THE. Grey River Argus. THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1869.

Grey River Argus, Volume VII, Issue 518, 13 May 1869, Page 2

THE. Grey River Argus. THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1869.

There can be no doubt that th°. grand question of the ensuing session of the General Assembly will be the future de^ fence policy of the Colony. It is for the settlement of this question that the Legislature has been summoned earlier than usual, for it is simply impossible that the Colony can successfully cope with the Native difficulty by the desultory operations that have hitherto been the only resistance made against the tribes in arms against us. The Colony will have to make up its mind to one of two alternatives, either to provide the means for a systematic plan for dealing with the insurgents, or to abandon its self-reliant policy, and sue at the feet of the Imperial authorities for such assistauce as is necessary. Although the principle of self-reliance has never yet had a fair trial, we think that in spite of the many blunders that have been made, and the many disasters that have been suffered, the efforts of the Government have not been unavailing in checking the spread of the rebellion. We may with justice go further, and say that practically the military operations of the lust ten months have been quite as successful relatively to the force at the disposal of the Government as any of the previous campaigns when the Colony had the advantage of a large Imperial army, and an enormous command of money. The offensive power of the enemy has been reduced to simply that which any body of desperadoes possesses — that of making sudden raids on defenceless positions, and committing wanton outrages and murders on the extremities of our frontier. Whatever else may be said, it cannot be deuied that the operations of Colonel Whifcmore have destroyed the organisation of the enemy. There is at present no probability as there was ten months ago of anything approaching to a general rising of the Native population. Titokowaru on the West Coast has at 'least been scotched ; he may, and probably will, give a great deal of trouble yet, but practically his power is broken. The scales have been turned against him since the affairs of Tututuromokai and Te Ngutu-ote-manu. The raw undisciplined levies hastily gathered from the streets of towns have been transformed into a serviceable army, to whom the bush is now no longer a place to be dreaded. The enemy have been dislodged from several of their fortified poskions, and although the successes of the u-oops have not been complete, they have at any rate proved that the rebel natives cannot long maintain a footing in any one place. Considering all the circumstances of the campaign there is much in its results that is satisfactory, although it has been marked by sad eveuts — satisfactory in having proved that with a sufficient force the Colony can deal with the insurrection. It may be urged, as it has been the fashion with English writers, that we have already a body of troops exceeding the number of those in arms against us, but those who use this argument to support the charge of incompetency against the Government forget the disparity of circumstances under which the contending forces Kav# to fight. The natives fight simply when it pleases them to do so. They have no frontier of isolatedsettlements to defenr 1 . They can retire at will into the fastnesses of the interior and make sudden onslaughts upon the outlying European settlers, which would require a standing army of. thousands of men to guard against. Our forces, on the other hand, have to defend scores of scattered positious, separated by wide distances from each other, and at the same time to be prepared to meet the enemy in force, whenever it may appear probable he will make an attack. We have not yet the force, nor have we yet the money to enable us to assume the offensive, and it is quite clear that we must assume that attitude if we are to hope for the suppression of the rebellion. But it is equally clear that without some aid from the Imperial Government, the Colony is not now in a position to maintain the large force required, without having recourse to an amount of additional taxation which the colonists would not bear. Judging from the tone

pf some of the influential journals at home, it is probable that the Imperial Government may assist; the Colony either by furnishing munitions of war, by a vote of money, or by guaranteeing another loan. We do not think Jbroops will be sent, nor do we think the Colony ought to accept them under the same conditions as before. It is not likely that the Home Government would send out an army to. be placed" under the sole orders of the Colonial authorities, and upon any other terqis we cauld u,ot hope far a satisfactory solution of the war. But England might supply arms or money, or both, and that is the help which alone we have a right to ask, if we still insist on the war beiug managed by the Govern nient of New Zealand. There is. tlje other alternative of appealing to the Imperial Government to take the war into its own hands, which would of course involve the suspension of the Constitution in the North Island. But we do not think the Colony has pome to such a pass as this yet ; or that it has* so far lost its self-respect. Those who would advocate such a policy are cowards, and fools into the bargain. We do not doubt that a large British army would disperae the rebel natives, and perhaps march triumphantly through the leugth and breadth of the North Island, as General Cameron did through the Waikato. After this the troops would go home, and the natives would rise again as soon as their backs were turned, and would find no difficulty in dealing with colonists who had become emasculated and euervated by dependence upon otheft} for that protection which they themselves ought to have undertaken.