THE The Grey River Argus. PUBLISHED DAILY. TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1872.

Grey River Argus, Volume XII, Issue 1088, 23 January 1872, Page 2

THE The Grey River Argus. PUBLISHED DAILY. TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1872.

Perhaps one of the most remarkable writers on history is De Tocqueville. When Napoleon, in 1850, was President of the French Republic, De Tocqueville was one of his Ministers, but the far seeing character of the man did not suit Napoleon, who shortly afterwards gave the historian his conge, [n one of his letters, shortly after his dismissal, he gives the following character of Napoleon, which has been corroborated in every particular: — " He is daring in his plans, but when tho moment of execution comes he hesitates. He ought to have lived within his incomo as the richest private man in Franco, without assuming princely munificence. He would have been more respected, ai:il really more powerful. ' 1 have t"M him so a hundred times; 1 have implored him to lay aside his extravagant retinue, and to discontinue his ostentatious fetes. But all his instincts are towards expense ; and his immediate adherents, who are as bad advisers as possible, stimulate an extravagance by which they profit. He is always thinking of his uncle; and the expense of tho Imperial Court is, of course, the part most easily copied." That he was daring enough none can deny, as the great coup d'etat, which sent Changarnier, Thiers, and Lamoriciere into exile, testified. In 1854 he wrote another letter, in which ho stated that Napoleon was unable to conduct a campaign, and should he attempt to do so defeat and disaster would follow. Here are his exact words :— " The real Prime Minister of France is, without doubt, Louis Napoleon himself. But he is not a man of business. He does not understand' details. He may order certain things to be done, but he will not be able to ascertain whether the proper means have been taken. He does not know, indeed, what those means are. He does not trust those who do. A war is to be carried out without any master mind to direct it, or any good instruments to execute it. I fear some great disaster. Such , a disaster might throw this man from the eminance on which he is balanced, not rooted. It might produce a popular outbreak, of which the anarchical party would take advantage." The Rhine campaign

and the present condition of France is the result. The French philosopher also pointed out that in order to sustain his popularity Louis Napoleon would be compelled to resort to either one of two measures, either a war with England or an attack on the Rhenish Provinces. Whether Bismarck, who is said to be one of the best read men in Germany, has studied De Tocqueville, or whether he intuitively comprehended Napoleon, would be a difficult 'matter to deal with ; but there is one thing certain, that "German unity" was not accomplished one moment too soon. France was not fighting Prussia and its dependencies, but was 6ghting Bavaria, Saxony, and all the various Grand Duchies in subjection to those Powers, and besides, Germany was only too ready to try conclusions, in order to wipe off old scores. Prussia was prepared, and at the first intimation its armies were in motion to "defend the Rhine — beloved Ehine !" and in a campaign so short as to be almost incredible, the French armies, led by tho most experienced French Generals, were defeated in detail, and despite all the dash, all the verve of M'Mahon or Bazaine, it was fruitless against the clockwork-chamber tactics of Von Moltke. The German armies moved like the men on a chess-board. Everything was pre-arranged and pre-deter-mined. "It is necessary," says Von Moltke in one of his treatises on the science of war, " for a commander before he enters on a campaign to thoroughly understand what is required of him, and having determined this, it must be done." Von Moltke and Prince Bismarck knew what was required, and this was done. Napoleon went into the war without any knowledge, without calculation ; and the consequence was Napoleon a prisoner and the Prussian army in possession of Paris. This was foreseen by De Tocqueville when he said, " The Empire i 3 essentially warlike ; and war in the mind of aßonaparte, and of the friends of a Bonaparte, means the Rhine. When the necessity comes, Napoleon must have recourse to the real passions of the French bourgeoise and peasantry — the love of conquest, or the hatred of England." And now for the climax, and who will dispute but that De Tocqueville" is one of the truest prophets of modern times : — " Thirty-seven years of liberty have made a free Press and free discussion necessary to us. If Louis Napoleon refuses them, he will be execrated as a tyrant ; if he grant them, they will destroy him. I have no fears, therefore, for the ultimate drstiny of my country, Wo_shaU^get rid of Napoleon in years, but there is no saying liow much mischief he may do in . iiibse years to his neighbors. ... When Louis Napoleon's violence or folly has destroyed the charm with which he has worked, all eyes will turn, not towards a republic, but Henry V." But the greatest testimony to the almost prescient knowledge of this man is contained in a letter to Count Mole, the French Premier, in 1835, and alas, it forebodes dire days for England, and, strange to say, the course of events are shaping themselves precisely as was foretold thirtyLeven years since. He says : — "When I consider attentively the state of this country I cannot help believing that a democratic revolution will sooner or later take place in England, but it will not occur by the 3ame way or by the same means as in France. Opposed to a small minority of rich is an immense majority of poor, and nowhere is the antagonism between the class that possesses everjthing and the class that possesses nothing so formidable. 1 know that the rich are beginning to agree perfectly among themselves, but the poor are more of one mind than in any other country in the world. The misunderstanding is only betweon the two classes. It is true that democracy is ill-represented by the members it sends to Parliament who desire political not social equality. But it seems to me that in time they will be driven from the one position to the other. Universal discontent will urge them on. When the aristocracy is losing its political influence its chiefs will remain great people, for they will still be rich ; but to the inferior members the result will be unendurable. The rearguard of aristocracy will in that day become the vanguard of democracy ; and feeling themselves the injury, they will suggest to the people the remedy."