Chinese Communists Building up Strength in Hong Kong

Grey River Argus, 30 August 1948, Page 7

Chinese Communists Building up Strength in Hong Kong

(From W. E. Parrott, N.Z.P.A., Reuter Correspondent). HONG KONG Chinese Communists are rapidly building up their strength in the crown colony of Hong Kong. Official sources hesitate to describe the situation as alarming, but at least they say it ■ is serious and add that they are watching developments closely. Several happenings recently have raised questions about Communist intentions in Hong Kong but none has borne directly on the real problem that is worrying the authorities. This problem is the growth of Communist and Allied control in a number of the colony’s major unions, the members of which are largely employed by European-owned public utility companies. These unions, have to date, caused little trouble of any political significance. But it is believed that, even now, Communist strength is such that, at a sign, they could throw much of the colony’s life into confusion. Should the occasion arise —and such occasion could no doubt be easily provoked—it is possible that the Communist at their present strength could go much further than merely create industrial confusion. Some observers believe their numbers and their influence could bring about serious disturbances whose object might well be political. That possibility is largely why the authorities are worrying. , Recent turmoil in Chinese territory across, the colony’s mainland border received much prominence locally but had little real for Hong Kong. The issue was a perennial one between the Chinese authorities ahd the region’s smuggling population and . was mainly economic, although Chinese Communists may 'have used the opportunity to fan the strife and perhaps extend their influence. Again, a recent public reminder that Chinese arriving from all places other than China and Macao must have passports was obviously designed to prevent undesirables, including, no doubt, escaping Communists from Malaya and Siam, slipping into the colony unobserved. Whether any Chinese have been apprehended under this regulation has not been disclosed, but fugitive Communists from the south do not appear to offer, a serious threat to Hong Kong’s peace. Nor do observers see any danger to the colony in the much publicised plans of Chinese Communists and anti-Juomintang groups to meet at an undisclosed place and. discuss the formation of a Coalition Government in opposition to the existing Chinese regime. It is definite that the Hong Kong Government would not permit such a meeting within the colony on the grounds that it would be a hostile act to a friendly Government. Therefore, in spite of widespread and possibly inspired speculation, no serious issue involving Hong Kong arises. But the threat from Communists within the colony could be very real. Mostly Hong Kong born and members of the Hong Kong branch of the Chinese Communist Party, these men have ‘built up their power in skilled and semi-skilled industries including the dockyards, the telephone company, the tramways, the ferries, the gas and electric companies and the carpentry trade. They are opposed by a group of right-wing unions, mostly confined to unskilled workers employed by Chinese and giving support to the Kuomintang, or Chinese Government Party. This group is said to be much less closely knit and organised than the left-wing unions. Both groups in recent months have formed Federations. As yet the Communist leaders and their sympathisers have given no inkling of their ultimate intentions—whether they are honourably industrial or insidiously political. But after the pattern of Communist activity elsewhere, observers are pessimistic. They do not care to state categorically what the Communists might do, nor when or why action might be taken They do believe they are up to no good. Observers suggest that if the civil war continued badly for the central Government and there was a definite threat to Shanghai and the south, Hong Kongis Communists might quite conceivably rise in an attempt to bring the colony within the Communist orbit, or, at some signal from abroad, they might easily provoke disturbances with the . object of embarrassing Great Britain. Hong Kong’s internal security at present depends on an efficient police force backed by a battalion of the buffs regiment and a battalion of Gurkhas. Administrative headquarters of the British Pacific Fleet has been transferred to Singapore although operational headquarters still remain in Hong Kong. These forces would constitute an important deterrent to a general uprising but whether they could immediately and effectively subdue widespread disturbances is a moot point. There are hundreds of thousands of 'Chinese in Hong Kong who owe no specific loyalities but who would, merely from the point of view of self-preser-vation or self-interest, be eager to assist the cause of the moment. Some i observers contend that the authorities should act now and prevent a situation developing as in Malaya. To this the official reply would probably be that, if tney had definite grounGS for action, they would. One well-informed source suggested that possibly the wisest course, from the long-range point of view, would be to attempt by positive action to remove the causes that breed Communist sympathy in Hong Kong. Some definite effort should be made to prove that life under the British system was better than what Communism could offer. In that way, he said, the doubtful loyalty of the Hong Kong Chinese could be won. But no loyalty could be ensured while the future of the colony' remained obscure. The source said that what was first needed was a clear, firm statement, from Britain rather than from the Colonial Government, that Hong Kong would remain irrevocably British. The lack of that statement left loyalties suspended. Most important, Britain’s failure to make her intentions crystal clear was regarded as a sign of weakness —and an invitation to political intrigue.