THE PROBLEM OF BELGIUM.

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Issue 47, 11 March 1937, Page 4

THE PROBLEM OF BELGIUM.

The movement in Beigiiwn to cut adrift. from the close defensive association that Ras hithertp existed with Great Britain end France is neceasarily causing some little disquiet t in the minds of both British and French statesmen, This is very naturally intensified by the increasing aggressiveness of the Rexist — ianother n^me for Faseist or Nazi — faction in Belgium's internal political sphere, The growing strength of tbis faction, under the leadership of M. Degrelle, is oceasioning a good deal of anxiety to the moderate Government of which M. van Zeeland, a comparatively recent and very able reeruit to Europeaa politics, is the head. So far as Belgium's internal affairs are concerned, M. van Zeeland set out his views a few months back when he emphasised the dahiger of forming extremist groups with their tendency towajrds one form or other of totalitarjan governinent. His cywn Government, he said, representing a large majority of .the people, was determined to oppose such groups, to keep away from anything in the shape of a dictatorship eitber of tiie Right or the Left and to govern in the face of facts. So far as concerned the possibility of war he was not himself ,very greatly perturbed, but at the same time recog^lised the need for Belgium being stronger and more independent than she had been. To understand the present situation we havc to go back to the Locarno Treaty of 1926 to which Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Belgium were parties. Under this, broadly speaking, each signatory undertook to come to the assistance of any of the others who might be the victim of unprovoked a^gression by yet another. This treaty was virtually destroyed when early last year Herr Hifcler, in direct viol&tion of one of its specific provisions, marched his troops , into the Rhine "zone" which Germany had undertaken would be permanently demilitarised. This disruption oecurred while the League of Nations was still engaged in its futile attebipt, by means of "economic sanetions," to bring Signor Mussolini to book over his invasion of Abyssinia. Italy was thus in effect for the time being outside the pale, and it was left to Britain, France and Belgium to patch up some sort of defensive agreement among themselves. This was done and much eloser military arrangements were made among the three Po ./ers, ujid more particularly between France and Belgium. Since then, however, Great Britain has been endeavouring, but with very little success to bring both Germany and Italy back into the Locarno fold. Now these efforts are being further frustrated by a new attitude .assumed by Belgium under which she would appear to seek the revival of her pre-war position of guaranteed neutrality. Germany, while standing aloof from any combined guarantee, has expressed herself as ready to reaffirm Belgium's neutrality, but in view of what occurred in 1914, when Germany was similarly pledged, Belgium requires something a good deal more than this if she is to feel at all secure. So she asks her neutrality to be again guaranteed by Great Britain and France, at the same time, however, proposing to strengthen her own defenees. This means, of course, that she suggests transforming herself from an active ally into a practically passive protegee, which is quite another thing, As Germany is the only Power with acquisitive desagns on Belgium, this would in effect mean setting Great Britain and France in a virtual alliance against Germany. This is a position which the former is determined to avoid, her aim being to establisb some system of ' 'collective security" into which no suggestion of predestined partizanship would enter.