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THE WAR IN EUROPE.

CHRONICLE OF THE WAR. [EROM THE ARGUS.] The Franco-German war may be said to have entered upon its third great stage, after the breaking off of the negotiations for an armistice at Versailles. The first period of the campaign was characterised by the victories on the frontier and in the Ardennes and the capitulation of Sedan. The second includes the occupation of the whole of south-eastern France by the Germans, the investment of Paris, and the surrender of Metz, Strasburg, aud Toul. The third book of this henceforth to be famous epic of the battle between the Teuton and the Gaul, opens with Count Bismarck dismissing M. Thiers under what may be called, on this occasion, by a somewhat broad metaphor, the walls of Paris. From the first it seemed impossible that the mission of M. Thiers could have any useful end. France, not yet freed from the illusions which have exercised .so fatal an influence over her destinies duriug this war, was only prepared to deal with Germany on the basis of equal with equal. As a condition precedent to all the proposals for a truce, she demanded the revictualling of Paris for 25 days. This condition, however reasonable from the French point of view, was one to which it was impossible for the German military leaders to agree. The question was clearly a military, and not a political one. To take Paris through famine rather than by force had been from the first a part of General Von Moltke's calculations. Of the three courses which were open to him for the capture of Pari°, a regular seige by parallels of approach could not have been attempted without a much larger force, and would have been in any circumstances a tedious and hazardous operation. An assault of even one of the outlying forts would have been attended with a •.great sacrifice of life ; nor could any one ifort be successfully held without the simultaneous capture of its immediate neighbors right and left. There remained, therefore, no other alternative to the Germans than to sit patiently outside until the stock of provisions within. Paris was exhausted, when the fall of the city would become inevitable. To permit the reprovisioning of Paris therefore, even if it were practicable, was out of the question. It was to give to the French a clear strategical advantage, for which no equivalent whatever could be gained by the Germans. The delay of 25 days would not only have permitted the armies of the Loire and of the North aud West to complete their equipment and organisation, but it would have seriously affected the position of the Germans before Paris in respect to their own supplies, seeing that if the railways were used for the transport of food to Paris, they would not have been able to furnish the wants of the German commissariat.

M. Thiers left the Prussian head-quar-ters on his return to Tours on the morning of the 7th November, and on the next clay one more disaster was added to the long list of French misfortunes. The fortress and town o£ Verdun, always reckoned one of the keys of France, surrendered after two or three days' bombardment. The possession of this place was of great value to the Germans, as completing an important link in their chain of communications, and giving them the command of the wooded passes of the Argonne, which had up to that time been the favorite refuge of numerous scattered bands of Francs-tireurs. At this period the position of the outlying German forces was as follows : — The army of Metz had been broken up into three parts, of which one, under General Manteuffel, was inarching in a direction due north-west, to keep in check the Northern French army under General Bourbaki. A second detachment had joined the army before Paris and was on the point of taking the field again, under the command of the Duke of Mecklenburg- Schwerin, in the direction of Orleans, for -the reinforcement of Von der Taun. A third, under the personal command of Prince Frederick Charles, was advancing in a southerly and westerly line on the flank of the French Southern armies, and had already reached, on the sth of November, the banks of the Yonne, at Sens. On the left, Prince Frederick Charles was feeling the extreme right of General Werder, vrkosQ head-quartets vreve at Dijon, on -whose left again was General Von Schinerling, the principal part of whose force, was massed round Belfort, the siege of which important fortress had been formally commenced in the first week of November! Due south of Paris, and in communication with the Duke of Meck-lenburg-Schwerin, was Von der Taun, in occupation of Orleans with 30,000 Bavarians. The French army of the Loire, which, under its new commander, General d'Aurelles de Paladines, had been content for some weeks to rest quiet on the left bank of the river, commenced on the 9th a general movement in advance by the left. Crowing the Loire below Beaugency, and concentrating his forces between that place and Vendome, General d'Aurelles de Paladines pushed forward to occupy the forest of Marchenoir, while with his extreme right he threatened General Von der Tann's rear. In the execution of his movement the two armies were brought into collision at several points. The Bavarians, aware of the great superiority of the enemy's force, and fearing to be cut off from their communication with Paris, evacuated the city of Orleans, and took up a position on the northern road at St. Peravy. Here he was attacked by the French in front and on his right. After an obstinate action around the Tillages of Baccon and Coulmiers, in which the Germans were worsted, and at St. Peravy, where they were victorious, it became evident that a retreat was inevitable, which was effected on the next day, the 10th, in good order. In this battle, called that of Baccon, the French gained their first decisive victory of the •campaign. The losses of the two armies were about equal, the French taking by their own account upwards of 2000 prisoners, including the sick and wounded which were in the hospital at Orleans, and •a number of guns and reserve ammunition. The proportions of the two armies were about the same as at the battle of "Woerthwith the difference that the French were the superiorinnumber, andthatit was the Bavarians who were surprised. It is acknowledged that Von der Tann made the same blunder as M'Mahon on the sth of August, of holding his enemy too cheap, and that he lingered too long in a posi-

