ANOTHER EUROPEAN WAR.

Grey River Argus, Volume XI, Issue 1018, 31 October 1871, Page 2

ANOTHER EUROPEAN WAR.

[SPECTATOR, AUGUST 19.] ■ '. The world has been on tiptoe this week to hear what is arranged at the meeting of the Emperors of Germany and Austria at Gastein on the 17th inst., and we cannot wonder at the general curiosity. Emperors might meet without a purpose, though it is improbable, or might meet for minor ends ; but Prince Bismarck is human, and is tired, and he does not leave the pleasant woods of Varzin, with his able a dlatus, Herr Lothar Bucher, by his side, in the midst of his autumn holiday, without grave reason for his sacrifice. And unfortunately there is visible reason for his anxiety and his efforts. The Roumanian affair may involve war, and war on the very largest scale, war including Powers which are not to be vanquished or to be victorious in a single year's campaign. The "Eastern question," as we call it, chat is by far the most serious latent quarrel existing among the civilised Powers, is fairly upon the carpet once more, and it may tax all Prince Bismarck's audacity as well as all his diplomatic knowledge to attain his object, and yet to prevent an immediate renewal of the European struggle. The facts, as we hear them, are in this wise. The Parliament of the Principalities, a kingdom independent in all but name, but protected by the Treaty of 1856, recently borrowed, ten millions sterling, but finding the payment of interest inconvenient, formally repudiated its obligation. That would matter little, being strictly in accordance i with the modern precedents which peimit States of the third rank to swindle creditors with no other consequence than loss of credit • but the Hospodar of Roumania is a Hohenzollern ; the majority of the lenders are North Germans, among whose foibles extravagance cannot be reckoned, and repudiation has accidentally involved a distinct and terrible insult to' German nationality. The Hohenzollerns dislike breaches of faith, and the signature of the Hospodar to the Act cancelling the debt was only obtained by a threat that if it were refused, the Germans within the Principalities should be massacred, a threat we neither expect nor wish that the new masters of the world should endure with equanimity, ft was indispensable for the Emperor of Germany to act, not only to protect his subjects' pockets, but to maintain the place of his people in the world, and he applied therefore to the Porte, as Suzerain of the repudiating provinces, to enforce the laws of honesty and of international fair-play. The Porte declined, alleging, what is strong enough, that it had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities, and Prince Bismarck had therefore to obtain redress for his own people through other means than diplomatic remonstrauces. That might be easy enough, neither Roumania nor Turkey being in a position to resist a formal demand from Berlin, ' but for the general situation) inf Europe produced by th« injudicious

