Alignment Against Communism
"Senex")
WHAT ARE MOTIVES? Possibility oi a Military AOiance JAPAN AND THE SOVIET
(By
Just four years after the signing of a Russo-Italian. non-aggression pact which. Mussolini's mouthpiece Signor Gayda declared "was nobody's business, ltaly has entered into another conipact, which General Goering's nejvspaper declares is nobody's business, this timq against ,her ally of 1933. For some timo entry of the antiCommunist pact. concluded by Germany and Japan bas been expected of ltaly. For tbougb Mussolini was the first leader in iilurope, outside of Germany, to conolude an agreement with tho Soviet Government, and thougb the trade pact which was concluded was reinlorced by a peace pact four years ago, tbat Russo-ltalian link h^s long been >napped. Its P.arting was one of the smaller sounds in the din. over Abyssinia. The treaty of,1933,it should be realised,was xnore than a mere renouncement of military measurOs on the 'part of the contracting "l'owers. It contained a list of other acts, financial and economic, which ltaly and Russia pledged tliemselves not to perform
against one another. "One of these was the introduction of a trade boycott. In joining in the imposition of sanctions, Russia hroke this treaty, ihe . Italians argue, and since 1.1 JDuc© obtained his African empire he is less interested in the trade fields which Russia presents to him. Hence the' trade understanding with- the Soviet which was so iinportant a few years ago has shrunk to nothing in Italian ca;lculations. To this state of mind the intervention of Russia in the Spanish war has contributed its part. The first result of the anti-Commun-ist pact in Rome is ' likely jbo be the same as the first result o£ the pact in Tokio at the end of last year — loss of trade privileges. As the result of tho alliance with Germany, Japan lost the opportunity to eonclude a fisheries agreement with. 'Moscow covering privileges to fish in Russian jvatfrs. which had long heen sought. A second result is likely, .t.o he tho f urther alienating of British official ppinion.
Bfeak With Britaln? Tf was Japan' s decision to fprm an anti-Communist alliance with Germany which resulted- in the fitst real break fcetween Britain and .lepanj *he bonds -of the two countries had survi/ea >he; strain which had been put oji tiiem hy earlier incidents in velatiori to trade inatters and to the Fac East. Japan's deal with ltaly is likely to be two-sidad; it will f urther cumplicate Anglo-Japanese relations and ' it w;ll strengthen the British determiaaiion to create an alignment with France. in spite of the statesmen European relationships are stretching themselves out into far seas and jn the hringing of Japanese influence into the situation in the Mediterranean the Italians are creating a new and trjcky situation. What is behind this anti-Communist Pact? If it follows the form of its predecessor it jvill consist of three Articles, with a preamblo. The preamble will arecognise tbat the aim of the Communist International is to "disintegrate and subdue existing States b'y all the means at its command" and will state the conviction that the activities of the Comintern not only endanger the peace and well-being of nations, but are a menace to the peace of the world. Being agreed on these
points the nations will thereupon ttndertake to inform one another of all the activities of the Comintern which come under their notice "and will promise to consult on the necessity of preventive measures which will be carried through in close collaboration. Next, the contracting Powers will under tak© to invite other nations to join the.pact, prpvided that their internal peace is threatened by Communism. Finally, the parfcies will agree to take' severe action against vthose engaged directly or indirectly in the work of the Comintern, at home or abroad, and will set up a perm'anent'cOmmittee which will consider Jefensive measures The Strategiq Aspect.
■' That .the pact is .this ahd ' no more is likely to he doubted by, a, sceptical Europe. In the first place, when Japan chose to.conclude such a pgct sbe did it with Germany, a nation placed strar ■tqgicallyi.on the far frontiers of Russia, with.whom Japan was chiefly concerped in the Far East. In the seconj place, at: the time of signafuro of the German-Japanese Pact Communist activities in Japan were diminishing and tho situation, in the general opinion, was better than it had been for years. Comniunism in- China could hardly be included in the scope of such a pact unless there were secret clauses. If Japan were contemplating action against' Chinese "Communism," the agreement with Germany might take on a very different - complexion ; it might amount to an alliance which pledged Japan aid if she were assailed by Russia iu the course of the carrv-ing-out, of » this legitimate (from the point of the agreement) project on the Asiatic mainland. - If ltaly also intends » o appoint herself chief anti-Coramunist agent in the Mediterranean the pact mav provide her with powerful and strategicaliy-placcd sppport. In other worda, the real danger of the pact is not in the pact as it stands, but in the implications as a possible military^ alliance It is unlikely tbat eit.her the old pact or the new one includes pre visions for unqualified mutual" assistance. , In tlie case of the GermanJapanese agreement it is highly unlikeJy that Japan, which is notoriously conservative in foreign policy and bas
Mo desire to become mixed' with the affairs of Europe, undertook to aid GermaDy in a purely European quarrel. Does It. Mean an Alliance? J.t is also believed at Whitehall that the pact provided for German assistance to Japan, a confirmation of?the thesis that Germany's leaders believe war with Russia to be inevitahle, sooner oi* later, and giving a hint of the circumstances in which they might launch an attack to capture the c.ovet©d Ukraine. Similarly, it is far from probable that ltaly would pledge her-
self to further a Japanese quarrel unless it suited her. But since her relations with France have worsened to s> state approximating that of four years ago when the Italo-French frontier was being fortified, it must not be overlooked that. Russia is France's ally, that anything which weakens France strengthens ltaly and that, at the sam© time, Germany is at present Italy's friend and lined .up with Tokio. In other words,' Mussolifii is playing a subtle game. Not the least of his intentions, too, may be to strengthen the hqnd of Japan at the moment when other nations have adopted an unfriendly attitude,to pick up a valuable ally hy this show of timely consideration, and to prove to Europe ouce again j vain without tbe dazzling figure -of that all international conferences are JMussolini, or the reflected glory from oue of his emissaries to light their way.
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Bibliographic details
Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Volume 81, Issue 44, 15 November 1937, Page 9
Word Count
1,128Alignment Against Communism Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Volume 81, Issue 44, 15 November 1937, Page 9
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