Tanks and Planes in Spain

Hawke's Bay Herald-Tribune, Issue 44, 8 March 1937, Page 13

Tanks and Planes in Spain

Limited Success of Modern Mechanical Arms »

PAIN'S civil war, up to the moment when Franco ' renewed his attack upon Madrid and gained much ground, could be divided clearly into two periods (writes Pembroke Stephens, the Daily Telegraph special correspondent in Spain). From a study of the conflict in its two aspects some useful military lessons can be drawn in answer to the question other Powers may well ask themselves: Of what use in actual warfare are the latest mechanical aids, the aircraft and the tanks? The first period of the war, between July and November, was essentiajly a struggle between sections of the Spanish people; the second, in November and December, assunted a character much more international and presenting quite other features. The first period brought few surprises in matters of military novelties. The series of battles fought out, both in the north and in the south of Spain, were monotonous in that much the same result was obtained in all. In almost every battle in the South where the country is flat the Government constructed excellent trenches, usually on both sides of a main road. But these trenches did not extend indefinitely on the flanks, with the result that Moors and legionaries merely walked round them and positions had to be abandoned almost without a shot. In the North where the mountainous character of the country rendered outflanking movements impossible artillery invariably succeeded in making the Government militia abandon even the most •formidable defensive positions. Superior military organisation, leadership and knowledge, accounted— with one other consideration — for the Nationalists' success In the first period of the civil war. The second reason was their , superio? moral. In his headlong advance on Madrid after the fall of Toledo General Varela was cut off by the Reds; but he stormed on, took Getafe, and the Reds behind him, frightened at his success in the van, made no effort to attack him in the rear. Colonel Yague, earlier in the war, marched direct on Talavera from Badajoz, without protecting his flanks or rear, cutting his way forward. as a knife cuts into butter. An experienced opponent would have had no difflculty in surrounding and exterminating his flying column. But the impetus of the advance paralysed the Reds. Colonel Boerlegui at Oyarzun in the North proved that a few resolute men with courage, even If untrained, are worth -hundreds without courage. He seized the key position of Oyarzun with a handful of Carlists and bluffed the Government that he had an army at his back. Organisation and courage worked miracles for the Nationalists until organisation and courage came to the other side. And this brings us to the second period of the civil war, which began when General Varela's columns were halted at the Manzanares before Madrid. To-day there is nothing lacking in the modern armament of either side. In an article from Saragossa in the first weeks of the war I expressed the view that the military importance and effect of aviation has been very much exaggerated. Subsequent observation, during close on six months of war, has not changed my view. Of course, it Is a terrible experience for

civilians to have their homes destroyed by aircraft, but what is the military effect? Again and again aeroplanes have attempted to bomb bridges or destroy roads with bombs. Invariably they fail. The bombs fall, harmlessly, a few yards away from the objective, in a field. Not once have I seen an air raid combined with an infantry attack. The planes pass, drop their loads on eiiemy trenches and vanish. A few minutes later it is as if there had been no air raid. Feverishly the dislodged sandbags are built up, the shattered machine-guns are replaced by others. Confidently the defenders await the attack — which does not come. An air raid can only last a few minutes. Then it ls over. Artillery bombardment can contiriue steadily for days. Planes can be seen approaching; there is time to take shelter; there is even time to move one's position when the bomb is aetually in the air,, falling. One can see the bomb leave the plane; several seconds elapse while it is falling. One can judge its probable landing place and avoid it. I have done so. In a city the danger is greater on account of collapsing masonry. Those who take shelter in underground refuges or even lie prone in the street escape. There is plenty of warning when planes approach. Nationalist aviation has, of course, been very conspicuous in the siege of Madrid. A large number of houses have been destroyed and civilians killed. But the military effect on military objectives is not yet evident. During the first weeks of the siege the Red garrison possessed very fast bombers, but their very speed' was a handicap in aiming bombs, which fell hundreds of yards away from their objectives. The new Russian bombing planes are more leisurely and more effective. The practice of Red scouts is to co-operate with the artillery, spotting enemy concentratlons for the artillery to disperse. Anti-aircraft batteries do not appear to have been so effective as was expected. Writers on future European wars forecast that a third of an attaeking air force would be destroyed by existing anti-aircraft defences. Nothing like this percentage of casualtles ls apparent in the civil war. The anti-aircraft batteries are not numerous and not as "continuous" as they should be. Those in Spain are overworked; they are moved from place to place; the delicate apparatus is upset by bumping over rough roads. Neverth'eless planes are brought down if only in one's and two's. The gunners' error is to aim at instead of far in front of the attaeking plane with the result that shells usually explode behind the enemy. Bombers in Spain are heavily armed, the latest types carrying four machineguns. When numerous— 30 or more together — such bombers need no protection from fast-flying scouts; they go into action surrounding themselves with an impenetrable wall of fire. Bad weather conditions stop flying. Muddy ground has been found to stop another new war engine — the tank. The tank, in fact, has not lived up to expectation. The Nationalists use two kinds— one fast, low, and small, carrying a crew of two and armed with a light doubleaction machine-gun, the second of medium size, not so " fast, armed with heavier machine-guns and also carrying a crew of two, driver and gunner. The small tank travels at 30 miles an hour on roads and 20 across country. It has six wheels working within a caterpillar

