ; hut it is sufficient to say that the Auckland and Otago members predominate. Mr. Stafford asserts that he has got one good Wellington, man in his Ministry, but who that is, nobody seems to know positively, though rumor points to a well known local solicitor, who, though not in Parliament, can, if necessurv, be [nit into the Lords to represent the New Ministry there. The announcement to ho made to-day will set all doubts at rest, meanwhile it is certain that Wellington will, if at all, be hut faintly represented in the new Cabinet.

In the preceding article we liave pointed out that Mr Stulidrd’s success is mainly owing to the alleged consent of the Governor to dissolve Parliament in the event of the Ministry being deieatod. lint for this power the Stafford Ministry could not hold olKco a week, hut with it, the new occupants of the 1 reasury Benches will lor a time have the whip hand of Parliament. Mr. Weld and Ins colleagues were willing to have oi.ee more taken otlice on certain conditions, and

they were equally willing to give place to Mr. Stafford ; hut recent events have placed them in the position of being unable—whatever might he the wishes of the house—to oust the Aew Ministry during the present lai liameat. Ino Assembly is therefore powerless and the next appeal will he made to the country, which must decide whether to support or abandon the policy of selfreliance.

We deprecate all factious opposition to Mr. biutiord and believe noue wili be shewn by the lute Ministry and its supporters, ilr. Weld has already shewn what, a Government should be, and will now show what an Opposition should be. IJut a great principle is at stake, and it behoves every iiieniher of the Colonial party to stand up in its delence. A year ago the policy of self reliance was laid btlure the country, and if Mr Stullord asks us to abandon it now—• it ho even in the slighted degiee endangers it then lie must be opposed by every legitimate means. We have not yet Mr. Stafford s policy before us. and anxiously wait for him to explain it, but if it be indicated by bis speeches in opposition, and ins more recent statements, then there i: nothing to hope and everything to fear Iroin lus accession to ofiL’e.