KUBAN CAMPAIGN

Grey River Argus, 3 June 1943, Page 5

KUBAN CAMPAIGN

STILL THE MAIN ONE

Incessant Fighting

[Aust. & N.Z. Cable Assn.]

LONDON, June 1. Reports from Moscow and Berlin indicate that the Kuban, in the norwest Caucasus, is still the busiest sector of the Russian front. The German News Agency reported on Thursday night, that the battle for the Kuban bridgehead had again flared up. It stated that Russians attacked the eastern sector of the bridgehead, and attempted to cross the Kuban River in the northern sector, but the Germans repulsed the attacks.

Tuesday’s Soviet night communique states: “Fighting continued on Monday in the Kuban north-east of Novorossisk. There were no important changes in other sectors.” Reuter’s Moscow correspondent says: Fighting is going on unceasingly both in the mountain district north-east of Novorossisk and along the Kuban River estuary. The approaches to 1 Novorossisk through the mountains is difficult as the terrain favours defence. The Germans can also get in supplies by air from the Crimea. In the flat country on both sides of the Kuban estuary, the time for a large-scale attempt to drive the Germans into the sea has not yet come. Much of the present fighting is conducted from flat-bottomed boats. Only at the height of Summer, does a sufficient area dry up to enable bigger operations. RUSSIAN ATTACKS. . LONDON, June 1. The German News Agency stated that. Russians made attacks west of Vroshilovgrad. The attacks misfired. The German Agency also reported that the Russians launched two attacks in the Lisitichansk area, and it added that very heavy artillery and mortar fire strongly supported the attacks. A Soviet communique stated: Two Germans attacks yesterday against the Soviet bridgehead at Lisitichansk on the Donetz were made in quick succession, and were thrown back with heavy losses to the enemy. The German News Agency also reported that fierce fighting had also developed at Velish, 60 miles southeast of Velikye Luki, where the Russians tried to pierce the main German line, but powerful attacks were repulsed /

The German Plan TO KNOCK OUT RED ARMY (Rec. 8.30) LONDON. June 2. “The Times” Moscow correspondent says: The prevailing opinion in Moscow is that, in order - to form a strategic reserve, which will be necessary to meet Allied operations in other European theatres, the Germans must seek* a quick decision in Russia, one limited to knocking out a substantial Russian force, and to upsetting any plans which the Soviet may have for an offensive either in the summer or next winter. The correspondent adds: The Prussian Army has been warned to expect a most powerful .and concentrated German attack, in which the issue will largely depend on the relative mobility of the Panzers and the Russian anti-tank forces. It is thought that the Germans will be obliged this year to seek purely military successes on the eastern front, and that they may strike, not against great cities, rich territory, and vital communications, as they previously have done, but will strike specifically at the Russian armed forces. If such is the German plan, it will be a desperate one. But the adventurousness of desperation is just what Russia is expecting from the enemy. From all appearances. Russia can still take hard knocks. No doubt she will be able to return them, and is determined to strike in her own time.

GERMAN ATTACK. NEAR VELIKYE LUKI. LONDON, June 1. The Berlin radio, in a brief announcement, stated that units of the 19th German Army had begun an offensive near Velikye Luki and had captured several Russian strong points. There is no confirmation from Moscow, of a new offensive in this area, where the Germans have so far failed to iron out the deep Russian wedge in their positions. The British United Press points out that this area would be an obvious place for the Germans to strike in any central front offensive. It is here that they have made the least impression on the front, and the Russian salient in this sector has continually proved a stumbling block against new German advances on the central front. , GERMAN LOSSES DESPITE THE LULL. (Rec. 7.40) LONDON, June 2. Reuter’s Moscow correspondent says: The Russians established a new bridgehead on the west bank of the Donetz River, near Lisichansk, in the first week in May. Since then the Germans have lost seven thousand killed alone in fruitless attempts to dislodge the Russians. Every day there is some engagement in this sector. Several have been on a considerable scale. The net result is that the Russians have at several points enlarged and consolidated their foothold. On the central front, facing approaches to Smolensk, the Russians also have taken a heavy toll of the enemy since a so-called lull set in nine weeks ago. From Stalingrad to the Azov Sea, two months of the lull cost Hitler in killed alone the equivalent of three or four good divisions. Famous Siberian snipers have been making life extremely uncomfortable for Germans in “quiet” sectors. Ten ace snipers in May killed 1062 Germans.

AIR EQUALITY ON RUSSIAN FRONT. NEW YORK, June 1. The Moscow radio ‘ to-day claimed that the Soviet Air Force had gained complete command of the air over the. Russian front. The radio reported that the Nazis lost 2,069 planes between May 2 and May 29 in air combat and in Russian attacks on German airfields. The “New York Times’s” correspondent at Moscow. Carl Sulzberger, says: ' The Luftwaffe on the Russian front is no longer the overpowering instrument of destruction it was in June 1941. The Germans have lost their overwhelming aerial ascendancy and can muster probably only parity. Any effort to obtain local superiority in, one sector would risk stripping protection needed at other points. Furthermore, the efficiency Of the Luftwaffe’s personnel is almost certainly steadilv deteriorating Although the Luftwaffe’s power is still formidable it is a power that can be matched, and perhaps

overmatched. It is difficult to establish accurately the exact amount of the German losses on the Russian front, but the Luftwaffe has not shown anything like its original strength because of the exceedingly heavy losses it suffered in the earlier stages of the war on the eastern front The Luftwaffe had 10,000 aircraft in June, 1941, 4000 'of which were reserves. Almost the. entire number could be thrown against the Russians, because the Nazis had only light commitments elsewhere. Today the situation is different. The strength of the Luftwaffe is at least 1000 planes fewer anil must be prudently split up to protect the Continent from the Allied aerial onslaughts, or counter the risk of invasion. The - Luftwaffe reserves have also fallen off to under 1000. This aerial situation means that the Germans, must succeeded in their effort to achieve a decisive, maior victor-v in 1943 or else the efficacy of the Luftwaffe is likely to be virtually destroyed in the effort.