“PORTENTS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE”

Grey River Argus, 2 September 1948, Page 8

“PORTENTS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE”

LONDON, August 25. A diplomatic correspondent writes: II- is still too early- to decide how the present Yugoslav-Russian dispute will end. The Russians have evidently under-estimated the force of Marshal Tito’s personality, and his ability to stamp on disaffected elements by the employment of just those methods that the men of the Kremlin employ with marked effect in their own country. . They have also under-estimated or perhaps ignored the force of economic laws. They rejected co-operation in European recovery under the Marshall Plan and insisted that such cooperation should likewise be rejected in all the countries they control. Russia was going to be the fountain of commercial prosperity in place 01 the United States of America. But it is becoming clear that she cannot fulfil these obligations. Austerity is showing its face increasingly in the satellite countries and not least in Tito’s Yugoslavia. . Russia has consistently professed to regard the dispute in Yugoslavia as solely a Cominform dispute, rhe facade of unity between the Kremlin and the actual Governments of th esatellite countries must be preserved. This policy worked admirably at the recent Danube Conference where, though mutual, coolness was noticeable, the Russian and Yugoslav, delegates showed a common front with their partners. Yugoslavia’s . position as a riparian. power associated with the other riparian powers doubtless played an essential part in that country’s solid support of Mr Vyshinsky. . In other words the Comihform is supposed to be something quite distinct from a government. On the surface no doubt it is. But one recalls how the position of the Commform's predecessor, the Comintern, was similarly expounded. On many occasions when the Comintern policy irritated foreign nations Russia would endeavour to blunt criticism by dissociating herself, as a Government, from the actions of her nongovernmental organisation. This assumption of neutrality no longer holds water. Moscow brought the Cominform into being for the express purpose of consolidating the Communist front, on modern Russian lines, in all countries within its orbit. That a Cominform quarrel must be or must become a quarrel between states therefore becomes obvious to the least suspicious observer. ’ In the case of the Yugoslav dispute this is underlined by two recent pointers. The first was the clandestine introduction into Yugoslavia of pamphlets, published by the Moscow Pravda Press in Serb, containing correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders. Pravda’s position being what it is, this could only have been done under the official direction of the Soviet Government. This action, like the original Cominform appeal to “loyal” Communists to overthrow their leaders, is with no shadow of pretence aimed at the subversion of Tito’s personal authority. It is grave “intervention in another country’s internal affairs” —a charge which has so often been levelled at the western Governments in their dealings with eastern European countries. The second pointer is the bloc Cominform decision, reported in several British newspapers last week, to apply economic sanctions against Yugoslavia by ceasing to trade with her. Albania had already taken steps on these lines more than seven weeks ago and Czechoslovakia and Roumania have since followed suit in a certain measure. Such concerted action can only have been taken on orders from Moscow where, it will be remembered, it was announced in April that Russia would not negotiate the anticipated 1948 trade agreement with Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito’s revolt is not a revolt against Communism; no one has been a more staunch adherent. It is a revolt against the Cominform, or international, brand of Communism. It is the first upsurge of national sentiment against dictation from without.

With the dramatic shooting of General Yovanovich by ,a frontier guard the situation took rm even more ironical twist. To Tito the Kremlin is an all-demanding dictator. To General Yovanovich it was Marshal Tito who was the oppressor. It is not Communism Marshal Tito dislikes; but the Kremlin’s brand of Communism. It is probable that General Yovanovich, a Montenegrin of passionate revolutionary sentiment, disliked Tito’s brand of Communism more than the Kremlin’s. As the complexities of the situation increase and widen, a foreign observer may be forgiven for pondering on certain sentiments recently expressed. The official Cominform bulletin in Belgrade for instance has stormed against the “swindling machinations of the Yugoslav Communist Party.” The Yugoslav Communist Party newspaper had stormed against 'the “Hungarian secret police” for exercising “unthinkable pressure and terror” against the congress of the south Slav minority in Hungary. From whichever quarter these sentiments come they have an oddly and uncomfortably familiar ring.