BRITISH DISASTERS IN AFGHANISTAN.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 2120, 9 December 1880, Page 3

BRITISH DISASTERS IN AFGHANISTAN.

A cavalry officer who was present at Mait wand and at Deh Khoja has sent home a most interesting account of the disasters i which befel our troops in Afghanistan. He > says —“ We received information on the Monday night (July 26th) by one of Bt. John’s spies that a couple of hundred ot 1 Ayoub’s cavalry had reached Maiwand, ten | miles north of our camp; that 2000 of his i army were at Goormawuk, six miles northwest of Maiwand; that it was supposed the ■ remainder of the enemy would pass through the Goormawuk Pass that night; that the rendezvous of the whole army was Maiwand; and that their object was to march up the Khakroz Valley so as to reach Ghuznee by that route. A council of war was held of commanding officers and staff, 1 and it was resolved to march our force, with baggage, in order of battle at 6 a.m. the next day, and to move on Maiwand in the direction in which we thought we should have a battle ; and as Ayoub’s army had all along been reported to consist of not more than 3500 regular infantry, 5000 Ghaiis, 2000 cavalry, and 34 guns, we thought that with our little force, 1400 infantry and 450 effective sabres, and 10 guns, we should give them a good licking whenever we met them. Accordingly, at 630 p.m., we marched, with our baggage on our right. At 10 a.m. we saw the enemy’s cavalry on our left front, and for some time I don’t think they saw us. I was sent forward to reconnoitre, and observed the main body of their cavalry inclining to their loft in the direction of Goormawuk Valley, the advance post still watching us. I reported this to Burrows, and, after satisfying ourselves that a village which we should have to leave on our right rear, if we advanced to the attack, was unoccupied, the cavalry brigade crossed a big nullah which ran past the village, and opened fire on the enemy’s cavalry, ~W o advanced our guns twice, and at length the enemy’s position and their numbers in their enormous strength were fully revealed to us—not 3000 or 4000 infantry, but 20,000, and 4000 cavalry, and perhaps many more. To think of retreat was simply impossible, and there was nothing for it but to fight it out on the open plain, without any protection for our flank or rear, though opposed to such overwhelming numbers.” He then describes the action, saying that “ the Dooly Walis in many cases bolted, and the poor wounded lay imploring for help, and yet not a man could bo spared to carry them off.” About two o’clock the 30th Native Infantry, surrounded by Ghazis on both flanks and in front, gave way. “The Ghazis were literally mown down in hundreds—nay, thousands—but all was of no avail. The Ist Grenadiers followed suit and ran up against the 66th in their backward career, and the 66th, seeing both the Native Infantry regiments retiring, did the same and broke. In vain the European officers did all they could to rally their i men; in vain they gave up their lives and i died as they stood; all was of no avail, and the retrograde movement could not be stopped. Then Burrows rode up to Nuttall , and said, ‘ The only chance now, to give our retreating infantry time to retire in an orderly , manner and to rally a bit, is for the cavalry to i charge the line of Ghazis in their rear.” The i 3rd Uavalry and 3rd Scinde Horse, who were nearest, amounting, I suppose, to about 100 sabres, led by their officers, Nuttall, and my- | self, then advanced. I saw how hesitating their manner was, and that they did not like the job.” And after a feeble attempt at a ( charge they retired steadily at a walk, ] and the infantry ran as fast as they | could. “ There was no possible time or , means of assisting our wounded men, who i were hacked to pieces as they lay on the ground; not only were they out up, but the Ghazis rushed on to the top of the infantry i squares, cutting the men down down as they stood in the ranks. It was, indeed, a ghastly sight, but as we all retired defeated the prospect was still more hideous.” The officer then relates the horrors of their retreat, in which the troops suffered so much from thirst. “ Many succumbed, and it was no use trying to urge them on ; they lay down exhausted and awaited the arrival of the savage Ghazis, who followed us and who out them to pieces as they came across them. At last we hit off a spring of water. Stopping as wo had done to pick up wounded men, wo had got separated from the other troops, and in the dark even the troops who had been together got apart. When we arrived at the spring at 9 p.m. wo had with our lot about a hundred men of the 3rd Cavalry line and Scinde Horse together, no infantry, and no guns. What a godsend that water was I cannot describe, and how it refreshed us. The poor horses had had no food since five in the morning. We stayed at the spring till a quarter to ten, then started off in the pitchy darkness to find our way on our poor, tired horses to Oandahar, still thirty miles distant. At daybreak, we were at Asa Khan ; the wretched camels and the poor men on foot were utterly worn out, and we scarcely made one and a half miles an hour. The villagers, too, opened fire on us, and we skirmished with the enemy the whole way. When we got within a mile of Oandahar, the opposition increased ; we were fired at from both flanks, and had once more to bring our guns into action to clear the way. At length, at 130 p.m., after having been thirty-three hours in the saddle, having marched sixty miles on a worn-out, hungry horse, and myself hungry and almost utterly exhausted, wo arrived at Oandahar.” Speaking of the unfortunate sortie to Deh Khoja, a village about 800 yards from the eastern front of Oandahar, the officer describes it as one of the maddest ideas that ever entered the head of a general, the village being a very large one, and requiring at least 5000 troops to storm and occupy it properly. “ Furthermore, on its southern front it was connected at short intervals with numerous other villages all round our position, each one of which was swarming with the enemy. The project was carried out in the very way of all others to make it a failure. The cavalry, at least 100 sabres from each of the three regiments, left the Bedgah gate at 4 15 a.m., and making a long detour of about five miles, to avoid the fire of villages, arrived about 1500 yards east of Deh Khoja at 5 a.m. The artillery on the walls then bombarded the village with mortars, 9-pounders and a 40-pounder, and after a cannonade of half an hour the infantry was ordered to advance from the Oabul-gate and storm the village.” The cavalry, it appears, amid some skirmishes, made for the south of the village. Everything went well until suddenly the aspect of affairs altered. “The village, which when we charged had been captured by our men, was being rapidly refilled by the enemy, who were swarming towards it in thousands, and the fire was too awful to describe. An order had been given for the infantry to retire, and we retired parallel with the 19th Native Infantry, who were alongside of ns. The ground wos totally unfit for cavalry, being all cut up by walls in every direction, and there was literally no room for mounted troops to stand, much less to manoeuvre. However, there was no help for it, and all this time we were under the most fearful fire from the village close by, besides the enemy’s sharpshooters behind every wall and

enemj O Huarpeuuubcio uomuu every bit of cover tbey could dud. It was, indeed, a terrible ordeal, horse after horae and man after man being knocked over. I never expected to get out of it. So we went on till we reached the fort wall*, and we were then ordered to enter the Oabul gate and come inside. Up to this time, however, all the infantry had not been able to get out of the village to retire. It was easy enough to give the order, but not so easy to obey, for they were eurrounded amid innumerable houses, fired at on all sides, and fighting for their very lives. Three bodies of them managed at last to extricate themselves, two by the northern exit from the village (these returned by the Eodgah gate) and the third by the western side. I never thought they would get off. There were only thirty or forty of them, and swarms of Ghazis pursued them out, and were so close that it appeared to us from the walla impossible for them to escape. However, every man on the walls was ordered to fire, and, besides this, there were seventy or eighty infantry (retreating) who were half-way between the fort and village, and their combined fire saved our men, who got in all right with one or two exceptions.