COLONIAL V. IMPERIAL FORCES.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 6, Issue 298, 17 August 1865, Page 1

COLONIAL V. IMPERIAL FORCES.

pfrom The tress, 2nd August.] We print to-day the remainder of the papers relative to the capture of the Wereroa pa the despatch from Sir George Grey which we published yesterday contains a detailed account of the operations in question, but other portions of the correspondence will be found exceedingly interesting. We may especially remark the hearty, and workmanlike style in which Sir G. Grey writes to Major Hookes and Captain Brassey, forming a strong contrast to the tone of much of the writings we have been accustomed to peruse from the same quarter. His Excellency begins by applying for assistance to BrigadierGeneral Waddy, which that officer in accordance with the instructions under which he is acting from General Cameron expresses himself unable to grant without orders from headquarters though he is afterwards induced to establish a post at Nyenene, about half-a-mile from the pa, to act as a support to the Colonial forces and friendly Natives, and also to order up a party of artillery. The next day 200 men of the 14th and 18th arrived, and under the command of Lieut-Col. Trevor took up their station about threequarters of a mile on the left front of the pa. None of the regulars took any part in the attack ; they only served by their presence to prevent the enemy from attempting a sortie and to furnish guards for the prisoners Meanwhile the Governor after a careful observation of the ground discovered that the pa was commanded in the rear by the heights of the Karaka, and that a force once established there could harrass the defenders of the place by their fire, cut them off from their supplies, and entirely prevent their escaping in that direction. He accordingly determined in occupying the heights with the Colonial and Native force, a mancevra which was successfully accomplished under command of Major Hookes, and the occupants of the pa, on finding a fire opening in their rear, immediately abandoned it as best they could, leaving about fifty prisoners in the hands of Major Hookes. Had thera been time enough to occupy other propositions at Pirikama and on the Waitotara which formed part of his Excellency’s plan plan, it seems probable that not a single Native would have escaped, but a message from Captain Brassey, at Plpiriki, asking for instant-assistance rendered it necessary to make the attack at once. The colonial force behaved throughout in the most spirited manner, and are spoken of by his Excellency in the very highest terms. Through a failure in the supplies the men had to start on their march to Karaka without rations, and there appeared little chance of obtaining any to send after them, nevertheless they started on their toilsome march through the . bush in the. midst of pouring rain with the utmost alacrity, “ expressing,” says the Ga

Httuor* * u.e;r willingness to encounter any privations or hardships, if there was work to -do, 1 * He adds* significantly enough, “ I knew however that they would obtain the next morning ou the Karaka heights the supplies intended for the pa. This successful assault upon the enemy’s strongest amt most carefully chosen position happens must opportunely at very time the Assembly had been summoned. It is a conclusive argument in favor of the policy laid down by Mr Weld in hia memorandum upon taking office, and in the resolutions assented to by the House last session. No more satisfactory proof could have been desired that the Colony Will best consult its own interests by ceasing to depend upon the protection of the Imperial troops, and by adopting the manly and straightforward course of fighting out its battles with its own men, and at its own cost. The capture of Wereroa is an additional and striking proof of what has been so frequently asserted, that for the kind of warfare in which New Zealand is engaged, a force raised in the Colony itself, and led on by officers accustomed to the bush will be found more effective than the most admirably disciplined regular troops, commanded by officers trained according to the maxims and practices of the European school. Here we find General Cameron coming up to a pa, reconnoitring it, noting bow strongly it is fortified, and quietly slipping past it in the night to avoid the loss of life which Would evidently follow an attempt to take it by storm. Rightly enough. We dare say, accotding to the rules of civilised warfare, but among the Mauris such conduct Was in all probability attributed to downright fear, and was the next worst thing, so far as its effect on war went, as a defeat in the open field. To the Native mind it was a defeat; it was the avoiding of a direct challenge to come on and fight. Yet it turns out that a Native position was all the while altogether indefensible. It was only calcutu resist an attack in front; at the rear it was left quite open and was commanded by the adjacent heights, the occupation of which would allow the attacking force to pour a galling fire into the place, cut off the garrison from their supplies, and force them into a surrender. But to reach those heights it Was necessary to “ pass through several miles of dense forest and over a most difficult country,” a proceeding entirely opposed to all military instinct. Very few officers with any.reputation to lose would care to leave the open country and run the hazard of a march over broken ground and through heavy bush; and General Cameron, following the orthodox rules of the service, on finding the pa unassailable in front pushed on bis road to Taranaki, and left Wereroa to be dealt with afterwards as occasion should serve. This is precisely what the Maoris expected. In lighting against the soldiers they have learned to regard bush land, swamps and precipices as their most valuable allies. Experience has taught them that when beaten in the open a retreat intothe bush will leave them free from pursuit, and that in the bush they need fear no attack.

As long as the colonists depended on the soldiers to do their fighting for them, this notion of the Maoris was a true one; and the war was never likely to come to an end, because it was evident to the Maori that whatever. successes the JPakeha might gain there Was a point beyond which he could never pass. Not that we mean to disparage the army ; heaven forbid that we should say one word against the honor of the gallant gentlemen and brave soldiers who have made the name of England honored and triumphant in e\ ery quarter of the globe; we only say that this is not the kind of work they are fitted for, and its unjust to them to expect them to undertake it. But with the colomsts the.case is very different. There are hundreds of men in the colonies who aie as mu.h at home in the bush as the Maoris themselves, and are ready to follow them into its deepest recesses. It is nonsense to suppose that the Maories are better hands at bushfighting than the English, The Maoris are a brave race-—no one is more willing than ourserves to do honor to their proved courage—but they are not a snatch for Englishmen; and a few parties of bushrangers, led by men who know their work and are ready to fight their own fashion, would soon convince the Natives in them of the fact. The Maoris themSfives seem to be fully alive to the dangers they are in whenever their opponents venture .*« plunge into the bush and attack them on bhek own ground. It is curious to read Sir George s description of the panic among the Nidives an the W-ereroa pa when they found Major Hookes’ force in possession uf Abe heights of J£acaka. As soon as- the fire from -the beights opened upon them, the confusion in the pa was very great; Native could he .seen about seeking ior.shel-

ter,” and in a short time “ numbers were seen escaping down the cliffs and precipitous banks, with bundles, evidently escaping from the place.” In short, as soon as they found the pa being Surrounded, and their retreat cut off* they abandoned the position and &u?ly fled for their lives. This is why’ we believe that such engagements as the capture of the Wereroa pa and the expedition against and repulse of the assault of Pipinki, make the real beginning of the end. When once the Natives find that campaigns are no longer to be conducted with the slow precision and harmless display that has hitherto characterised our military operations, but that they are being actively sought out and attacked in their own haunts, we are persuaded that they will quickly lose all taste for war and be ready enough to sue for peace. Yet war having been carried so far no satisfactory terms of peace can be arranged till the Maoris are convinced of their own inferiority and have learned to respect European prowess. The Waikato campaign did but little to teach them this lesson; the capture of Wereroa will serve to impress it upon them with peculiar distinctness.