SPEED ISSUE AT INQUIRY ON RAIL DISASTER

Grey River Argus, 14 April 1948, Page 3

SPEED ISSUE AT INQUIRY ON RAIL DISASTER

Coimsei Give Estimates DRIVER’S ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT CHRISTCHURCH, April 13. The driver of the express which was wrecked near Seddon on February 25, Joseph William Gurr, a fireman and acting-engine-driver, of Christchurch, gave evidence at the sitting of the Court of Inquiry investigating the accident this morning. Gurr said he first drove in August, 1946, shunting between Linwood and Christchurch. He did four- relieving trips on the Suringfield-Arthur’s Pass run and trips from Rakaia to Methven, to Parnassus, Rangiora and Kaiapoi. Only two or three runs were on passenger’ trains. When told bv the senior assistant foreman (Baterpan) in February of this year that he was to go to Kaikoura, said Gurr, he told him he would have to go with another driver to learn the road to Kaikoura. He added that the road from Kaikoura to Wharanui was new to him and that his memory of the road, north of there was vague. He was stationed at Ward nine years ago. Bateman had replied: “That will be all right,” and said he understood there was an instruction that a driver could refuse to make a trip if he did not know the route. GOODS TRAIN PRACTICE

“I have come to realise since that perhaps I was ■ over-confident,” said Gurr, when asked how he had felt about driving the express. Asked why, having sighted the warning board, he did not reduce speed to a safe pace, Gurr said that he had followed what would have been the normal course for braking on a goods train a light application to bunch the train and avoid jolts, and then a further application. Mr ML H. Cunningham (for the Crown): If the train went into the curve at 55 or 60 miles an hour, you must have been very much astray in your estimate of speed? Witness: 1 macle a terrific error there.

When lie look over the express al Tua marina, its driver said he had taken the brakes up and the engine was running well, continued Gurr. LOST 12 MINUTES

He was too busy watching fin- signals coming into Ihe station, said Gurr, asked to comment on the statements that his speed into Blenheim had been excessive. It was the first time he had driven any train in from the north. By F.is watch the train left Seddon at. 11.30 a.m. In addition to the five minutes lost at Blenheim, he had lost seven minutes on Dashwood, south of Seddon. The train was drifting and he was watching tl.e track ahead down a straight, continued Gurr. When he saw the 10-chain warning board, perhans 100 yards off, he made a light application of the brakes and then the train was into the curve.

“The next thing I remember, I felt a kick ox* a surge behind me and there was a cloud of steam.” Gurr said. “I don’t know what actually happened after that. I remember flying through the air. The engine went ovex' on the fireman’s side and I Hew through the ah’ to the fireman’s side.” Addresses by Counsel There were two chief factors in the cause of the- accident, said Mr Wicks, in his address. The engine had over-turned because the speed limit for the 10-chain curve had been exceeded. The second factoi’ was the employment of a driver insufficiently experienced and without adequateknowledge of the route. Gurr had not been over the route in a passengei’ train at all, and he was. perhaps, over-confident of his ability. The senior driver at Kaikoura, A. J. Guthrie, must accept some responsibility. He did not check fully Gurr's knowledge of the route. The locomotive foreman at Christchurch, oi’ his immediate superiors, were indirectly responsible for the accident. Locomotive foreman Buckley knew Glut's previous driving experience, but no details of that were sent to Kaikoura. The Department itself, or the C'nrislchurch office, was at fault for not ensuring that a record of a man’s qualifications were sent with him on transfer, and for allowing actingdrivers on express trains. "The train examiner at Picton knew the brakes on car 1821 h id not been working properly for two months”, Mr Wicks said. "There is a possibility that, if those brakes had not been working, they may have had some effect on this accident”. Among recommendations Mr Wicks made were the use of speedometers in locomotives, the carrying of emergency equipment in the vans; the use of unbreakable glass _in express trains; and the use of steel-ended carriages on passenger trains. "If part of the curve had not been of 8.4 chain radius, it is possible that, notwithstanding the excessive speed, the accident would not have happened. The evidence showed that the toppling was gradual”, he said. “It is amazing to me that a di'ivei' comes on at 2 a.m.; and takes ovex' an express after’ being on duty eight hours”, Mr Wicks continued. “These long hours are of some concern to the public. The matter should be taken up bv the Department or possibly by the ’Board. Only first-class drivers should be employed on express trains. The Department’s reply would probably be ‘where possible’. In that case, the first rule in the employee’s handbook would probably read: 'The first duty of every employee is to look to the’ safety of the public—where possible’.” , . The over-running of the Blenheim station had received an emphasis totally out of proportion to its value in the inquiry, said Mr A. R. Tarr, representlnp' the Railways Officers Guild. The whole position of locomotive running supervising officers Buckley and Bateman was dictated bv the staffing problems. Guthrie \vas also justified in the circumstances. The curve itself was nou, nor could it have been, a contributing cause to the accident. Whatever the cause of the accident had been, there had been no culpability and no blameworthy dereliction of dutv on the part of the driver, said Mr Wild. There had been rumours in Blenheim that persons had left the train there and at Seddon because of excessive speed; that the train was driven at an excessive speed ovei’ the Awtere bridge; and even a dastardly rumour of liquor. There had been no suggestion of any of those things throughout the inquiry. On the question of speed, there were three different sets of times, but they were unrelated, and unreliable. Three most experienced passengers in the train had said that there was nothing unusual about the running. Eleven passengexs had given evidence, and only one elderly, and perhaps nervous rnan had made the- slightest suggestion of alarm at the speed. The technical evidence that the minimum overturning speed was 54 miles an hour was based on a large number of assumptions. Each might have been slightly in error, but considerably so in their sum. "It would be a surprise to the general public to know that some sort of speed indicator is not available