tion which it was impossible for him to maintain with 30,000 men against 140, C0D. Great credit is, however, due to General d'Aurelles de Pulladines, who manoeuvred his comparatively raw troops with great skill, and who, but for the failure of his right wing, and the bad behavior of his cavalry, would have cut off Van der Tann altogether from the road to Paris. Although not disjjraceful to the Bavarians, who fought well for many hours against a greatly superior force, and who ultimately retired in good order, the victory at Orleans was attended with very considerable results, both moral and material. It put renewed confidence into the almost despairiug French, and gave the world assurance of a new military force which had risen in France on the ruins of the Grand Army. The Army of the Loire, since the 10th of November, has acquired a substantial entity, and its existence has ijiven a new turn to the campaign. There is no doubt that for the threo or four days succeeding the defeat of Von der Tann there was something almost approaching to a panic at Versailles. In the expectation of an immediate attack by General d'Anrelles de Paladines on the outside of their line of investment, seconded, as it' pi obably would have been by a sortie en ' masse from Paris, orders were immediately despatched by the German I leaders for outlying detachments to close up around the Versailles road. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, who was already on his march to join Von der Tann at the date of the latter' 3 defeat, took command of the united forces, retreating as far north as Etampes. To him was joined shortly afterwards a force under General Wittich, which had been detatched from the army of Prince Frederick Charles. That leader himself was advancing by forced marches on a line at right angles to the Orleans-road. Even Gereral ManteufFel in the north had orders to fall back towards St. Denis. In the interval between the 10th and the 17th, in fact, there was formed what was almost a second line of investment round Paris, within a few miles of the first. General d'Anrelles dePaladines, however, whether fearing another trap a la Sedan, or distrustful of his new levies, did not attempt to persue the retreating Bavarians beyond Thorny. Foe some days his movements were wrapped in mystery, and appeared to have been marked with indecision. At one time it was supposed that his object wasio take a north-westerly direction, so as to form a junction with the most advanced portions of Keratry's of the west, and then to march suddenly upon Paris on what was supposed to be the weakest part of the besiegers' line. If any such intention, however, had beeu entertained by the commander of the army of the Loire, it was quickly abandoned. The rapid advance of the " Red Prince" on his right flank compelled General d'Aurelles de Paladines to fall back upon the line of the Loire, and to be satisfied with entrenching himself around Orleans.

The week between the 10th and the 17th was marked by no change in the fortunes of France. The surrender of the fortress of Neu Brisach gave the Germans military possession of the whole of Alsace, with the exception of the two small forts of Bitche and Phalsburg. A small engagement took place on the 10th November at Montbeliard, close to the Swiss frontier, and resulted in a victory for the Germans, and the occupation of that place. On the 13th, the union of the various detachments, under the Grand Duke of Mecklemburg, was completed, and that leader recommenced an advance into South-western France, at the head of about 90,000 men. On this day Dole was occupied by the force under General Schmerling, having been evacutedthe day before by the Garibaldians. On the 16th the head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles were still at Troyes, a portion of his army, consisting of the 10th Corps under General Voight Rhetz, being at Tonnerre. On the 17th, the array of the Grand Duke of Mecklemburg, which had been marching westward, came upon a body of 7,000 French Mobiles at Dreux, whom it dispersed with trifling loss. This engagement was at first reported as having taken place with a portion of General d'AureUes de Paladines' force, but it has been proved that the Mobiles at Dreux belonged to the Army of the west, General d'Aurelles de Palidines being on the occasion many miles away to the east and south. On the 11th several skirmishes took place between detached bodies of the French and Germans in. the department of L'Aisne, ■with indecisive Jesuits. On the same day, a body of 400 Garibaldians, under command of Ricciotti Garibaldi, surprised a German force of double their number at Chatillon, and, under cover of the darkness, killed and wounded a great many of the latter, carrying away some 150 prisoners.

On the north, General Manteuffel, who had been arrested in his progress towards Amiens by the news of the French victory at Orleans, after falling back on Paris, seems to have been despatched in a northwest direction, apparently with the object of preventing a junction between the forces of General Bourbaki and of General Keratry. On the 21st, Manteuffel was at Gisors, holding in check the French troops in Normandy. On the 23rd the whole of the Prussians besieging Mezieres and Montmedy, were suddenly withdrawn, under orders to join the main army before Paris. On the 24th, the French claim a small victory over the Prussians near Amiens, with trifling results ; and on the same day the fortress of Thionville capitulated after a bombardment of twentyfour hours. To understand the nature of the operations which took place between this date and the Ist of December, which up to their latest results promise to open a new phase of the war, it is necessary to recapitulate the situations of the two armies. With the design, apparently, of enveloping the army of the Loire precisely as Marshal M'Mahon's army was enveloped at Sedan, and in ignorance, as it has since appeared, of the strength of the French forces, the German corps south of Paris were extended in a long line east and west, of which the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, with a body of some 70,000, occupied the extreme right, and the rear-guard of the Prince Frederick Charles, or that which was his rear-guard coming from Metz, the extreme left. The total number of troops available to the Germans, not including the armies of General Werder and General Von Schmerlins:, might be reckoned at 200,000 men . The French, under General d'Aurelles de Paladines, who had contrived to conceal their real strength and position with great success, did not probably fall short of 250,000 men. From east to west the line of the two armies

