THE SECRET OF THE FRENCH DISASTERS.

Grey River Argus, Volume X, Issue 826, 21 March 1871, Page 2

THE SECRET OF THE FRENCH DISASTERS.

[LONDON TIMES.]

The last series of papers from the Imperial Correspondence would alone afford a more than sufficient explanation of the disasters which have hither tooverwhelmed the French arms. They displays collapse in every particular of army organization such as would previously have been incredible in a military nation. When all the world was wondering why the Emperor should be lingering on the frontier during the precious days at the end of July, it was reported that the real reason was a deficiency of supplies ; but no one then dreamt of such confusion as is now revealed. It may not, indeed, be matter of surprise that after the first few days of unexpected disaster the generals in command Bhould be destitute of any fixed plan of operations ; but these despatches confirm the worst surmises respecting the campaign of Sedan. It is placed beyond question that the fatal movement of M'Mahon was urged upon him from Paris in opposition to hh own clear judgment, and against the first instinct of the Emperor. On the 17th of August the Minister of War in the capital appeals to the Emperor to renounce the idea he had expressed of withdrawing the Army of Chalons on Paris, and suggests " a powerful diversion on the Prussian Corps, already exhausted by several engagements." The next day the Emperor replies that he yields to the Minister's opinion, and on the 20th M'Mahon announces his departure for Rheims. On the 27th, however, M'Mahon had satisfied himself that it was irapos- ' sible to cariy out the plan prescribed to ' him, and he predicts almost the very fate which overtook his army : — " Since the 2th I have no news of Bazaine ; if I attempt to meet him I should be attacked in the front by a part of the first and second armies, which, favored by the woods, can deal with a force superior to mine, and at the same time attacked by the Crown Prince's army, cutting off all line of retreat." He added, "I approach Mezieres to-moirow, whence I shall continue my retreat." The reply of the Minister not only sealed the doom of M'Mahon's army, but will be. held to justify the bitterest accusations, brought by the Republicans against the Imperial Government. It commenced with the fatal sentence :— " If you abandon Bazaine the revolution is in Paris." Count Palikao assured the Marshal that the Crown Prince was not at Chalons ; he observed that the Marshal had at leaat thirty- six hours' start of his enemy ; and he begged him, first in his own name, and a day or two afterwards in the name of the Council of Ministers and the Privy Council, to succour Bazaine. Even up to the 31st of August Count Palikao seems to have cherished the delusion that the French had the start of the Crown Prince, but on that very day M'Mahon had to announce his disastrous retreat on Sedan, adding the curt statement, "Up to the 31st of August the Emperor still commands." From these despatches it is clear that M'Mahon, from the first, acted with hesitation, and that Count Palikao, to whose urgency he yielded, had a very imperfect knowledge of the enemy's movements ; while it would seem that the Emperor, even after Bazaine had nominally been appointed to the command-in-chief, exerted, both at Metz and on the march to Sedan, a distinct influence on the course of the campaign. Between Generals on the spot who did not know their own minds, and Generals at a distance who did not know the facts of the position, it would have been a miracle if the French Army had escaped the destruction which befel it. This kind of confusion, however, has been seen before in baffled Generals and defeated armies. But there is evidence of strange disorder even in the staff arrangements before defeat was ever dreamt of. On the 21st of July General Michel telegraphs to the Minister of War: — "I have arrived at Belfort. I have not found my brigade. Have not found the General of Division. What must I do? Do not know where are my regiments." At that moment every soldier in Germany knew perfectly where to find his place in the vast masses which were moving on the Rhine. But even this is surpassed by the helpless muddle of the subsidiary services. On the 18th of July De Failly, at the head of 17 battalions of infantry, telegraphs from Bitsche for "money to enable our troops to live. No money in the public treasuries. No money in the military chests." The reader may remember that in a letter published in our columns some time ago a French officer narrated how, while he was in full retreat on Chalons, he received a parcel which had been forwarded with great care, and which contained plans of fortresses in the Palatinate. This was no exceptional case. On the 21st of July a General complains that " the depot is sending us great heaps of map 3 which are useless for the moment. We have not a map of the frontier of France." At this moment, again, every Prussian lieutenant was in possession of the information fthe French General wanted. That the Army of the Rhine should so long have lain inactive around Metz cease 3to be surprising that on the 20th of July it was in want of the commonest food. On that day the Iniendant-en-Clief, or Chief Officer of Control, complains that " the numerous troops outside Metz are obliged, in order to exist, to consume the biscuit which would serve as a reserve, and which, moreover, comes in inadequate quantities."' On the Bth of August the same officer makes a demand on the camp of Chalons for 400,000 rations of biscuit and campaign provisions, and his subordinate at the camp has to telegraph to Paris for instructions, as he has " not a ration of biscuit nor field provisions, with the exception of sugar and coffee." At the same moment the General at Verdun sends word to Metz that there are wanting in the town as siege provisions, " wine, brandy, Bugar, coffee, bacon, vegetables, and fresh mean." It s *ems necessary to stop and reflect that the places thus left destitute were not in the heart of an enemy's country which had been suddenly occupied, but were the chief strongholds of the French army, in the most accessible districts of France. If food was deficient, material supplies were not likely to be plentiful. Marshal Leboeuf himself, announcing his presence with General de Failly's corps on the 26th of July, states that " the organisation in respect of accessories is very incomplete." The Minister of War, writes from Paris that there are no revolvers in the arsenals, and the officera must buy them

