THE Grey River Argus. THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1870.

Grey River Argus, Volume IX, Issue 646, 10 March 1870, Page 2

THE Grey River Argus. THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1870.

The Act for amending the pre-existing Canterbury Ordinance for regulating the licensing of public-houses in Westland Jias given rise to numerous difficulties, owing to its incomplete character. The principles of the Act are right enough, and had proper provision been made for giving complete effect to its, intentions the Act wo,uld haye given public satisfac"! tion. But, like many other measures which have been h&stily drawn up and passed without full consideration, it is found to. b,e so disjointed as to render it 9, matter of great difficulty, for thos.e who are entrusted with its application, to carry it out in such a manner as to comply with its spirit without prejudicing previous rights. The greatest failing in the Act consists in the entire neglect of any pro, visions, for dealing with interests which had aii3en under the previous law in force. Had Westland been an entirely new country, without any legislation whatever with regard to its public^houses, the Act of 18G9 would have presented no difficulties in its application. But such was not the case. Under- former Ordinances certain rights had been created, which, however, the new Act failed to deal with, or reconcile with the fresh system. At the first licensing meeting the Magistrates, both in Greymouth and Hokitika, found themselves in a difficulty, Had they determined to administer the new Act in it 3 strict integrity they must have caused very great injustice to many persons who, having already paid their license fee under the old Ordinance", and whose licenses had not then fallen in, would have had to pay over again for at least a portion of the year, The G.reyuiouth Bench, fully recognising the hardship which a strict interpretation of the law would have created, decided to. meet the difficulty in the manner which they and we considered to be the fairest manner — viz., by grantW^' Jiceu.ses for such portion of the year as

was not covered by previous payments, and charging only, a pro rala fee. This plau was perfectly satisfactory to the publicans, and if carried into effect would have tended greatly to convenience of administration, It is quite true that the Act did not specifically give the licensing bench power to take less than the amount of a whole years' license fee, but as every* one was agreed that the Act never contemplated any additional taxation on the existing license holders, this plan was well calculated to meet the equities of the case. But it happened that the ultra vires action of the Greymouth bench, slight as it was, did not meet with the approval of the County Chairman, who selected another, but equally unlawful, method of bringing the new law into force, Mr Hoos chose to override the compromise which the Magistrates here had adopted, and instoad of allowing the interval licenses which the bench had granted, accomplished the same end by gr-auting, on his own authority, what he terms "interim licenses." Now, neither the old Ordinance nor the new Act provides for any snoh licenses, within the limits -suf the towns of Hokitika or Greymouth, and further, the Act is, positive and explicit on one point, which is., that all retail licenses, for the towns mentioned, must be granted by the Justices. Mr Hoos, in granting his '-interim licenses," clearly trespassed on the functions of the local Magistracy ; but, on the other hq,nd, it is equally clear that the Greymouth Bench had no legal power to accept, as, they did on the first licensing day, any payment short of that required for a whole year's license. The wholo case simply resolves itself into this—^the Act was infirm, and something had to be done outside the Act itself to give it effect, The local Justices chose one plan, and the County Chairman preferred another. Whether the plan of the Magistrates qr that of Mr Hoos was the best, is not very material in the consideration of the circumstances to which we are about to allude. The question appears to be— in whom, if any anyone, Ihe discretion should He ? The public-house law of any particular province or county differs very materially from such general legislative enactments as relate to the common interests of society. They are strictly speaking proprietary Acts, passed in accordance with the wishes of the local authorities, and not upon any grand ground of public policy. It is not necessary for the public interests that a publican should pay a license fee for the right to sell liquors ; but it is found desirable that the various local governments should exact this tax as a means of revenue. It is necessary, however, for the welfare of society, that pnblic-.houses should be placed under police surveillance, and that they should be conducted in an orderly manner, and it is chiefly with regard to the latter conditions that the authority of law is required. As the various laws in New Zealand relating to public-houses Stand, they include two provisions — one for raising a revenue, which is a matter purely affecting the local Government; and the other for protecting the peace and welfare of society, These two cbjocfc3 are entirely and essentially independent of the other; and it is this distinction which should be borne in mind in relation to the events, that ha,ve occurred recently here, in which the County Chairman and the Greymouth Bench have come into collision. As we have already stated, the County Chairman has been granting liceuses which are not authorised by law, Upon this Mr Revell, the Resident Magistrate at Greymouth, not only refuses to recog. niso them, but instructs the police to prosecute one of the holders. The police obey his orders. ; a prosecution is instituted ; and is at the last moment withdrawn by the police, under instructions from Mr Hoos. Whereupon Mr Revell and his brother magistrates deliver themselves of a homily upon the duties of the authorities, winch would have been very proper under Other circumstances, but which, under the facts in question, was quite unnecessary and uncalled for, and betrayed great ignorance of judicial practice, Mr Revell accused Mr Hoos of having connived at and compelled the police to assist in "a flagrant breach of the law," and stated that, if similar things were to be done, "there was an end to all Jaw and justice," and that it yet remained for the police to "show cause for such a dereliction of duty." One would think, from the highflown language used by the Bench, that really some '< flagrant breach of the law" had, been perpetrated, ; but such is not the case. The defendant in the action did hold a license, which, however irregular,, was issued at the instance of the representative of the local Government, who alone was interested in seeing that payment for a. license was ma.de, and as the documents antecedent to the granting of the license passed through the Magistrate's office, it must have been within his knowledge that application for the same had been made. Considering the circumstances the County Chairman did not wish any prosecution to occur 1 ,, and, availing himself of his authority, he ordered its withdrawal. We confess that we can see neither a " flagrant breach of the law," nor even an impropriety in this course. If apy impropriety has been committad it has been on the. part of Mr Revell, in himself ordering a prosecution and afterwards sitting to adjudge upon the case. If Mr Revell and his brother Magistrates will read up their authorities they will find numberless instances in

which, the Crown, in cases affecting its immediate interests, and not those of the public, has declined to prosecute. Many cases could be instanced in which the Crown has, through its legal prosecutor, declined to proceed in cases of breach of Customs regulations. And even further : case 3 have occurred in which criminal actions have been stayed by the Crown for reasons unexplained. "Undoubtedly, however, the responsibility of any failure of justice through the interference of the authorities must be borne by them ; but as to their right to interfere, there can be no doubt, It is, still a. question whether that right has been properly exercised in the instance referred to.