may be said to have covered a distance of nearly a hundred miles, the French being I chiefly concentrated in an entrenched camp formed between Artenay and Orleans. On the 24th of November the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, coming from Dreux and Chartres, had marched rapidly to within twenty miles of Le Mans — that is, to a point almost due west of Tours— with the design, apparently, of throwing up his right and making a dash upon that city. On the 26th of November, the two armies along the Loire began to come into collision at several points. On the French left, a detachment which had marched from Chateaudun towards a portion of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's army encountered a German force on the heights of Yevres, which, after a desultory engagement, was abandoned by the Germans. On the next day, a portion of Prince Frederick Charles's army came into conflict with the French, the Germans attacked consisting of the 10th (Hanoverian) Corps. The engagement seems to have been renewed on the next two days along the whole line of Prince Frederick Charles's front, his chief strength being in the Forest of Montargis. There was heavy fighting between the 30th Corps and the main body of the French, under the personal command of General d'Aurelles de Paladines, as to the result of which very conflicting accounts have been published. The French claim to have successfully repulsed the enemy at all points, and to have taken one gun and many prisoners. On the other hand, the official Prussian report speaks of the 10th Corps having maintained its ground against superior numbers for several hours, when the Prince himself having come to their aid with a couple of divisions the French were "victoriously repulsed," with the loss of over 1000 killed and wounded, and taking 1600 prisoners. A later account represents the troops beaten on the 28th as retreating on the north. The truth would appear to be that General d'Aurelles de Paledines, who has manoeuvred his army with great skill aud has shown much discretion iv the manner in which he has held his young troops together, had arranged with General Trochu for a great combined movement against the enemy. The army of the Loire was to throw icself on the Prussianline between Montargis and PithMers, and force a passage to Fontainbleau, where it wastobemel by General Ducrotwith all the available Mobile force from within Paris. This scheme if it has not yet entirely succeeded, has been attended with results which promise to give a totally new character to the war. The army of the Loire, if it has not been able to overcome Prince Frederick Charles, has given evidence of being in very great force, within a distance of not more than sixty miles from Paris. On the side of General Trochu, it has been met by a corresponding movement of great vigor aud boldness, which up to the Ist of December promised to be successful. After keeping up for three or four days an incessant fire from the forts in nearly every front of Paris, and making a feint in force in the direction of Chenilly on the 29 th, and another on the same day towards the north-east, the great sortie which has been so long threatened was finally made, in a quarter which up to that time had been entirely neglected by both French and Germans. A body of from 80,000 to 100,000 men, including all the regular troops of the Paris garrison, issued from under cover of the forts in various directions on the morning of the 30th of November, under the command of General Ducvot. After a terrible fight, which lasted till 6 p.m., the brunt of which was borne by the Wurtemburg Division, who held the investing line between Bonneuil and Champigny, along the southern bank of the Marne, a portion of the French succeeded in establishing themselves outside the German Avorks between Champigny and Villiers. The importance of this success, even if it is not followed up immediately by any other sorties from Paris, is very considerable. It is an indication that the I spirit of the Paris garrison is unbroken, and that the re-organising measures which have been conducted with so much skill, judgment, and patience by Gen. Trochu have succeeded to the extent of creating another large army available for the defence of France, and capable of acting independently in the field. If General Trochu is able to maintain his position, and if his movement is met by a corresponding advance on the part of d'Aurelles de. Paladine, there can. fee no doubt that the Prussians on the south-east of Paris are in an extremely critical position. The proof of this is afforded by the fact that General Manteuffel, who had gained a decisive victory over the French army of the north at Amiens on the 28th, was hastily recalled to the south. It remains to be seen whether the advantage gained by General Ducrot in the great sortie of the 30th November can be upheld, but all indications up to the beginning of December seem to confirm the idea that the war had henceforth entered upon a new stage, and render it doubtful whether the siege of Paris can be maintained.

[Our readers will remember that the late telegrams announce that the promised sortie from Paris utterly failed, and that the army of the Loire was defeated and scattered. — Ed. A.]

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GRA18710204.2.14.2

Bibliographic details

Grey River Argus, Volume X, Issue 788, 4 February 1871, Page 1 (Supplement)

Word Count
3,165

THE WAR IN EUROPE. Grey River Argus, Volume X, Issue 788, 4 February 1871, Page 1 (Supplement)

THE WAR IN EUROPE. Grey River Argus, Volume X, Issue 788, 4 February 1871, Page 1 (Supplement)

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