THE EGYPTIAN WAR.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2691, 22 November 1882, Page 3

THE EGYPTIAN WAR.

THE BATTLE OF TEL-EL-ZEBIR

The groat and final battle was fought early on September 13th with the Egyptian troops under the command of Arabi, at Tel-el-Kobir, the speedy result being the capture of all his works and camps, together with a considerable number of his guns, the position being carried at the point of the bayonet. Sir Garnet Wolseley appears to have handled his forces in a masterly manner. The disposition of the troops was as follows : —The cavalry division was upon the extreme right; next to the cavalry came General Graham’s brigade, the hard worked 18th and 84th being reinforced by the 87th, a comparatively fresh battalion. Graham was supported by the Duke of Connaught and the Guards, and thus the whole of the first division was collected, under General Wifiis, to operate on our right and upon the north bank of the Canal. Between them and the Canal were the artillery, seven batteries, forty - two guns in all, massed under Colonel Goodenough, with the naval origade, their six Ghtlings and their forty-pounder on its truck occupying the railway. The artillery was supported by an infantry brigade, apparently that recently formed by the two light regiments, the 46th and the GOth, and commanded by Brigadier Ashburnham, although these troops later on must have crossed the Canal and acted as reserve or second line to the Highland Brigade. The attack to the south of the Canal was e’ trusted to Sir Archibald Alison’s Highlanders, the 42nd, 74th, 75th, and 79th, four as fine regiments as there are in Her Majesty’s service. Behind the Highland Brigade was the Indian contingent, consisting of another Highland regiment, the 72nd, with weak battalions of the 7th, 20th, and 29th Bengal Native Infantry. On this side the chief command was entrusted to Sir Edward Hamley. To have sent up an attacking column against a position known to be of formidable strength, in the open and in broad daylight, would have been madness, remarks the “ Standard,” entailing frightful slaughter and jeopardising the result. Sir Garnet, therefore, timed the march of the attacking columns so that they might arrive within charging distance of the enemy’s entrenchments about dawn. Moving off, in perfect silence, about 2 a.m., the six miles inter- ' vening between our advanced position and Arabi’s outposts were easily and safely accomplished by half-past four. Graham’s . advance took the enemy completely by , surprise ; the first intimation of the attack was the fire of our artillery and the sight of oar men. The Egyptian troops must, however, have promptly lined their entrenchments, for they at once opened, ' first wild, then well directed, well sustained volleys upon our troops, who had by j this time deployed, and were availing them- , selves of such cover as was to be had. But our men were forbidden to waste time in answering shot with shot; they were directed to reserve their fire and push on. With a grim determination that nothing could check, they crept forward, advancing in regular “ rushes ” to within a couple of hundred yards, then quickening their pace they fixed bayonets and charged home with old-fashioned British cheers. Graham’s men had a race for the works; all vied with each other to be the first in—the ISth Eoyal Irish, a fine corps with many glorious fighting traditions, “particularly distinguishing itself,” Sir Garnet tells us, “by its dash and the manner it closed with the enemy.’’ This terrible onslaught was too much for the unhappy Egyptian troops, and they streamed away immediately to the rear, abandoning their first line of entrenchments north of the canal almost without striking a blow. It was a complete debacle, an utter irremediable rout, in which some tried to hide, in their great terror, some surrendered, and more threw down their arms and ran for their lives. Having thus easily, but gallantly, carried the outer lino of entrenchments, Graham sent the 18th to storm an inner redoubt to the left, which was said to be the key of the position, and which was captured Tjy a second determined rush. Meanwhile, upon our left, beyond the Canal, an attack, which must have been nearly simultaneous with that on the right, was made by the Highland Brigade. On that side the enemy was no less taken by surprise, but he rallied quickly and opened a terrible and very telling musketry fire. Its effect is plainly visible in the list of Highland officers killed and wounded, which is, unhappily long. But the Highlanders were no more hindered by musketry than their comrades on the right, and, having halted when within 1000 yards, to form a fighting line, they again advanced, fixed bayonets, and charged. They, too, carried all before them, the correspondent of the “ Standard” describing the movement as the most martial sight he ever saw. Here, again, it was a case of saarc qui peut. The Egyptians fled in hot haste in all directions, closely pursued by our troops, the Highlanders leading, the Indian contingent coming up fresh and close behind. Thus the victory became general along our whole line. Guns in great numbers, probably the bulk of those mounted upon the position, fell into our hands, immense quantities of stores, also, several trains,* heavily laden, and at the lowest computation some 3000 prisoners. But Arabi, the arch rebel and leader, himself escaped on a fleet horse. Our losses are put down as follows: —9 officers and 45 men killed, 22 officers and 320 men wounded. The rebels had over 2000 killed and wounded.

One of the most impressive sights that he had yet witnessed, remarks the correspondent of the “ Times, ” was the Jaying down of arms by the infantry at Kafradouar, numbering some 11,000 men. Par away on the bank of the Canal we could see the stream of men with bayonets glistening in the sun. Company by company they advanced, their officers at their head, and carrying a white ensign. Crossing the Canal by the bridge of boats they passed through an avenue of redcoats. The soldiers were stationed at about ton paces from each other, and stood at attention as the prisoners passed down the winding avenue of half a mile to the station. There they defiled between a telegraph post and a train of trucks, throwing into trucks as they passed their rifles, swords, bayonets, and pistols, and leaving their water bottles in a pile on the other side. The effects surrendered included 700 horses, 15,000 Remingtons, fifty field guns, mostly eightcentimetre Krupps, with all harness, saddles, and general equipment. The men were allowed to disband, the officers were brought in under escort and lodged in Ramleh Palace. The disbanded soldiers seized the train at Damanhour by force and disappeared to their villages. The Alexandria correspondent of the “ Times ” throws a flood of light on the Egyptian army, and why it so suddenly collapsed. We are told that 11,000 men surrendered at Kafradouar, and these men picked and hardened Egyptian soldiers, and that Tel-cl-Kebir was only manned by raw recruits. We also learn that Aboukir, with 14,000 of the best soldiers of Egypt, has surrendered to Sir Evelyn Wood. The correspondent says that this place had “ a series of earthworks that Plevna itself could hardly have sui'passcd.” There were three long lines of redoubts —flanked on both sides by impassable ground, and traversed by a railway and canal, each line of redoubts with a 15ft moat before it, the distance between the two first redoubts being 4000 metres, the third 5000 metres behind the second—forming a position which 2000 soldiers might have held for weeks against 10,000, and which 15,000 surrendered to 4000. The “ Times ” correspondent goes on to say—“l asked Omar Bey what induced Arabi to leave his best soldiers here and to face our troops with raw recruits. He replied, ‘We were very badly served by our spies, and the continual skirmishes and feigned attacks which you made from this side deceived us. "Wo thought that the Ismailia move was a ruse, or at least only to secure the Canal, and that the real attack would be from here.’ ” If there were, as is reported, 11.000 picked men at Kafradouar, and 14.000 of the same class of men at Aboukir, besides the 5000 at Damietta who resisted for a few days, and the 20,000 men at Tel-el-Kobir, who were so soon slaughtered or put to flight, there must have been a large, but scattered and ill-commanded, army in

Egypt, and that army must have been sustained by national feeling, or it would have fallen to pieces from internal weakness. The latest explanation of the sudden collapse of Arahi’s army is one put forward by a French paper, that a good round sum was paid by the English for the defection of certain Egyptian generals.