GOVERNOR GREY and GEN. CAMERON.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 6, Issue 5, 13 July 1865, Page 1

GOVERNOR GREY and GEN. CAMERON.

[From the Sydney Morning Herald.] The differences between Governor Grey and General Cameron have long been notorious in the official circles. There is nothing new in a conflict of opinion between the civil and military officers—nothing uncommon in secret opposition between persons of independent command, or so far capable of separate action as to have different interests and responsibilities. We should indeed be sorry to accept any of the imputations cast npon a General that would imply an unfaithfulness to his trust. The war in New Zealand is one full of danger to regular soldiers, and there is bui little in any success it can accomplish to satisfy a military ambition. It is understood that some operations, in which the soldiers’ lives were imperilled, hnve not received the approval of the Horse Guards. Indeed, the lossess in taking the celebrated Gate Pa can hardly be accounted for in harmony with skilful arrangement or prudent forethought. A General, acting under responsibility to opinion far distant from the scene of action, is not unlikely to regard the views of the Local Government with distrust, and even impatience; and, if rumor be correct, the operations of the war have been retarded, confused, and rendered in some instances useless, by this contest between the civil and military government. The mischief of divided authority needs not to be debated ; but that division has boen occasioned by the contradictions of British policy. A General is sent to subdue the rebels. He is furnished with a large army. But simultaneously despatches are sent to the Governor with exortations to make peace at almost any sacrifice. The tone of some of these communications would seem to imply that the whole affair is too mean to engage the national honor, and that to get out of the difficulty by any possible avenue is the grand aim of the British Government and the supreme duty of Sir G. Grey. How is it possible for persons acting under these contradictory instructions which, however,, have changed, from month to month, either in their character or in tone —to realise any event whatever? Meantime the enemy is increasing in strength. A bond of union is being established between the various tribes, which for the time will clothe their resistance with the air of religious fanaticism. Those conversant with the history of the Church are not unaware that apostacy from original teaching has often followed the brief epoch of simple and undoubting faith. The fact is that the differences among Christians —magnified as in some instances they have been by a puerile animosity—have naturally shaken in the mind of the native his first coulidence in the truthfulness and authority of his Christian teachers. The way has thus been prepared for that monorrf creed .which seems to unite the. aven<?im» spirit of the ancient law with the grosser forms of heathen superstition. This is indeed a force in favor of the insurgents which may have great results, although it shows the ultimate extinction of their power, and perhaps of their race. They will necessarily forfeit all that sympathy by which they have hitherto been shielded, as their religion bears its natural fruits and shows itself in murder and revenge.

We can bardly imagine it posssble for an account of these difficulties to reach the Ministers at home without a prompt recall of one or other of the authorities—Sir George Grey or the General. But these gentlemen may be considered representatives, to some extent at least, of opposite ideas in the government of the colony, and if either be retained to the exclusion of the other, it . will be impossible for the Minister to avoid specific and decided instructions. If the colonists of New Zealand; are to be left to themselves, as arranged between the Ministry, of Mr Weld and the-Secretary of State, they

***** assume a military organisation, and lighting will be the main business for some years to come. That the natives will not take advantage of the retreat of our soldiers to recover the ground they have lost,, and use their own efforts to drive the pakeha into the sea, is to assume that they are wanting in courage and sagacity which, at all events, their eulogists have assigned to thelh in a very large proportion. But it is not to.be expected that the pakeha will willingly -submit to this summary process of drowning. The history of British colonization has shown the power of settlers to cope with aborigines more numerous and as well organised as the Maori warriors. But the process of war will certainly assume a character very different from that we have hitherto seen ; and the mischief of indecision in the first stages of the contest will be illustrated not only by the loss of British life, but also by the speedy destruction of the native tribes. If, however, the British Government renounce this notion of abandonment ; if any resolution shall be adopted to enforce the Royal authority to the extent of the Royal dominions—then the Government will assume a m ore military character, and the civil institutions be for a time in subordination. Every one must accept the proposition that those who pay shall rule. That doctrine is the palladium of liberty. If, however, it is good in favor of the colonists, it is irresistible when pleaded by the Home Government.' If the National treasure restores the National peace, and if the army provided is paid for by the Empire at large, the prosecution of the war and the conditions of peace must be fixed by the Government of England. This however, would include another condition—that the colonists deprived of all authority and voice in the management of public affairs so nearly concerning them, should be relieved alike from the military risk and labor and permanent debt necessary to pacification. It would certainly have been far better to have sent originally a military Governor, with power to do all that was necessary for the restoration of peace. Surely the British Empire would furnish some man who could unite the qualities of an administrator with the skill and talents of a General.

No one, looking at the circumstances, can avoid the conviction that the war has continued solely through a blind appreciation of its character in the first instance, and a random application of the means provided for its termination, ending in a conflict at last between the two powers which held for a time the destinies cf the country. Whether Sir. George Grey or General Cameron should be recalled it is not for persons at a distance —except in possessson of their explanations —to decide ; but no one can doubt that a quarrel which hinders their co-operation should be terminated by one or the other being relieved. It may, perhaps, turn out that the public service would be best assured by an appointment which should not be encumbered with old prejudices, conflicts, and disasters.

The recent attitude of the colonists called to the performance of military duty will require explanation to justify them in the eyes of the British public. At the same time, it is possible for men to be so mortified, distracted, the humiliated as to lose for a time that feeling of subtn ssion to authority which is always desirable, and which is essential in the presence of an enemy. But there can be no doubt a new regiment, animated by a different spirit, would rally their courage and restore their discipline. It is mortifying for civilians to submit even for a time to the necessary dictation of military rule, but it is doubly so when the submission is accompanied by circumstances of humiliation, and when the service loses all the eclat which is assured by an intelligent direction and signal success.