THE SPANISH IMBROGLIO.

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Issue 115, 1 June 1937, Page 6

THE SPANISH IMBROGLIO.

It looks very much us if, quite unexpectedly, Mr Neville Chamberlain were to be faced at the very out^et of his premiership with a. neAvly created international situation of considerable gravity. The "incidents" re^orted yeaterday and to-day .as having oecurred off the Mediterranean coast of Spain certainly bear a very ugly aspect. To understand the position aright it may be necessary again to explain how the naval patrols of the Spanish coasts were aljotted by the Nonintervention Committee. The object, of course, was to prevent either troops or war materiail from foreign countries being landed for the support of either side in the civil war. As matters stapd at present in that w.ar it may be said that, with the exception of the narrow strip of Basque country, of which Bilbuo and jOviedo nre the main eentres, the whole of the Spanish territory facing the Atlantic is in the hands of the insurgents. So also is the southern coast from the Portuguese frontier round tlirough the Straits of Gibraltar to a point on the Mediterranean a few miles west of Almeria. All the rest of the Mediterranean coast is still held by the loyalists, whose political headquarters are now at Valeiicia. The general scheme of thc naval non-intervention patrol would seem to have been as follows. To France and Russia, sympathetic with the loyalists, and to Great Britain, holding herself entirely neutral, the oversight of the Atlantic coast was committed; to Great Bri^in alone that over the southern coast to a point eastward of Almeria, and to Germany and Italv, openly favouring the rebel cause, that over the whole eastern coast from that point. The cable fu^thermore tells us that the Balearic Islands, also in the hands of the insurgents, were placed under French control. Thus, so far as concerns France and Russia, on the one hand, and Germany and Italy, on the other, each was assigned coast-lines that were in the hands of the Spanish faction to which it was opposed. The t,rouble that has now arisen has had its origin in incidents occurring at Iviza — or, according to the Spanish spelling, Ibiza — the westernmost of the Balearic group. The real truth as to whether the German warship or the loyalist Spanish aeroplanes were responsible for the first offensive act has yet to . be elicited, and unfortunately credeuce can be given to the story of neither side. However, that is, for the moment, a point of no very great importance, for Germany has awaited no investigation on it, but has, ' 'by way of reprisal" as she puts it bombarded a Spanish pori which, if our maps are correct, lies within the zone of British supervision. Following on this both Germany and Italy — an Italian warship was also implicated — have given notice of withdrawal from the Non-intervention Committee until satisfaction— whatever that may mean — is given. This presumably implies that in the meantime they wB hold themselves free to pursue whatever course would seem best to suit their purpose. What calls for present consideration is as to whether what has happened is the outcome of hasty and ill-advised action on the part of the Spanish loyalists, or whether it is attributable to some well set ai\d concerted plan on the part of Germany and Italy to bring about just such a critical and delicate sitpation as has arisen. The messages so far received to-day do not yield much to guide us to a conclusion, but past experiences cannot but prompt very uneasy suspicions of both Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini. In any event, it would seem as if there is at least a possibility that the very measures taken for confining hostilities to Spain might afford a soughtfor excuse and occasion for spreading them. [Since the foregoing was in type a message has arrived saying that Germany is content with the "satisfaction" she has taken. This, if reliable, eases the position, though we have yet to hear what other Powers have to say to it.] \