THE LESSONS OF ALEXANDRIA.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2656, 11 October 1882, Page 3

THE LESSONS OF ALEXANDRIA.

Military critics (says a Melbourne exchange) are eoanning with esgsrnegg the details of the bombardment of Alexandria in order to elicit the lessons of the fray. For the first time ironclads and forts came into collision, and the experience thus acquired mutt teach a great deal. Admiral Seymour will obtain reports from the captain of each ship of the behaviour of the vessel and of her guns ; the hulls will be examined ; the calibre ol the Egyptian artillery will be ascertained and then important deductions can be made. Apart from these technical lessons there are broad results which we may well apply to our own situation, for any action fought at Melbourne would probably be like that at Alexandria, one of forts versus ships, In the first place, there is the fact that eight ironclads and four unarmoured gunboats were in action for ten hours without receiving serious damage. It may be said that the Egyptian gunners had not much skill. But they were men who had been carefully trained as artillerists by American and French officers, and it is admitted that they displayed creditable bravery, fighting their guns until the batteries were in ruins. The Egyptian guns for the most part were obsolete. They were no match for the British armament, but there is no reason to suppose that they were not good guns so far as accuracy and serviceableness are concerned. An 80 pounder may be no match for a 25-ton gun, but as an 80-pounder it may be a good weapon. What the result of the engagement would havs been if Egyptian batteries had been both heavily armed and well served no one can say; but we may consider, in the first place, not what are the chances of ship v fort in a sot engagement, but what are the chances of a ship seeking to evade an encounter with batteries as hostile ships would seek here. Balancing consideration against consideration, the action must be regarded as farther evidence of the difficulty of hitting ships under way, and of the possibility of vessels being able to run the gauntlet of guns in position. The American actions at Vicksburg and Mobile, where wooden squadrons ran past batteries which could easily have sunk them if they could have concentrated a fire upon the craft, are farther proofs. Alexandria is only the last incident of a chain of testimony. This problem naturally presents itself to us : a fleet of twelve vessels engages batteries prepared for the encounter for ten hours without substantial injury. What is the prospect of batteries at the Heads stopping vessels which would come in under a full head of steam, and might not be within range much more than ten minutes ? Thera can be but one reply, more especially when it is remembered that hulling a man of war is not supposed to destroy her. The Peruvian Huascar was riddled before she struck her flag. On this last occasion two shells burst inside the iron-clad Alexandria, but that did not interrupt her operations for a moment. With these foots in mind, the batteries at Port Nepean and at Qaoenscliff cannot be regarded as obstacles which can be depended upon to bar the progress of a hostile squadron to Melbourne. Their ate as stated by Sir Wm. Jeryois, hes in defending the magnificent anchorage at Queensoliff, which otherwise might be occupied by an enemy who could blockade the port with ease and in security, But it would be a bold thing to argue that an enemy bent on reaching Melbourne could not rush past them receiving little or no injury. The defence scheme relies upon stopping the enemies at the shoals below Queensoliff. The entrance to the two channels are to be guarded by torpedoes, and in order to prevent the enemy destroying these submarine mines by counter explosions the torpedoes are to be covered by forts, the guns of which would destroy bouts or vessels engaging ia the service. The Swan I»land battery is now partially armed, and with tor pedoes it would defend the West Channel. The South Channel, which is the channel for large vessels, is to be protected by a fort built on the shoal, and this cannot be erected for two years. Until then, therefore, the words of Colonel Soratohley in his report (April, 1880) will hold good : —" For all practical purposes, at the present time the Government would have to rely upon the Cerberus and the Nelson for the defence of Port Phillip.” As regards armament, there seems to be every reason to bo satisfied with the guns which are being placed in position. A number of 9in guns, firing 2501 b shot, have been already mounted; 10In guns, firing 4001 b shot, have been ordered. These ere the weapons which the Cerberus'carries. And it will be seen that the bulk of the fighting at Alexandria was done by these guns. The following are the vessels which wore engaged in tbe attack npon the formidable Fort Mex and its neighboring earthworks :

, f Four 25 ton guns (12 inch) Monarch ... [ Two 6 * ton guns Invincible ... Ten 12 ton guns (9 inch) Penelope ... Ten 12 ton guns (9 inch) The firing of the Monarch is said to have been the least effective of the fleet; The 9 inch guns of the Invincible and the Penelope, which were better handled, did enormous damage. Tho Alexandria, the Ternaraire, and the Sultan carry 9 and 10 inch guns, and the part they took in the action speaks for itself. Their armament is as follows : ~ f Two 25-ton guns (12-inoh) Alexandria ... £ Ten 18 ton gun# ( 10 . i, ai) „ , C Eight 18-ton guns (10 inch) Hultan ... £ Jf jur 12 ton guns (9-inoh) _ . ( Two 25-ton guns (12 inch) Temeraire ••• (Four 18-ton guns (10-inch) As a matter of coarse, the 25 ton gun is the better weapon for special purposes, bat the

118 and 12 ton guns held their own as capable of smashing almost anything which human hands can put together, while they are more readily worked. According to the correspondent of the “ Standard.” who appears to hare had exceptional advantages for studying the situation, some disappointment Is felt with the fire of the monster 81-ton guns of the li. flexible. The shot did enormous execution, but the fire was necessarily slow, and the enemy had time to recover himself. Some of the foreign critics aver that quick fighting boats, such as the Temersire and the Invincible, were more suited for the operations than were the monster ironclads. As we want a manageable gun here, the pr&ite bestowed upon our 9iu and lOia guns is important.

One of the incidents of the day is the long; engagement between the Marabout Fort and the gunboat Condor. The Condor steamed up and down end on to the fort, presenting the smallest possible mark, and always is rapid movement. She was not hit, while she dropped shell after shell into the works. The “ Saturday Review ” remarks that if a gunboat with a single 112-pounder could render suoh service as the Condor did, still better results must be expected from gunboats of the Staunch and the Gamma types. The boats recently ordered for Victoria are of this character. They will carry each one 10 in gun, throwing a 4001 b shot, capable of penetrating every ironclad at Alexandria, the Inflexible excepted, and carrying also two light piece* and Gatling guns. The performance of the Condor and her sister vessels must go far to establish the wisdom of the step taken in ordering thea- craft. While it would not be prudent to entrust the ds-feuce of the port entirely to vessels which would be sunk or disabled by a few well-directed shots, their value as auxiliaries must be regarded as established.