STORY BEHIND ABYSSINIAN WAR

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Volume 81, Issue 8, 2 October 1937, Page 15

STORY BEHIND ABYSSINIAN WAR

Signor Mussolim and Marshal de Bono Knew in 1933 That m October, 1935, Their Operations in East Africa Would Commence, Despite Their Geneva Protestations. i

j 1 AN ITALIAN iias blown tbe gaff. Marshal J Emilio de Bono, tbe Italian Commanderj in-Cbief in Abyssmia in the first part of tbe war i of conquest, bas written a book tbat will sbock ! tbe world, writes C. A. Lyon ig Tbe Sunday Express. It is tbe frankest tbing tbat has como out of ltaly since tbe Pascist regime began. How t de Bono ever dared to write it is haj*d to ima- !. gine. He tells the world: , How Mussolini and be planned the Abyssi- , aian invasion in 1933, montbs and months before « tbe alleged "aggressions"' of tbe Abyssinians. » How tbey developed tbe plan in secrecy s taking cai'e. tbat tbe public should. know nothing of it. How tbey used wbolesale bribery to dieintegrate Abyssinia witb one band and played injured innocence at Geneva witb tbe other. • _ How they fixed the exact date of tbe ixivai sion nearly a year abead, resolutely prepared for it, and never deviaced from it. , — And a sheaf of ociier biazmg indiscretious. If tbe ftalians ever had a *;ase in Abyssinia de Bono's book has kiUed it dtono-dead. Mussulini hnnself writes tbe proface. He fiaunte bis dupiiuity in tbe eyes of the world, i Seldom ean such barefaced admissions liave been made witb tbe approval of tbe bead of a State. Bead de Bono'g own words; "Tbo Duce was defiuitely ot' tbe opinion that the niatter would bave to be settled not * i later tban 193G. It was tbo autumn of 1933. i The Duce had spoken to no oue of tbe coming ( operations in East Africa. Only he and I know . wbat was goiug to happeu, apd no indiscretion ocourred by wbick tbe news would rcacb tbo publie (Note, — Tbe Wai Wai incident, pretext of , tbe war, was not until Novomber, J934!) "I put the following considcrations to tbe Duce:— 'The politieal conditions in Abyssinia are deplorablej it should not be a very difficult

task to effect.the disintegration of tbe Einpire if we work at it well on politieal lines.' "Tbe Duce tbought as I did, and ordered me to go full speed ahead. I must be ready as soon as possible- " 'Money will be needed, cbief; lots of money ' " 'There will be no lack of money,' said Mussolini." Mussolini 'e secret plan was kept a dead secret, Tbe public must not know; tbey inigbt

not like it. Even tbe general staff must not know at first. Tbe plan to seize tbe Abyssinian Empire was a secret between Mussolini and de Bono. Preparations were aceelerated at tbe begiuning of 1934, still jnonths before ever tbe world had beard of tbe Italo-Abyssinian question. A few more Fascist notables wero brougbt into tbe secret. But only witb tbe utmost preeautions to prevent tbe news' of tbe premeditatert conquest leaking out. No letters were allowed— tbat migbt have been dangerous. Mussolini himself kept minutes of all decisions taken and all the people brought into tbe secret simply signed tbe minutes one after anotber. Tbus there could be no leakage — or, if tbere were, tbe signatories could bave no possible alibi. NEXT STEP: — ■ On tbe 20th December. 1934, tbe bead af tbe Government personally compiled tbe "directions and pjan of aetion for tbe solution of the Italo-Abyssinian question." This document was very secret and issued only in five copies. Mussolini knew tbe Emperor would never attaek them, so be determined on aggression. We have it in Mussolini' s own handwriting. "... tbe Negus, be says, does not wish to take tbe initiative of tbe encounter." Mussolini wrote to de Bono on March 8^ 1935:— "It is my profound conviction tbat we being obliged to take tbe initiative at tbe cnd of October or September, we ought to bave a combined force of 300,000, plus 300 to 500 airplanes and 300 rapid cars. "Even in view of possible international controversies (League of Nation, etc.) it is as well to hasten our tempo." Tbese damning documents ^make everytbiug tbe Italians said at Geneva eyewash, Tbey are revelations indeed. Tbe conspirators having laid tbeir plans, de Bono slunk out of ltaly, bis martial clouk wrapped round bim, on January 7. 1935. Eew people knew be bad left Lorne. He describes frankly bis twin tasks — to prepare the Italian aitack and to break tbe ground for it by a wholesale campaign of bribery. He bad to bave all ready by October. Always tbe date was October. It was, as da Bono says, "irrevocable." We know bow tbe deiegates to Geneva caine and went, bow tbe committees wrangled an-.l procrastinated, and all tbe timo bebind tbe scenes, de Bono now tells us, tbe Duce knew exaetly wben be was going to smite tbe Euiperor. Meanwbile Ihe Empire was boueycombad witb spies. Chiefs were oue and all tampered witb. S'iUled agents worked on morcenary suvages for montbs preceding tbe war. AU tbe itching pulma in Abyssinia were m be greosed witb gold from the Eternal City. Mucb was needed. and mucb came. "Tbe Politieal Bureau and tbe Intelligence Service were not stinted financially," says do Bono, Tbev installed a famous explorer wbo "set to work with alacrity and success" on tbe border tribes. Of one agent de Bono says: — "Witb bis profound knowledge Qf meu, of politieal atmosphere, and of feints and subterfuges. be was able to build up a spepial network of reliable informers." Of anotber, wbo was ostensibJy a faetory owuer: — "He professed to be looking after Jiis own

interests, and on the pretext tbat be was there (near tbe frontier) on business bo received persons from beyond tbe frontier and sent bis own emissaries across." Preparatory work was done in all parts of Abytisinia. De Bono does not tell how much was spent in bribery and secret agents, He dpea tell Ihe resuits. "Tbe important tbing to understand is tbis: Tbat from tbe very outset of the campaign tnera

were no signs of the result of tbis disintegrating politieal aetion and tbat it deprived our enomv of at least 200,000 men," Along. witb tbe bribery went the inibtary preparations. Tbe roads were eecretiy reinforced. Hangars were construeted for the airplanes Daring fligbts were made over Abyssinia to make maps. Barracks wero put up. All tbrougb ihe book as tbe preparations go on, and as Geneva footles on, we can road Mussolini 's ruthless message to de Bonp:— On July 26 the Dilce wrote? "Tbe attack ougbt to be cruahing from tbo very first blows. You have only 120 davs in whicb to get ready." Two montbs before tbe start Mussolini toi#, grapbed: — "Conference came to no eonelusion; Geneva will do tbe same. Make au end." Tben came an instruction lo tbe Italian Navy relating to "international complications, " so secrpt tbat de Bono was only told of it by Vv'ord of Uioutb. Iu a liigbly CQpiidentiaJ note to de Bono, Mussolini told bim tbat if Britain ileclared war on ltaly tbey would stop tbe Abyssinia oifonsive and confine tbemselvea to defend* ing Entrea. Tben tbe end of September. Now they were waiting for tbe Duce to press tbe button. On September 29 Mussolini telegrapbed: "I order yoa to begin advance on tbe 3rd." So, in the first davs of October, ;just as Mussolini had always intended, tbe Italians poured over the border. After all the secret preparations, Mussolini dared to raise as bis war-crv^ "We have been patient with Abyssinia for forty years, Now gnqqgh." Wbat a rev ealing picture it is of Dictatorsbip in aetion! Tbe rost we know.