normally in our engines”, Mi’ Wild said. ‘‘The reasons advanced have been adequate, but, in the last 10 years, we have had foui' majoi’ railway disasters. Three of them might have been avoided if a speed indicator had been in the engine. After the Ratana, Mercer, and Hvde inquiries, recommendations that sueed indicators be used were made. If they could have been of help at Ratana and Mercer, where first-class drivers were concerned, how much greatei’ the effect would have been in this case. If ever there was an accident which might nave been avoided by the presence of a speed indicator, it was this accident at Seddon”. Could the Board hold culoable or negligent a driver of Glut’s limited experience when he was driving his first express over an unfamiliar route? Mr Wild continued that an attempt had been made to justify the sending of Gurr to Kaikoura. A first-class driver had to have 339 clays’ first-class capacity, but Glut had had only 148 L of which only 57 in charge of trains. Nearly two-thirds of his time had been ‘spent in preparing and putting away engines, and he had scarcely ever had a passenger train. "It is probable that, never in the history of the New Zealand Railways has such an inexperienced driver been placed on an express train, and aftei' this inquiry I would say that it will not happen again. Public confidence would be shaken. It was directly in contrast to the golden rule ‘safety first’. One can only criticise the lack of attention given to Glut’s transfer. Gurr was a willing horse —he had been on several relief duties ■ —and he accepted the situation at Kaikoura. It was an error of judgment in taking the job, but he was a keen and conscientious young man with his first big chance. If you find that this accident was caused by speed, that speed was due to an honest error of judgment, by an inexperienced driver”. "It is one of the first duties of. a drivei’ to keep a lookout for restriction and curve warning boards”, said Mi* Cunningham. “The less the driver’s experience the greater the notice he slpuld take for th? boards. The accident was caused by a dereliction of duty on the part of Gurr. At any speed up to 50 miles an hour, the train would have passed safely round the curve. An acting-driver is not an inferioi’ driver. Gurr had driven 'on the Arthur’s Pass-Springfield line with the most powerful type of locomotive in New Zealand, the K.B. In 1938, he had been up and down the Kaikoura line 40 times, and he must have acquired a certaiit, knowledge of the road. It is difficult to see any reason why he should have disregarded the curve warning board. Gurr had the qualifications by experience and examination to drive the train in safety if he followed the instructions”. Mr Cunningham said that, as far as speed indicators were concerned, the Department seemed to have its hands on satisfactory apparatus. •