Britain's Attitude to War

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Volume 81, Issue 77, 23 December 1937, Page 10

Britain's Attitude to War

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VITAL ISSUES ONLY Major Policy is to Play for Time THE ARMS PRGGRAMME

(By

The collapse of Japan before the sudden stiffening of froiit on the part of Britain and the United States as the result of recent attacks on the flags of those two coi ntries has given new food for thought to those who have maintained that the democracies have been too long-suffering in their policy towards the bellicose States and that prompt measures would have called their bluff. Thus the French learned too late the tremors which the Germans felt at the reoccupation of the eastern bank of the Rhine, the Germans collapsed when confronted with the French threat that if troops were sent to Morocco they would be turned out, the Italians, faeing Anglo-French nav.al power in the Mediterranean, ended their submarine warfare on behalf of the Spanish rebels. Even Japan, bellicose, armed to the teeth, half a world away from any attackers and entrenched against any attacK, has suddenly oecome almost abject when she finds the two Englishspeaking nations assuming a peremptory tone. These incidents help to illustrate the nature of the European diplomatic poker game of today, as The Economist recently termed^it, a game in which the totalitarian Powers bid until they discover that there is real strength massing against them and then hurriedly threw in their hands to avoid the inevitable show-down. In the midst of this confusion there is one element which increasingly appears as helping to make it possible — the doubt about just what would make Britain fight. There are certain essential interests which it is obvious that Britain would defend, and one of them is her sea roads. It is in her threat to these that Italy is making the error which sooner or later may spell her downfall. But just how far could the more aggressive Powers go before Britain would refuse to compromise or make concessions any further? This knowledge is the real key to peace. Have Not Overstepped Line. So far the Fascist Powers have not overstepped the line which separates peace from war. There are those who feel that each unchecked act by them helps them to go'nearer the line next time. There is general regret to-day that Britain did not accept the invitation of Mr. Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of State, in 1931 and derup- Japan the right to enter Manchuria. There are some who feel it an error that Britain did not act with France in the Rhineland incident instead of being misled by the fog of words and unkept promises about a new League of Nations and a Western Locarno with which Herr Hitler attempted to palliate that act. There are those who feel that oil should have been added to the list of articles on which sanctions were imposed at the time of the Ethiopian conquest. But these things are over. Their usefulness is that they give a key to the future. Britain will not fight the Fascist States over Spain. Mr. Anthony Eden has made it clear that his Government does not feel that a Franco regime in that country would necessarily be inimical to Britain. And Britain will not fight alone. That is the lesson of the Ethiopian and the Rhineland affairs. In both cases there was division* of opinion between Britain and France (at one stage during the crisis with Italy Sir Samuel Hoare reminded the House of Commons that no other nation had "moved a ship or a man" to the Mediterranean), there was lack of unity over the course to be followed in the Rhineland. In 1931 Britain was unable to check Japan even if she wished to do so; her hands were full elsewhere. Morepver, it is doubtful if the country, remembering the state of chaos in China, though Japanese occupation of some of the territory such a calamity. Again, at the time of the Rhineland move there is no doubt that a great body'of opinion in the country sympathised with Germany's action in recovering her own territory, ■ in removing a humiliation and protesting against the Franco-Rus-sian pact as aimed against the Fatherland. Even in the case of 'Ethiopia, an affair which. was surrounded with sentiment, there were those who claimed that the country was unfit to govern itself and that Italy had been cheated of her rights under the Treaty of London, and, if she must expand, might as well do so at the expense of the last home of slavery.

Influence On Policy. That is not to justify those points of view, but only to record that they were in existence and that they must have had some influence on national policy. Division of opinion and general uncertainty must have been created, also, by the military and naval weakness of Britain. The iesson that moderation does not always breed moderation has been learned, the day of clear warnings has returned and th'e cementing of a close partnership with France, which has come about in the last year, has helped towards clarifying any future position which may arise. It is notable that in the last few months the two countries have spoken and acted as one and that whenever they have felt strongly about a particular point it has been conceded. The Britain of to-day, with a vast industrial machine capable of turning out many aeroplanes almost at the point where it can operate at top speed, is vastly different from the Britain of two years ago. Her gigantic naval programme has staggered the nations which would lilce to be able to alford it. And these things, with the overhauling and mechanisation of the Army and the entente with France, have created a new Britain, a Britain with a Continental branch that is also a firstrate military Power. To a country in this position, what are the vital issues? Her communications, obviously, for over these lines,

come her food and her raw materials, baclc over them flow her exports to all parts of the world. France, Belgium and Holland come int" the vital sphere which Britain would defend at the cost of war. An open road through the Mediterranean is a thing which, at present, it appears she would fight to hold, though it is not vital to her. She is conxmitted to the defenec of Egypt, but whether she would aetually move in this defence is an Empire question and one of the lesser-known sides of British policy. She is pledged to defend the Irak. This gives the answer to tln question of whether she would clash with Japan. The answer is no; not as long as Japan moved towards Asia and away from Empire territory. Even the valuable holdings in Shanghai would probably be sacrificed, with their loss to British trade and impovcrishment of British worlcers, rather than rislc a conliict. In the next year or two Britain 's major policy will be to play for time. For tim£ will give her a chance to complete her formidable armament and will tax to the utmost the crazy economy of her oppcnents.