The Grey River Argus MONDAY OCTOBER 4, 1948. WILL ATOM END WAR—OR CIVILISATION?

Grey River Argus, 4 October 1948, Page 4

The Grey River Argus MONDAY OCTOBER 4, 1948. WILL ATOM END WAR—OR CIVILISATION?

W AR rather than peace would appear to hold the floor as the topic of discussion for the United Nations. The usual wrangle'over the agenda featured the question of whether limitation of armaments in general should take precedence of that of the atomic bomb, the latter being placed first, contrary to the proposal of the Soviet bloc, and even then there arose the issue of abolition versus inspection. A sidelight is the American official estimate that the Russians, during

the present generation, are sure to have the atomic weapon, the United States General Staffs having formulated a defence plan for a period of half a century, which anticipates ocean hopping atomic missiles that might wipe out American cities. It is a prospect certainly calculated to put a premium on immediate efforts to banish .such a possibility. Russia s Stand is that all actual atomic bombs should be handed over instantly to an international controlling body, and that there.be agreement to produce no more of them. It may appear a radical solution,,but it is not. The Western Powers argue that the first step is to deal not only with the actual, but also the potential, and that is logically far more radical. It might be presumed that the Americans have a big start, or a considerable “stockpile”. The Russians are entitled to emphasise that so far atom bombs have been used by one power alone, and that whether other Powers would follow that example is a question yet to be answered. Moreover, the collaborators in its use were the British. It has indeed, transpired that during the war the Russians secured for themselves very important information on the making of these weapons. Perhaps other Powers would have

been prone to do likewise were the secrets not in their "possession. Hence the importance not only of any actual bombs, but of potentally more destructive ones, and of such data and facilities there now may be possessed by various Powers to turn out even oceanhopping ones. Defence secrets hitherto have been kept secret. It is only the unpredictable destructiveness of the latest products of science which gives an impulse wards the exploding of atomic secrets in the interest of humaneness, and in fact, the preservation of civilisation. If the Powers went the length of exposing all their atomic secrets and of guaranteeing to prevent or to oppose their use for war purposes, it would be a very long stride towards general disarmament. It could then be said that science, which has done so much to invent means of taking life, would by accident have brought about a

convention for protection of life. Yet behind the possession of a capacity for using atomic energy to kill indiscriminately—not to mention the other new forms of mass killing anticipated by the United States General Staffs in their plan—there is the matter of the mind of the possessor. To surrender bomb stocks would not do away with the capacity to replace them. The only evidence of an intention not to resort to atonic warfare would be the absence of any facilities or preparations for fashioning* the means for such warfare. It is that consideration which prompts the attitude of the great majority of the United Nations in proposing that the first step should be an inspection in every country where there might be means of putting atomic energy to military use. Possibly the calculation is that the Soviet might not wish to have its progress in the matter macle known, whereas the capacity of the United States, as well as its stocks, are already known -world wide to be a solid fact. The Soviet has in the latest debate varied its attitude, with a proposal that the outlawing and handing over of actual atom bombs be accompanied by a simultaneous inspection. This proposal is worthy of due consideration, despite the expressed suspcion of the Western Powers that a Russian undertaking to cooperate fully in the thing general-

ly could not, in the light of experience, be taken at face value. The proposal to begin with inspection is protective on the part of those in possession of the weapon, and leaves others with no alternative except to take it at face value. It is really a question of whether or not all concerned are determined to avert the possibility of a repetition of the exploits at Hiroshima and to submit to inspection would be Nagasaki. On the other hand, to submit to inspection would be no more onerous than to turn in a supply of bombs and do away with the , manufacturing apparatus. The issue is ultimately a moral rather than a material one. Its essence is the knowledge possessed by men, not uranium or mechanism. It is reasonable to judge the matter on the basis of moral principle, and in so doing to be guided by the conduct and philosophy of those concerned. An inspection is certainly a step in testing good faith, as all must submit, the “haves” as well as the “have nots”. It may not be too much to hope that as inspection, in the matter of mere time, might be on a par with abolition, the further step of giving it priority may be taken—and the U.S. 50 year plan modified accordingly. ' The fly in the ointment, however, will remain—the potentiality, not only of the atom, but also of those exploiting the atom.