severity of the German Treaty with France. To fight any power whatever is for Germany to encounte^the risk or rather the certainty of having to fight France again, and it is very doubtful if Roumania can be coerced without a general war, The Russian Government, to begin with, has every interest in protecting a power which is weak, which is new, and which lies stretched across her only road by! land. to the, conquest of Constantinople. The Austrian Government has every interest in protecting a State which holds, as against all scronger powers, the mouths of the Danube, that is, a position which Austria cannot Burrender to any first class power without immediate extinction. And finally England has some interest, and thinks she has much, in maintaining the validity of the Treaty of Paris, under which'Roumania cannot be coerced nor conquered without the consent of the whole European Pentarchy. It is absolutely necessary if anything is to be done without Europe being wrapped in flames, that one of these Powers should be detached from the Roumanian cause, and Prince Bismarck, with his accustomed skill, has pitched upon Austria as the one. If the Hapsburgs can be induced to agree heartily, the opposition of the remainder of Europe may be prevented by alarm.; or if it should become active, m%y be defeated by force, Europe in arms, that is Russia and France in 1 combination, being scarcely equal, to a campaign with Germany and Austria united upon their own selected grounds. Unless England joined the alliance, and joined it with a resolution to take the sword in both hands, there does not exist in Europe the force which could resist the combined decision of the two German Kaisers, or arrest the action of the million and a-half of soldiers at their immediate disposal. It is to secure an alliance of this kind, an alliance between Germany and Austria for defence against Russia and France, that Prince Bismarck is accompanying his master to Gastein, and he has so much to offer that it is possible he may succeed. A guarantee from Germany would protect the Hapsburgs from half the evils which threaten them, from the disaffection of their German subjects, from the exigencies of their Magyar supporters, from the threats more or less avowed' of the nationalists in Bohemia. Neither German, nor Magyar, nor Czech could move a step against Austria. supported by Prince, Bismarck, unless aidettfby a Russian alliance which neither Magyar nor German could under any extremity be induced in such a cause to invoke, while the Czech friendship for Russia is like the Irish friendship for France, a sentiment to be taken into account, but not to be seriously feared. Russia would hardly intervene, even with hope of aid from France, merely to prevent the Roumanian boyars from'paying a moderate income-tax ; and if she did, Prince Bismarck has a grand card in reserve. He may offer the Principalities to the Austrian Government, which not only covets, but needs the control of the entire valley of the Danube^ and so inflict upon Austria the task which naturally belongs to her, under circumstances which would compel her for years to come, from a mere regard to her own existence, to be the humble ally of Berlin, from which alpne she could obtain-secu-rity in her new dominion. That the Government of St. Petersburg would resist such a final defeat of her. secular ambition, and would obtain the alliance of France, eager for vengeance upon Germany, may be taken as certain ; but Prince Bismarck may believe that the struggle must come ; that it could not come under more favorable auspices, and that.it is better to run the risk than allow the new Empire to pose before its subjects as a power unable to recover a just debt from an almost powerless neighbour. It is part of his policy to secure the Valley of the Danube to Germany, whether through the intervention of the Hapsburgs or otherwise ; part of his policy to secure the good-will of Hungary, whose interests are directly threatened by Rnssuih influence in the Principalities ; and part of hia policy to attract Austria into an alliance which would turn all Central Europe into one impregnable camp of defence. It is difficulty to doubt that this, or something like this, is the offer which Prince Bismarck will make at Gastein, and if it is accepted, war in Europe may be considered certain within two years. Russia would, in her own estimation, be throttled by such an arrangement, would be driven, willing or unwilling, to offer France the alliance, in the hope, 6r7as*he thought, in the certainty of which Jules Favre refused any territorial cession after Sedan ; and of course, if France is to fight, she will fight, if she can on good grounds and with a fair chance, before the in* demnity is paid. All this talk in demiofficial telegrams of French insolence and negotiations being broken off points to some new hope at Versailles, which is making the tone of French statesmen Once more independent. The point of ,interest therefore is to ascertain what is agreed •upon at Gastein, and upon this the probabilities are conflicting, is/certain tb&tthe preliminary interview '^between the two Emperors at Ischl has been satisfactory, or Prince Bismarck would not be needed ; but the difficulties in the way of a cordial alliance mnst be almost insuperable. The Hapsburgs throughout their history have, when needful, postponed their pride to their policy— aa witness the conduct of the House after the desertion of Maati? milian — and they may do so. qnce mpip, but nothing short of a distinct and 'unmistakable guarantee of their German territories could tempt them into an enterprise in which failure would be ruin, while success would involve an immense addition to their non-German responsibilities. Ruling from ' Bavaria to the Black Sea over millions of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, .Croats, and Ron? manians, they must federalism their. Empire^ and although, the present Government is not indisposed to that course, and has even proposed a kind of. autonomy for Bohemia, the Emperor would never carry out such a policy at the riak of a German insurrection! He must be guaranteed from that, and the guarantee would cost the newKaiser of Germany much of his esteem, if not of his loyalty, among his N.orjhGerman subjects. The war, tqo, although if the prize went Roqraania it would not be unpopular in the Austrian Empire, would be, a most formidable one to a i Government but just escaped from the imminent risk of bankruptcy, while success would leave the Court of Vienna detached from France, and dependent for years to cdme upon the good- will of Berlin. Still the hazard may b» risked, under a belie! that Germany will Mithw

surrender her reversionary, right to the Danube, nor undertake the task of civilising South-Eaatffca Europe for herself, under the sense of accumulating difficulties which the alliance would solve, and under a conviction that the hatred of the Russian Court, as explained by General Fadayeff, will not stop short of the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire. If' these considerations govern, and they are very likely to govern", there will be war. •. . • .r.r.i-".. ■-■;■> It may be Baked what part England would take, or would be expected to take^ ' in such an affray. Probably none at all. The Treaty of Paris binds us to support the integrity of Turkey, but it is only by a stretch of language that this integrity" can be said to be involved in the retention of a nominal suzerainty over two Principalities in which no Turk is permitted to set his foot. Her integrity would, indeed, be directly protected by the transfer of Roumania to the Austrian Government. With their dominions extended right across the road from Russia to European Turkey, it would become the. direct interest as well as the duty of the Viennese statesmen to arrest the march of Russia to the South, and allow the Government of Constantinople to transmute itself into some new form at its leisure and without interference from the North. A new and roost formidable barrier would be erected against Russia, one which it would be almost impossible for her to pass, one Which, at all <events could not be passed without a long and most exhaustive war. We might protect France if France suffered too greatly in the war, but to throw our little army into those Danubian swamps in order to prevent our best ally from performing a great service to mankind j is scarcely an enterprise which will tempt our statesmen to abandon their policy of non-interference. The Treaty of Paris was intended to limit the ambition of Russia, and no limitation could be bo effective as to the extention of Austrian power along the whole of the Valley of the Danube.