THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Volume 81, Issue 14, 9 October 1937, Page 4

THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS

It Gomes a*s no great surprise to find Signor Mussolini insisting that he cannot be represented at the proposed confeience on Spanish affairs unless an invitation is extended to Germany also. This, of course, is intended to provide further evidence of the coraplete solidarity of the Italo-German entente. • As has, however, previously been said, there cannot but be seriou's doubts about the real cordiality of the Mussolini-Hitler association, and this point of view is interestingly discussed by a writer in an English Review under the pen-name of "Augur," who lays special stress on the fact that U Du.ee has always adroitly avoided any commitment to the railitary alli?ance which Der Fuhrer has been sedulously seeking. Surveying events immediately preceding- and following on the German reoccupation of the Rhine zone demilitarised under the Treaty of Versailles, he points out that Herr Hitler ventured on this step when the League of Nations, with Great Britain and France in the lead, was already deeply iavolved in the atte'mpt to check Signor Mussolini' s designs on Abyssinia. Indeed, it is suggested that Hitler' s movement in tbus. ignoring the Versailles Treaty was inspifed by the boldnes's of Mussolini' s adventure into Abyssinia. Augur is of the opinion that had France, with Great Britain at her back, made any real. show of resisting the German advance^ on the Rhine^ then Hitler would probably have desisted, for his military advisers were by no means enamoured of his project.. However, the Freneh Government of the day was singularly weak and had also serious domestic troubles with which to contend. In the result the Hitler bluff came off triumphantly,, neither France nor Britain made any opposing move and the zone was re-occupied by Germany' s armed forces.. Hitler was naturally greatly elated and strongly conhrmed in the belief that his day had come. It was then that the bargaining between Germany and Italy for mutual support really began in earnest. Italy, as a signatory to the Locarno Pact, was nominally bound by it to join with France and Great Britain in opposing Germany' s violation of it. Under the circumstances, however, there was little chance of that obligation being fulfilled, but Germany made doubly sure of this by indicating to Italy that any moVe in that direction on. her part W'juld mean that Germany woutd cdt off the supplies of steeL and other war materials essential to the conduct of the Abyssinian campaign. Then, it is said that when that undertaking had come to a vi'ctorious end Mussolini would have been only too glad to have revived Italy'* association with Great Britain and France. But the feeling that had been aroused was altogether too tense for this, while by this time the problem of Anglo-Italian relations in the Mediterranean had assumed a very grave aspect. This left Mussolini with virtually no recourse but to foster a still closer understanding with Germany, and to this end he has since devoted himself. In the meantime, however, Great Britain' S rearmameiit and the strengthening of France' s military power have given Hitler reason for some doubt as to the sureness of his own position and made Italian friendship all the more essential to him. Thus Germany and Italy have for the time been. virtually forced into one another's arms. Still, it is held that either, and especially Mussolini, would greatly plrefer to establish friendly relations with Great 'Britain, and that with this purposd in view either would be quite ready to- sacrifi.ce the other did any favourable prospect offer. It' is with Mussolini that Augur chiefly concerns himself, because in his case there is no antipathy to France to be overcome. "The Rome-Berlin axis," he writes, "has its uses in Mussolini' s eyes. In the diplomatic game, as in any other, you - have to concede tricks to your opponent, but he consistently

refuses to become the slave ot Utermany . . . ine nnai oecision, will. depend on the attitude which Great Britain and France adopt towards him, for undoubtedly the thing the Duce desires most is a good agreement with the Anglo-French entente."' Meanwhile, however, his diplomacy dictates the maintenance of a show of friendship with Hitler until he secures recognition of his annexation of Abyssinia, which perhaps will not be made any the more easy if there is any truth in the recent reports of risings in that country against Italian rule.