THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1881. THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANAMA CANAL.

Globe, Volume XXIII, Issue 2367, 3 November 1881, Page 2

THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1881. THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANAMA CANAL.

A ciECtTLAB was issued nine days ago by the Secretary of State for the United States which has, apparently, attracted no particular attention, but which may, nevertheless, have very considerable influence on the future of New Zealand. Mr. Blaine, in the document alluded to, announces that his Government insists that the United States shall have complete political control of the Panama Canal, adding that the Government will deem any European intrusion unfriendly. The line adopted by the United States Government indicates a new departure. We have been hitherto led to believe that that Government laid claim to no such arbitrary power with regard to what may be broadly considered as an international undertaking. Certainly, when M. da Lesseps was negociating with regard to the canal in the States, his scheme was never threatened with the incubus of such a protectorate as is now contemplated. It was then believed that the United States, acknowledging the importance of the canal to the world at large, was willing t® act in no narrow spirit, and was ready to see its benefits thrown open to all alike. Possibly, if President Garfield had lived, the present state of affairs would not have obtained, but Secretary Blaine has long been known as a man whose views are not laid on a wide basis, and the present political juncture has given him an opportunity of enforcing them.

It may be asked what is meant by " complete political control," for the phrase is somewhat vague. It may mean

that, in the event of war breaking out between the United States and any other country, or between two countries

entirely unconnected with the States, that then the States shall have power to prevent or to forward the passing of war

ships or war material through the canal. Or it may moan all this with the addition that the States shall use the canal generally in the direction of forwarding its own power and political interests. Or, thirdly, the phrase is sufficiently elastic to embrace a general determination that the canal shall be used for the purpose of furthering, not only the political but the material interests of the States. Those who take into consideration the

manner in which nearly everything in

America is made subordinate to business considerations, will be very inclined to imagine that the ultimate aim of the States is nothing more or less than to take advantage of its geographical position and undoubted power to foster, in

some degree, its own languishing mercantile marine The general tenets of the majority of American politicians are too

well known to render it necessary to point out that protectionist principles have become ingrained in their very being, and that it would be a labor of love with them to extend the idea so as to influence

tiio working of the Panama CanaL Of

'■ one thing we may bo very certain, that I Americana fret under the present deI plorablo state of their mercantile marine,

and that, while the bulk of them refuse to trace its decadence to its true causo, the less liberal minded would be not unwilling to stretch a point if they could thereby render it a service. As we have hinted, the politicians whom Mr. Blaine presumedly reprints will not acknowledge that protectionist principles are mainly responsible for the almost total destruction of the American mercantile marine. But a few moments' consideration will at once show that the state of things existing in the United States renders the nation incapable of struggling with outside competition. The high price of everything in the. States brought about by the protective duties in force makes it impossible that ships can be built there at anything at all like the prices they can be built in England and elsewhere. A ship that in the Clyde would cost £120,000 in the making, would in America cost £200,000. The price of labor, the price of iron and of all other materials, makes it impossible for shipbuilders in the States to hold their own. And even supposing the American ship owner were willing to sink the difference in the cost sf construction, he would still be unablo to carry on his business on anything like equal terms with the outside ship owner. For wages being high, a circumstance brought about by the high rate of living, he has to pay his seamen accordingly. If he provisions his ship in America he does so at a ruinous sacrifice ; if he wants capital he has to pay a high rate of interest for it; and whichever way he turns he finds himself hit in the same manner. The mercantile marine of the States has consequently for the last twenty or thirty years been gradually dwindling away until it has reached its present state, when it may be almost said to have died from inanition. If an American protectionist is asked the reason of all this he will vaguely answer that it has been occasioned by the war. The blighting .influences of the war aro made to answer for a good deal. The protectionist does not care to reflect on the fact that France, which was so badly crippled in the Franco-Prussian war, has not suffered to any appreciable extent in Iho direction of its mercantile marine, nor will he care to take stock of the fact that the commencement of the decadence of the mercantile marine of his country coincides with singular exactitude with the full development of protectionist theories in the United States. He only remembers that twenty or thirty years ago the American mercantile marine was in a flourishing condition, and that now it is nowhere. Of course the construction of iron ships has'had something to do in the matter. Before the war, ships were built of wood brought from the Bay of Fundy and other places, and the American ship builder had his supplies of timber close at hand, and so far was at an advantage ; but the loss of this advantage alone will not account by any means for the rapid manner in which the American ship-building and ship-owning interests have gone to the wall. Tho proseat state of affairs is mainly attributable to the blighting influence of protection

In view, therefore, of all the circumstances of the case, and of the views entertained by a large number of American politicians, it should not surprise anybody if the vague term used by Secretary Blaine covers something less abstract than a mere political control. Should the United States be allowed to have its way in this matter, it may well be expected that the political control may develop as the trade exigencies of the States may require. And finally it may possibly come to pass that a differential duty in favor of American bottoms may at once give that lift to its mercantile marine so ardently desired, and may carry to its extremest limits those principles so dear to one class of American politicians. For New Zealand the new phase in the history of the canal is full of painful interest. The public here has been gradually awakening to the vast importance of the work to our national welfare. When completed it will shorten very greatly our distance from the main markets of the world, and will, moreover, place ns in the direct route between Europe and Australia. With the Panama canal finished we shall be situated as favorably as any country could possible be in these latitudes. But if the canal is not to be a world's highway, the matter stands very differently. If it is to be utilised for American greed, and in the furtherance of certain short-sighted principles, then this country will suffer grievously in consequence. It is to be trusted that France, England,Germany, and other countries possessing large interests in marine trade, will bestir themselves in the matter and demand an explanation of the ambiguous term " political control." At present it bears an ugly look, and the sooner such countries face the difficulty the better. We can hardly imagine that they will sit calmly by and see the Panama canal utilised in the manner in ■which we have suggested as possible.