THE ADAMS CONSPIRACY CASE.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2696, 28 November 1882, Page 3

THE ADAMS CONSPIRACY CASE.

[pBESS ASSOCIATION TEIESKAH.]

WELLINGTON, November 27.

With regard to this case a summary of Judge Johnston’s judgment was given in our issue of yesterday. The three judges were unanimously in favor of quashing the conviction. The following is Judge Gillies’ judgment;— Gillies, J. opinion that the learned Judge who tried it ought not in the circumstances stated to have left the question of the capacity of the accused child to conspire to be determined by the jury, but ought to have directed the jury to acquit both of the accused, on the ground that no evidence of the capacity of the child to conspire had been given, beyond the fact of her age, her deposition before the Magistrate, and the evidence of the girl Morrison. The law is that a child under seven years of age cannot commit an offence. That from seven to fourteen years of age there is a presumption against the capacity of a child to commit an offence, which presumption may be rebutted by positive evidence of the capacity of the child to understand the nature and consequences of the act or acts performed, which acts if committed by a person above the age of fourteen would carry with them a presumption of such capacity. This presumption of incapacity between seven and fourteen varies in strength according to the age of the child, and consequently requires greater or less evidence to rebut it. In the present case the child is a little over seven years of age. The presumption of incapacity to commit the offence is therefore very strong, and the rebutting evidence of actual capacity must therefore be very strong. The offence charged is not a simple one, it is conspiring—a voluntary agreement between two or more individuals to give false testimony in pursuance of a common object, and in this case the conviction and punishment of one Longhurst. The evidence of capacity to conspire ought to be much stronger than that of capacity to commit a theft or such other simple offence. The child’s alleged co-conspirator is here her father, and this raises the further doubt as to whether the child was not acting under, if not the coercion, at least the direction of her father. This consideration necessitates still stronger evidence of her capacity to exercise an independent will and giving the alleged false testimony. If ever there was a case in which the words of Hale and Hawkins, “Strong and pregnant evidence,” was required, this is such a case ; but the case before us finds that no evidence of the child’s capacity to conspire was given. The age of the child was not evidence; it was presumptive evidence to the contrary. Her deposition before the magistrate was no evidence of such capacity, and the evidence of the girl Morrison, if it were worth anything, would, to my mind, rather negative than support any idea of conspiracy and of capacity for such a crime. Considering this case, I do not think that we have any right to take into

[consideration the verdict arrived at by the jury, or the charge to them by the learned judge] herein. I may differ perhaps from my learned brethren, but it seems to me if we come to the common conclusion that the jury ought to have been directed to acquit as a matter of law, we cannot use their subsequent verdict in any way except as an hypothesis. I have no reason to assume that the child’s evidence was false. X see no reason to assume that it was given in consequence of any agreement or understanding with her father; but even if these assumptions were made for the purpose of agreement, the law remains the same— That in the absence of “ strong and pregnant ” evidence to the contrary, she was incapable of conspiring in such circumstances. The case of Eegina v Fletcher, L.E, 1, C.C.8., 39, is a strong authority for the position that the question is one for the judge, and should not be left to the jury. I think, therefore, that the conviction ought to be quashed. The judgments of the three judges having been delivered. Sir Justice Johnston enquired whether James Jonathan Adams was on bail.

Mr Forwood replied that that was the case, and he was at present in Court. Mr Justice Johnston said the entry on. the record then would be that Adams, ought not to have been convicted, and his Honor would sign his acquittal. The persons who held him to bail would of course vacate their recognisance. Mr Forwood next referred to the application that was before the Supreme Court in banco for a new trial, and said he would, now feel it his duty to withdraw the application for a new trial.

Mr Justice Johnston remarked this being so there would be no necessity for himself and Mr J ustice G allies and Mr Justice Williams to sit in the Supreme Court to deal with the application. The conviction of James J. Adams was quashed accordingly, and this brought the Crown cases reserved to a conclusion.