THE MUSSOLINI POLICY.

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Volume 81, Issue 15, 11 October 1937, Page 4

THE MUSSOLINI POLICY.

The week-end news gives but little assurance of any satisfactory solution of the dangerous problem of foreign intervention in Spain's internal troubles. Italy's reply to the AngloFrench proposal for a three-^arty conference on the subject certainly does nothing towards easing the situation, for she practically declines to take a,ny part in such limited conference. Signor Mussolini's reasens for refusing to meet Great Britain and France, except in company with Germany, were diseussed here on Satnrday last and, truth to tell, there is some little difficulty in seeing why Germany shouid not be admitted to the conference. In one of our messages the explanation is offered that if Germany were invited, then Russia and Portugal, and even other countries, might also well claim to be represented, thus creating an unwieldy conference as little likely as the Non-Intervention Committee itself to reach any deftnite and effective conclusions. Stiil, if the withd rawai of foreign forces from the field of aetion is the main point at issue, then Germany is certainly pretty closely concerned, for at the outset at any rate, Germany and Jtaly w e/te almost equally involved in rendering assistance to the insurgent leader in the form of organised and fully equipped military units, to say nothing of war material. Germany would certainly appear to have eased off, if not entirely discontinued, her activities in this respect, but at the sarae time there must be a very substantial body of German soldiery fighting under General Franco's banher, so that her concurrence in any scheme of withdrawal would appear to be almost essential. However, Great Britain and France would seem to desire to make the issue one for decision among the three Great Powers more directly concerned in Mediterranean questions. There may be good reasons for this, but at the same time it provides' Signor Mussolini -ou his part with some show of reason also for his refusal, while Germany may find pretext for taking umbrage at not being recognised. In any event, the stand taken by Signor Mussolini may be accepted as the result of close consultatigp between himself and Herr Hitler, both being anxious at the moment to indicate as impressively as possible their determination to act in concert. Apart from all this, however, it is obvious that the Mussolini policy is to preserve as long as possible an atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty as to his real intentions and to stir up and maintain* apprehensions as to what his next move may be. From the beginning he has pursued the line of playing upon the anxiety of Great Britain, and France to prevent the spread of active hostilities beyond the Spanish borders, with all the fearfulness that a European war under modern conditions must almost necessarily involve. In this respect he has, "of course, had steady support from Herr Hitler. With Signor Mussolini, as with Herr Hitler, the idea has all along been to intimate his own complete preparedness for any eventuality, an instance of this being his present trans- " ference of further troops to- Libya, thus " threatening Egypt and, through Egypt, Great Britain. To his disclaimer of any such intention no weight need be given, for .his actions speak very much more convincmgly than can any words from such a flagrant violator of treaties and pledges. There is also no doubt in Signor Mussolini's mind some thought of belittling Great Britain as much as possible and showing up how futile is any pacific policy she may follow unless he shouid fall in with it. This probably is his egotistic idea of getting even with Mr Eden, the British Foreign Minister, who failed to treat liirn with all the humbie deference he imagines to be due to his exalted position. Yet all this may not, in his tortuous way of looking at international relations, be regarded as being inconsistent with an ultimate desire to cultivate British friendship, though it can scarcely^ appeal to British notions on the point. ' In any event, the situation is ' . manifestly and unhappily one of extreme delicacy and difficulty» especially as France seems determined to bring matters, to a head. Shouid she, as is suggested, throw the Pyrenees frontier open for an influx into Spain of French sympathisers with the Spanish Government, it is very hard to /guess what the outcome may be.