THE GLOBE. TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1882. THE REPORT OF THE VOLUNTEER BOARD.

Globe, Volume XXIV, Issue 2558, 20 June 1882, Page 2

THE GLOBE. TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1882. THE REPORT OF THE VOLUNTEER BOARD.

Although the full report of the Volunteer Board has not yet reached our hands, yet copious extracts have been forwarded from Wellington, which give a very fair idea of the drift of the document. It evidently contains many valuable suggestions in respect to the discipline of the force, the qualifications of officers, and such matters. But when we come to tho broad question of tho status of volunteers generally, we find that the ideas of the Board have not been so satisfactory. Indeed, they are so exceedingly erractic that wo can hardly credit that tho telegrams do tho report Justice. However, wo can, at present, but take the only information received for what it is worth, and trust that, when the matter comes fully before tho public, it will not be so bad as it looks. The plan of tho Board appears to be that the present volunteer force ehonld bo disbanded from a date to bo fixed by proclamation, and that a new system should come into force on January Ist, ISB3, This system will

provide for the keeping tip of such a orce as will be sufficient for the duties which they may be called upon to perform in support of naval defences and in preventing landing from | **?. enem y’ a cruiser at the chief harbors. This smaller force is to be very efficient, which the Board very truly remark can only be obtained by an increased expenditure. The Board proposes that the first line” should consist of 2042artillery and rifles (including officers), with 530 cavalry, or 2572 in all, to be located at the chief ports. The second line is to number 1827 of artillery. It is proposed to strike out the battery at Invercargill and have an extra one at Auckland, because of the defective communication by rail, while the Smth Island parts could, it is asserted, assist one another. The cost under ths new system is to be about £3 18s 9d per head infantry, £4 Is lOd artillery, and' £5 4s lid cavalry. The total estimated cost for the first year will be £28,500 ; for the second year, £19,381. Now, the first thing that strikes the • reader of these suggestions is that the whole status of the volunteer force is entirely altered. "We had always imagined that the principal aim of the whole system was to confront any invader with a population trained to arms. W hen the present volunteer force in the United Kingdom sprang into being in 1859 at the time of the affair of the French colonels, the population may fairly be said to have armed itself en masse. There was no picking and choosing, but every able-bodied man who presented himself was furnished with a rifle which he was trained to use. The French soon saw the edifying spectacle of a citizen force large in numbers, and buoyed up by enthusiasm, and they recognised that it could be a serious matter to land in England and be forced to encounter, not only tho regular force and the militia, but this cloud of sharp-shooters. Viewed philosophically also it has been held that it is the duty of every man to be able to strike a blow for his hearth stone, and for this reason perhaps, as much as for any other, tho volunteer movement has taken a strong hold on the imaginations and affections of Englishmen. But what does our Board propose ? It burkes this idea altogether, and suggests that what may may fairly be termed a small standing army should bo raised. It is true that entry into this army is a purely voluntary matter, and that the cost of its maintenance will comparatively be a small one, hut the primary motive of the Volunteer movement is thrown on one side, and the doctrine is inculcated that our circumstances demand a small but highly trained force, and the services of the citizens at large are altogether passed over. We fancy that this doctrine will not find any favor in the public mind. Setting aside for a moment its practicability. Volunteering must depend on public enthusiasm, and for that enthusiasm to be cribbed, cabined and confined in the manner suggested, will not be at all to the taste of the population. The two lines will consist of 4399 men, and when this number has been filled in, the remainder of tho men in Now Zealand may look upon themselves as de trop in a military point of view. An invader will no longer have to face an armed population, but a select body of troops. If the proposed system is ever so well managed, many a most useful man will be left out in the cold. Tho safety of his property will depend, not on his own right hand, but on the exertions of a comparatively small number of his fellow-citizens, who may or may not be found to be equal to the task. If such a system as that contemplated is brought into play, why not, in lieu of it, bring the Militia Act into force in this island ? The burden of the defence of the country would by such means be brought to fall with greater justness of incidence. But when we take into consideration the practicability of the proposed scheme, wo think that it will be found not to bear the test of examination. A force of 4399 men, when divided among the different assailable points of the colony, will certainly not leave many men for each particular spot. The Board seems to think the various places in the South Island can help each other, because there is good railway communication between them, and for this reason the battery at Invercargill is struck out. Can any reasoning be more fallacious ? Supposing a heavily-armed man-of-war to swoop down on Lyttelton, would the party who might land from it wait for tho train that was to convey the Southern warriors to the spot ? Why, the whole affair would be over in a few hours, and, having finished off the small local force, the enemy would probably march down to the station and welcome tho several Southern detachments in detail—at least, if they did not march back straight to their ship. Nothing, to our mind, is more clear that, in case of war, every port in the colony should be able to play “ a lone hand.” If we in Christchurch are to partially rely on external help wa may find ourselves at a crisis in a very undesirable position. The body of the proposed highly trained Volunteers allocated to this place would be but small, and thoy would have to meet possibly a numerically equal force of, so to speak, regular troops. An armed population would meet an enemy with tho advantage of numbers at all events.

Oar complaint is that the Board has not grasped tho very essence of the Volunteer movement, and has, moreover, proposed a scheme which is not at all likely to work out satisfactorily. They suggest the disbandment of the present force and the starting of a new one on a fresh basis. Why tho present one should be disbanded passes our comprehension. All that was wanted was a method by which existing materials might be worked into shape. The present system is not in fault, but the manner in which it has been carried out. Tho Board has travelled outside of its legitimate functions. The Legislature have never contemplated such a haul ever sc >ncni as that proposed. Tho Board has apparently found itself unable to do what was required of it, and has gone off on an altogether different tack. Wo never expected much from the Board from its very constitution. But that it should have given to the world such a very singlar report is worse even than what wo looked for.