THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1882. THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2579, 13 July 1882, Page 2

THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, JULY 18, 1882. THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS.

We are just now beginning to feel severely the defective arrangements that exist with regard to the transmission of news from Europe. The amount of information we obtain ordinarily respecting the undercurrent of European politics is remarkably small. We know a good deal more about the doings of the Australian cricketers than about those of the Conference at Constantinople. Murdoch's is a much more familiar name in the telegrams than that of Arabi Pasha. It is to be presumed that Renter's Agency is of opinion that in this out-of-the-way part of the world European intrigue is not thought much of. The sooner the Agency's opinion on this subject is dissipated the batter. Men may talk more of the Australian cricketing campaign, but European items, especially when important,, cause them to think. Cricketing items are apt to become monotonous, while the play of national feelings, as evidenced by ever-changing aspects of Continental diplomacy, become to the careful reader of absorbing and ever increasing interest. We notice that a number of Australian papers have began to realise the undesirable groove into which the European telegraphic news is running, and ara looking about for a remedy. They certainly are not beginning to act a moment too scon.

Owing to 4he meagre information received np to date, it is extremely difficult to arrive at the true solution of the present crisis. That the English liberal Governm&at should have ordered the bombardment of Alexandria certainly means that the Egyptians had gone considerably farther in their overt acts of hostility against 'Earopean control than we had been led to believe was the case. The briefest of resumes will put our readers on all fours with all that is known of the causes that have led up to the action of the English fleet. The deposition of Ismail Pasha in 1879 was preceded by an outburst of national feeling against the European financial control. Mr Rivers Wilson, the English Commissioner, had been mobbed in a riot that took place in February of that year. On tha accession of Prince Mohammed Tewfik, Ismail Pasha's eldest son, to the throne, joint •' Controllers-general" were appointed by England and France, under whom the finances of the country greatly prospered. Tewfik himself honestly carried out his part of the. arrangement, and it was hoped that things would run

smoothly. But t&£ elements againsf which he had to worfe were overwhelmingly powerful. On the one hand there was the Saltan, who was endeavoring to re-assnme the rights over Egypt that he had sold to Tewfik's father. Then there was what was known a» the National party, who not only to the monarch being placed in leading strings by European Powers, bat ran counter to their sovereign "o his lesaibgf towards the Porte and the power obitained by the Circassian officers in matters political. Tewfik, in point of fact, at last became entangled in an impossible position. Ho wished to please England and France; he placed much reliance on the Sultan, and he hoped to be propped up by the religions fanaticism which looked to the Caliph as the supremo arbiter, even in mundane affairs; and, finally, he had one eye on the Notables, backed up as they were by the army under Arabi Pasha. When & man tries to assume an impossible attiI tude he generally falls into the hands of the boldest faction. England and France did not act with decision, and the European control was ejected. The Porte was to send, first a commission, and then an army to right matters, bat put off action from week to week. Arabi Pasha, on the other hand, who is a rough and ready soldier, took time by the forelock and absorbed the supreme command. Like the founder of the present dynasty, Mohammed Ali Pasha, he has sprung from the lowest ranks of the people, and the force of character that has helped him upward* was not likely to quail before a wellintentioned but perplexed sovereign. He had, moreover, the preliminary advantage of being connected in people's minds with what was thought to be, more or less, of a patriotic movement Egypt for the Egyptians was the cry he at first naturally raised, and he obtained a certain amount of sympathy in many quarters. - But his game was a difficult one to playv and it is possible he has forced the hand of his adversaries too rapidly. He may or may not be aiming at supreme power, bat at the very least it may be assumed that he has for some time had every intention of being the real ruler, although it may be under the shelter of the throne. He had lately, too, succeeded in gaining the connivance of the Snltan. There were two ways open to the Porte to regain its lost influence in Egypt. One was by the gradual cession by the son of the powers sold to the father, Ismail Pasha; the other the substitution of another dynasty, or at least the placing at the head of affairs a Minister devoted to Constantinople. Hence we may argue that the honours heaped by the Porte on , Arabi Pasha had a deliberate design. The Sultan, &s usual, preferred intrigue to action. If he could gain over Arabi Pasha, the game was half won. It was nothing that Tewfik should be thrown overboard ; such things occur frequently even in European diplomacy. But Arabi Pasha apparently failed to grasp the idea of the im[«rtance to England of the safety of the rciL'a to India. Led on by tie indecision" of the present Government, he might think that they would shrink to bring affairs to a climax. The Conference at Constantinople would certainly fail to impress him with the idea that there was limit beyond which England would not allow him to go. Arabi Pasha is not likely, by reason of his want of general education, to realize that the British Government's very existence is bound up in keeping the high way to the East open. All England wants is that the Canal should be neutral ground, but it is a sine qua non that it should not be liable to be closed at the bidding of the Egyptian or any other Government. The fortifying of Alexandria has evidently been considered by England as a menace to the safety of the Canal. Although the month of the Canal is some one hundred and fifty miles from that city, yet it is evident that, with a strong hostile force securely entrenched there, a passage so easily blocked as is the Canal might soon he pnt in the greatest jeopardy. Hence the orders to the Egyptian Minister to cease operations, and the bombardment consequent on his refusal.

The English Government certainly cannot be free from blame for having allowed matters to come to such a head. A little more firmness in the earlier stages of the affair would probably have averted the existing crisis. Had such a statesman as Lord "Beaconsfield held the reins the necessary steps would have been takon aa they were required. But at least this much may be said for the authorities—that, taking matters as they were a few days back, they were right to put their foot down firmly. The European concert was lagging dreadfully, while Arabi Pasha was acting. The safety of the canal is a supreme necessity for England, not only in a commercial, but in a political point of view. There are occasions in which to hesitate is to be lost. Europe will think no worse of England for showing that she is determined in this matter. It is possible, indeed, that other interests may step in and serious complications may arise, and Germany, Austria, and Russia, which will be the Powers to reckon with, may view the action in an unfavorable light. But that will not be from any opinion. that England ia hankering after theoccupation of Egypt, but from causes of a totally different nature.