The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, September 22, 1937. HOSTILITIES IN CHINA.

Grey River Argus, 22 September 1937, Page 4

The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, September 22, 1937. HOSTILITIES IN CHINA.

At scarcely any point have the forces of China been yet able to maintain a lasting stand against those of Japan. Superiority in numbers is markedly on the side of the Chinese, but they lack the

mechanical means of warfare, the training, and probably the leadership of the Japanese. It is note-

worthy that Western Powers, especially those with large trading and other interests in China, are preserving an altitude 'of aloofness from the conflict. One ex-

planation may be the fact that there has been no formal declaration of war. In fact, the Japanese explanation of what is an obvious military invasion, is that there is no intention to. conquer or to annex any part of China. The object is explained as that of obliging the Chinese authorities to work in co-operation with the authorities of Japan in promoting a more orderly political, economic and social situation throughout the Far East. How that conception should be interpreted, however, is a question to which the only likely answer may be found in such parts of China as Japan already has brought into what she considers a satisfactory relationship. Chief of these is Manchukuo, where there certainly has been economic development, accompanied by a wonderful influx from other Chinese provinces, because the change in control brought at least more settled industry and trade. It is fair to assume that Japan wishes to sed a similar change in at least several other provinces of North China. Two reasons, at least; suggest themselves for such a wish. One is the assurance for Japan of a greater supply of raw materials and other commodities urgently needed by her fast growing population. Another is the design to prevent Russia gaining an ascendancy, first politically and then economically. Thirdly, Japan aims at being the dominant |

Far Eastern Power, and to that extent is anxious to prevent any Power other than Russia from supplanting her in China economically. These aims the Japanese declare to be quite consistent with the retention of autonomy by the Chinese, whether or not their territory is divided into several independent units, but it seems obvious that to the extent there is division io that extent the separate parts will look more to Japan than to any other source

for leadership. The Chinese are appealing to the Western Powers, through Geneva, for protection, and on League principles they have a case at least as good as any which has been upheld at Geneva. But appeal has been so far without any tangible results, and the Japanese continue forcing . the issue to a point where submission would seem to be inevitable. There are, of course, quite powerful influences in China which arc favourable to the Japanese. In fact, had not the Nanking Government reacted in a military way to the activity of the Japanese in the North, there might have been no resistance woth mentioning.

Souuth China is a very different proposition from North China in the matter of nationalism. It can be taken for granted that the Japanese have no intention of any permanent occupation of territory outside of areas specified as the ones where they proposed more or less independent administrations. This policy is dictated, as indicated, by necessities as much eco ; Domical as political so far as Japan is concerned, and so much has long been evident from the utterances of her spokesmen, who made it plain that they would brook no lasting resistance, but preferred to impose their will with as little strife as possible. China has made the best stand that she is able to make, and the. result is a determination on

Japan’s pari to eliminate as soon as she can the possibility of maintaining that stand. She has to reckon with an immense population, and also the danger that, should the campaign be prolonged, outside intervention might occur when her own sinews of war had been considerably weakened. Hence the use of forces at so many different points. _ A quick submission is the object, and the success of Japan’s effort is to be judged, not so much by the initial success of her . arms, but by the degree in Avbich resistance is removed. It is thus too soon as yet to say what the ultimate outcome will be, but, apart from Shanghai, the campaign certainly appears to be going according to the Japanese plan.