TORPEDO-BOAT TACTICS.

Globe, Volume XXIII, Issue 2171, 9 February 1881, Page 3

TORPEDO-BOAT TACTICS.

[" Pall Mall Budget.”] The study of naval tactics is so completely neglected in the British service, and all instruction in its principles is so studiously avoided, that it is scarcely surprising to find that but little attention is paid to the tactical significance of the new weapons which tho science of the day has placed in tho hands of seamen. When the general tactics of engagements at sea are so little considered, it is x-o wonder that minor tactics are rarely heard of. In the current volume of the " Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Mr Brassey, ever alive to the interests of tho navy, has published a translation from the German of a valuable and suggestive lecture on ” Torpedo Boat Tactics,” by an officer in the Russian service. The author of the discourse consequently belongs to a force which has recently been engaged in warlike operations, and to which alone we can look for experience of the employment of the latest forms of the torpedo in real earnest. Tho importance which this experience led the Russians to attribute to the weapon may be inferred from the fact that during the course of last year they added no fewer than 120 torpedo boats to their navy. Rot content with making this addition to their fighting viateriel, in which they have been imitated by all other naval Powers, they proceeded to turn it to a more practical nee than some of their neighbours by keeping, throughout the summer, a squadron of twelve of the boats in commission to train their crews to give their officers an opportunity of making themselves familiar with the methods of handling them, and to establish a definite system of torpedo-boat tactics. The results of their experience during the war and tho summer evolutions are worthy of attention. In the first place they are of opinion that the employment of torpedo-boats “as aggressive weapons" is likely to be attended with much less risk than might have been inferred from the history of torpedo attacks during the Civil War in America. In arriving at this conclusion they have not lost sight of the consideration that they may have in future to deal with enemies more determined and alert than those whom they had to encounter in their late war. An attack by modern tor-pedo-boats they hold to be capable of being made under* conditions more favorable to tho assailants than many of the “ cuttingout ” expeditions in older contests. It is passible that in forming this view they have attributed less importance to the effect of defence by machine-guns—so wonderfully developed within the last few months—than late experimental practice would appear to justify. Nevertheless their conclusions are based upon experience which in the present condition of naval warfare it must be conceded was considerable, and the maxima they have drawn up appear to be eminent ly sound. They exhibit a decided preference for tho spar-torpedo, an explosive charge fixed upon the end of a pole projecting from tho boat and practically forming a part of the craft itself. The two thus form a single weapon, so that the attention of the commander need not be divided between the management of his boat and the handling of the torpedo. The towing-torpodo showed itself open to two objections ; the tow-line containing the electric wire was liable to get foul_ of the screw-propeller, by which its insulation was destroyed and the weapon rendered useless and the boat itself precluded from moving. On tho other band, no peculiar dexterity is required to hit with the epar torpedo a target of the size of a ship; and the assailant knows precisely what is taking place, the fate of his adversary being decided before his eyes. The best place for tho protruding spar was shown to bo tho bow of the boat. The Russians found in the late war that every attack made by a squadron or boats was successful, whilst all made by single boats failed. They recommend, therefore, that such isolated attacks should only be attempted under exceptional circumstances. Every attack should be made according to some well-considered and clearly drawn up plan. A squadron of torpedo boats detailed for an attack should be divided into three sections or groups. The first section is charged with the removal of or the breaking through obstructions with which the ship assailed is nearly sure to have surrounded herself. The second section is formed of the boats which make the actual attack. The third is held in reserve to render help and fill up losses made in the leading sections by the fire of the defence. Tho last may also cover the attack by engaging ontlying boats of the enemy. The first two sections should approach the latter in double column. The post of the officer commanding the assaulting squadron should bo with the reserve. The speed at which an attack should bo made is evidently a matter of the highest importance. It is considered essential that it should be so regulated that the boats may get into their assigned stations simultaneously. The engines should be slowed at a short distance from tho ship assailed, and put at half speed when the space to bo passed over has diminished to about fivo-and-twenty yards. By adopting this method of approach the officer of on attacking boat can satisfy himself that bis torpedo is still in working order, and that it has got within the projecting defences with which the enemy may have surrounded his ship’s hull. The torpedo should be planted under the ship’s bottom, and as near an extremity as possible, as tho armour, if any, is there thinner than elsewhere. The torpedo should be fired on contact, and only when the attempt to do this has failed should the electric apparatus be put iu action. Ibis will prevent it a being exploded at too great a distance to do harm. To ensure a successful result the attack should be made from at least four points. Eor such an attack there will be necessary four boats to clear away obstructions, four to make tho attack, and three to form the reserve. The lecturer says that, “if only five of the torpedo-boats sent forth on the expedition return uninjured,” if the enemy is destroyed, the balance of advantage will still remain witfi the assailants, as the loss of the others will be fully repaid by the destruction of the ship. A single ship can with difficulty be defeudrd effectually against the flotilla cf torpedoboats. An interesting point is the color which these boats ought to be painted. In tho British service it is customary to paint them a light grey; but tho Rushans iouid this objectionable during the war, and that » light-brown or chocolate color was tho lecet conspicuous. Those results of their experience and of their subsequent studies contain lessons which wo should do ill to disregard. Tho tactical use of our new weapons is tees practised among us than is desirable ; end it may bo questioned if there is in the English language a single practical treatise on ary branch of naval taotios except that which Mr Brassey has given us in tho present translation.