belt. It is so low as to be exceedingly uncomfortable for the crew. Its speed makes it almost invulnerable to shell-fire, but the Reds have discovered a very simple method of thwarting its approach. They dig a steep-sided shallow trench only a few inches deep and just so wide that the small tank, once having entered it, cannot grip sufficiently to climb.out on the other side; once immobilised, the tank and its crew are doomed. The small tank is useful for reconnaisance: it is faster and more useful than cavalry. But for front-line attacks the medium-size is more effective. Armourplating underneath both types of tank is not always strong enough to withstand the explosion of a hand grenade crushed in passing. The driver cannot always see or avoid the grenades strewn in his path, with the result that sooner or later the thin plates beneath the tank are blown in and the crew are killed. Once immobilised a tank is blown to pieces with artillery. The Reds use a much larger type of tank that carries a light artillery piece and a small machine-gun. The light gun is automatic and quick-flring. Its loud report as it is advancing is disconcerting to the opponent. There is a crew of four; the tank is amphibious — can cross rivers even if totally submerged — and is surprisingly fast for its size. Some of the Red tanks are fltted with flame throwers which shrivel. everything which the flames touch, but the designers made an extraordinary error In fitting rubber in the mechanism which propels the tank; the effect of fire on the rubber swiftly immobilises the tank. Both the Moors and the Carlist volunteers have developed a special technique in the destruction of tanks by setting fire to them. Drenched with petrol, the tanks will blaze till the interior is a burning furnace, and the crew must either stay in and die or come out and be killed. I have seen many captured tanks. One or two have been pierced by the shells of anti-tank guns — curiously-shaped, insectlike contrivances with a thin muzzle from which the little pointed shells are flred. One had been pierced by ordinary rifle bullets; the majority had been set on fire. Obviously these tanks had been misused. Their object is to cover the advance or lead the advance of attaeking infantry, but the infantry had wavered and, blind to what was happening behind and on each side of them, the tanks had gone on alone to their doom. The very high mortality of tanks in the Madrid battles — six tanks put out of action when seven attack is not exceptional — and the dreadful plight of their crews has led to pathetic attempts on the part of waverers in the tank corps to avoid going into action. Petrol is emptied out,wilful damage is .done to the machinery, break-downs are staged on the way to the front — anything to ? escape that sudden horror, the tank on fire. In the war in the air the offensive weapon of the bomber with or without supporting scouts has so far defeated the defensive weapon of the anti-aircraft battery and defending scouts; on land defensive weapons have again triumphed over offensive, as in the Great War. When forces are equal, when the moral on both sides is high, when both sides have artillery and competent military leadership the result perhaps will be determined after all by the old qualities of valour which develop in the stalemate of trench warfare. ■ » " '