NEW ROLE OF THE RED ARMY DEFINED BY STALIN

Grey River Argus, 5 April 1948, Page 7

NEW ROLE OF THE RED ARMY DEFINED BY STALIN

A “revolutionary change" last February in Russia’s military philosophy shook the USSR armed forces, “from top to bottom,” says Ellsworth P. Raymond, formerly attached to the American Embassy in Moscow. “The new Soviet, military theory,” said Raymond in the March issue of the “United Nations World Magazine,” “regards the Army as an implement of persuasion in the over-all strategy of the ideological war, now raging. .“Marshal Zhukov, hero of Moscow and the man who saved Leningrad when it seemed doomed by the blunders of the 'political marshals’ Voroshilov and Zhdanov, was demoted for thinking 'otherwise.” Raymond, former chief of the U.S. Army’s Russian economic section wrote:—

“The change went unnoticed in the outside world ... it came rather unexpectedly and without warning in the midst of a violent but effectively concealed argument between the Communist Party and the marshals of the Red Army. “The marshals insisted on acceptance of their own military concepts. The crux of this concept was a complete divorce of the armed forces from the Communist Party, an autonomy in both technical and political matters which no other organ of the Soviet enjoys. "The structure of the armed forces was to bp established along conventional militarj r lines, with emphasis on land warfare devoted to defence of the Soviet fatherland.” These views said Raymond clashed with the “dynamic concent of Bolshevism. in which the Army is one of sevral political instruments of revolution . . .” Leader of the movement within the Red Army was Marshal Zhukov. Supporting him was a small group of professional soldiers, including Marshal Novidov, of the Air Force, according to Raymond. Opposing Zhukov was the Communist Party, led by Marshal Nikolai Bulganin. now Minister of the Armed Forces. Siding with him were Marshals Rokossovsky and Konev, Raymond said. “ The outside world,” wrote Raymond, “suspected the existence of some kind of controversy, but had no inklinp- as to its actual nature. On October 1. 1946, General Eisenhower remarked that, he had not heard from Marshal Zhukov for a year. At that time Zhukov was already in disfavour.

Resolved by Stalin “The controversry was resolved by Stalin himself.” states Raymond, “who decided, with Bulganin. Stalin removed Zhukov, together with a number of high-ranking leaders. ‘The role of the Army in the Soviet order of things was completely re-defined along lines which Stalin described as the ‘three major characteristics of the Red Army. “Acording to Stalin, the Red Army is:—

“(1) A weapon for the liberation of workers and peasants from the yoke of the land owners and the par)] t 1i 91 Ci “(2) It is an Army of brotherhood among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. “(3) It is imbued with the spirit of internationalism, an army of world revolution, an armv of the workers of all countries.”

Summarising, Raymond wrote: “The practical strategic consequence of this doctrine is the alternate use of politics and of war, either singly or jointly, as circumstances' demand.

‘This type of ‘war’ is not directed b yany one military organisation but by the supreme political organisation of the State, the politbureau.

“In contrast to Zhukov’s ideas the whole nations is engaged in a permanent' and total effort, maintaining its military might merely as a deterrent or an implement of persuasion or to be used only as a last resort.”

In Ravmond’s opinion, Russia does not want a “shooting war’ now or at any time in the future. The outbreak of a shooting war, he says, would constitute evidence of Russia’s complete political failure.