from private traders. The General of the 4th Corps, at Thionville on the 24th of July, had neither infirmiers, nor civil assistants, nor ambulance waggons, nor field ovens, nor train. Similarly, at the important fortress of Belfort, on the 4th of August, the 7th Corps wa3 without train, or infirmiers, or artisans. The intendant at Strasburg on the 23th of J uly had not received a single soldier of the Train Corps nor a Bingle workman. At Chalons 20 batteries had^ but a single farrier between them. On the 19th of August, at. the. same great. depot, Marshall Canrobert "continued" to have neither cooking pots nor platters, and the soldiers were "unprovided with anythiug." They had neither bedding nor enough shirts and boots. Even at Metz, j on the 29th of July, soldiers arrived " in almost all cases" without camping material or cooking vessels. It is said that at a time when our army in the Peninsula were in great need of new boots a large supply arrived, but they proved to be all for the right foot. We used to think such blunders were essentially British ; but the story, may be matched by two of these despatches. On the 28th of July the Minister of War is informed that, of 800 collars in the magazines at St. Omer, 500 have been found too small. A fortnight later it is again announced from St. Omer that " 1200 sets of harness have, it is true, been sent to the fortress, but the complement of this harness has been omitted, without which the companies cannot be provided. The preparations have, therefore, been stopped from to-day." In short, the French forces were everywhere at a standstill for want of food and munitions of war.

This extraordinary collapse has an interest for us aparb from the light it throws on the French defeats. We have lately reorganized the supply services of our army on the French model. Our Control Department was established in avowed imitation of the French Inbendance, which a short time ago was deemed perfect. Now that it has utterly given way, at the first pressure of war, it becomes of the greatest consequence for U3 to understand the causes of such a failure, and to know whether we have copied the faults of the system as well as its virtues. Something, perhaps, may be laid to the account of the personal demoralization which other branches of the French army have displayed in this campaign. No system will remedy neglect of duty on the part of those who administer it. But there can be little doubt the failure is in a great measure due to an inherent error of the French character, which was illustrated the other day in some interesting observations by one of our correspondents inside Paris. Even the disasters of the past few months, and the opportunities of organization which the defenders of Paris have enjoyed, have not enabled the Intendance of the city to avoid grave default. It is actually true that one of the reasons for the retirement of General Ducrot's army from the positions they had won at such a cost was that the Intendance had omitted to provide them with the warm clothing they needed. Their rugs and sheepskins were only five miles off, in Paris, but it was too late to fetch them. The fault, according to our Correspondent's observation^ does not lie in want of organization, but in excessive organization. The Army, like all the rest of France, is over-ad-ministered. Everything nrast be done by rule and system, and every man waits for orders. It must be owned this explanation is not altogether consoling to ourselves. We are not, indeed, so addicted to systematizing as the French, but experience shows that when our officials do get hold of a system they are apt. to deliver themselves up to it hand and foot. We may, however, learn in time by the lamentable experience of our neighbors. The failure of the French Department of Control at the outset evidently deprived the soldiers of any fair chance against an army so admirably supplied as that of the Germans; and the French people, perhaps, may derive some solace from the reflection that their defeats cannot wholly be ascribed to the superiority of their enemy in fighting qualities. Bat it can never be too urgently observed that the efficient supply of an army constitutes half the business of war, and at a moment when we have just adopted a new system it behoves us to be exceptionally vigilant. [Since the above was written England has resolved to re-oganise her army, j