Military Alliance

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Issue 202, 11 September 1937, Page 15

Military Alliance

' ' Senex. > ')

ITALY AND GERMANY Signor Mussolini's Ultimate Goal BRITAIN'S POSITION

.(By

Por the first tlme, Signor Mussolini is to pay a visit to his fellowdictator in Beirlin, and the trimnphal entry which will mark his stay at the German capital will have more than ordinary significance. Por this time Marshal Badoglio, the conq.ueror of Ethiopia, will accompany the Founder of the Empire, and the conversatlons will end with a military alliance hetween the two nations. Swift strokes of diplomaey have carried matters to the stt.'a wtiere the German and Italian Generui staffs are to meet. For only a month ago all tho' European discttssion was of the new amity which was manifest between Italy and Britain — how Britain, under the guidance of a new and realistic Prime Minister, ha.d shown her wiilingness to bury the past, how Mr Anthony Eden, while warning Italy that Britain would fight to dofend her interests in the Mediterranean, had declared tbat Ethiopia was a dead letter, that "in light of reports which had reached him" he would emphasise that Britain was not seeking revenge- — that the word "vendetta" had no English equivalent — how, also the Italians had suddenly ceased their anti-British Press campaign> had removed the ban on British newspapers, had stopped* the anti-British broadcasts in Arabic from the Bari station durinrr the currency of

tho Palestine settlement. Theie had been an ox-change of notes, and it was confidently anticipated that there would be an exchange of visits, too, with Mr Eden probably going to Italy to seo II Duce, who has now becomo the "Founder of the Empire." At tho meetings of tho Non-Interven-tion Committee in London, Count Dino Grandi, the Italian Ambassador, ceased arriving with Herr von Ribbentrop and became positively polite to the British chairman, thua arousing the suspicions of France and Russia. And now, instead of being brought back into relationship with London, Mussolini is going to Berlin. Moreover, the indications are that he is going to concludo the military pact for which the Germans have been augling for over a year and which ho has always evaded. It is a sudden change. "What has brought it about? Oouuter Interests. First it must be realised that Siguor Mussoliui has been using his link with Berlin purely to strengthen his position in Europo and not because he liketi this alignment. The weakness of Germany as an ally is that her interests and those of Italy run counter all through Central Europe. The forming of a working agreeiuent with Germany has already weakened the Austrian tie with Italy and set her courting Czechoslovakia, which is Germany 's No. .1 foe. Only by coneentrating on the

Mediterranean has Mussolini been able to inake the German entente a workablo understanding, and the eonstant j assertion of his xight of command of \ that sea has not endeared him either j to the British or to those other ancient enemies of Italy, the Yugoslavs Greeks and Turlts. The ultimate goal towards which the Italian leader has always yeurned is n renewed Four-Power Pact, embracing I Italy, France, Britain and Germany — virtually the same thing that the British mean when they talk of a Western Locarno. Anything else is an expedient. But dictators can be driven to acccpt expedients. The pressure of the Spanish war, the attacks on the Italians in the British Press after the Guadalajara fiasco helped towaras ucceptance of the German overtures. But more significant still has been the clever campaign waged by Germany herself, cagerly seeking an ally in the ranks of first-class Powers, even one she has every reason to know as a nation which will unhesitatingly consult her own interests bcfore sho fulfils any bond. For some time the British Government has realised that Germany was trying to isolate Italy from. British influence. This has been done in subtle ways; in the Spanish war, for instance, the Germans have been conveying the impression that they would gladly he quit of the whole business, but that they are being held to their obligations to tho Italians It was not, however, that Berlin was trying to prevent Italy and Britain from coming together; it was for quite another reason. Germany was prepared to see an understanding reached botween the two Powers as a useful guaranteo of peace, but Germany was equally detennined that any understanding would be subsidiary to and removed in point of time from tho ltalo-Gennan agreement. In other word'S. Germany was acLing to preserve the clairns of Berlin to be the diplomatic centre of Europo. This was necessary becauso of the fact that today the Nazi regime, 1'ace.d with a hard winter in which the crop failure will ieave an already short food supply still more sliort, needed some sort of triumph with which to hearten tho people. It was no longer possible to make that .triumph an internal matter; all those resourpes were exhausted. And u'se of violence for an external triumph is not possible. What remains is the comparatively barren satisfaction of a diplomatie victory. But suppose that victory took the form of pledging a front-rank Power to be Germany 's ally at a timo when she badly needs allies. That would be sometliing of a different stamp. France and Russia. So the Germans have inovo'l i'ast; faster than the Bi'itish Foreign Oilice which has already been negotiating for inonths :tnd has built up a patient strncture which may Jcad to results [i£t«r on. The ausjpicious Powers at this (

I juncture were Russia 'and France — j France because of her inherent drstrust of anything that coines from the liliine, Russia because reeent events have caused her to be considered as a dubious value as an ally and led even the French to look on her with a cold eye.. Thus the recent Russian Note to Italy about the sinking of Soviet ships _ may have been nothing more than an irnpudent blow struck at a moment when the author had gone into temporary eclipse nd designed^ like the German flourishes in Morocco before the World War, to act as a reminder to Europe that there is another large nation to be considered when peace is in the making, Germany is thus determined that the Italians shall not get over to the AngloFrench canip without a thorough pi'ior understanding as to possible lines of action in the future. And that understanding suits Mussolini also. Knowing just what he counts upon from Germany enables him to have a very strong eard in his hand when negotiating with the other Powers of the Stresa front. So, it appears, he is going to London by way of Berlin, taking his military and naval advisers with him and intending to come away with the maxinium of knowledge and the best of pledges. But he is much too able a man to allow himself to be led into the agreement which the Germans are preparmg for him without some reservations. So it appears that whatever understanding is reached in Berlin will be merely tentative, will not come up to the German hopes and will depcnd for its future on the tact and complaisance and the willingness to make. concessions which the British and the French display towards Italy in the near future.