THE GLOBE. FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1880.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 1995, 16 July 1880, Page 2

THE GLOBE. FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1880.

We yesterday drew the attention of our readers to the Report of Colonel Scratchley on the Defences of New Zealand, and gave an analysis of that part of the document which treated specially of the method which he advised should ho employed to repel the enemy's ship or ships in the event of any attempt to force an entrance into one of our harbours. "VVe showed that his advice was to rely on fixed batteries and torpedo boats, the expense of keeping up a system of submarine defonsivo torpedoos being, in his opinion, too heavy for the present circumstances of the colony. And hero an allusion may well be made to the disadvantages under which New Zealand labors with regard to dofenco. Her extended coast lino, the division of her population into at least four great sections, and tho fact that sho possesses four largo towns that require defending, are much against any efficient means of protection being employed except at a very large expenditure of money. The Australian colonies are much better off in this respect. Victoria and Melbourne, New south Wales and Sydnoy, South Australia and Adelaide are almost synonymous

terms, and tlio concentration of tho moans of defence at tho capital town guarantees tho safety ef the whole colony. Not so in our case. Now Zaland is a country with many heads, and proportionately vulnerable in consequence. We might efficiently guard the Parliament buildings, Government house, and the enormous wooden rabbit warren whoro the heads of departments are to be found running about like the familiar coney, but tho vitals of the colony might be attacked notwithstanding and almost irreparable damage be done by a successful enemy. This is an ill that cannot be helped, but it seriously complicates the question of defence. Turning then to the other modes of attacking our harbors beyond forcing tho entrance, Colonel Scratchley mentions three : " (!)• The enemy may attempt to land a body of men with the object of overcoming the resistance of the local troops assembled to resist his advance ; and, if successful, he might either levy a contribution and retire, or attempt to capture tho batteries with a view to the permanet occupation of the harbor. (2). He may bombard the town and shipping from positions at sea, conveniently situated for the purpose. (3). He may blockade the entrance to the port." The dangerindicated by the first of these three methods can of course only be met by the local forces opposing the landing. In our own case Sumner is indicated as the weak spot where an enemy might land, and march on either Christchurch or Lyttelton. He would, however, do so with tho chance of his retreat being cut off by a change of wind or weather not permitting him to re-embark on an open beach, so that unless he was pretty certain of being able to hold his own on shore, he would be little likely to risk the venture. The economical steps that are being forced on tho Government at present will, it is to be feared, militate against the maintenance of an efficient volunteer force being kept at each of the principal towns. It will have to be left more than ever to the patriotism of citizens to sacrifice their money and time towards the defence of their native country. It will have to be recognised that volunteering is not a mere " playing at soldiers," but that the time may come when a stern reality will prove or disprove the value of the whole volunteer system. Discipline and efficient organisation are not manufactured in a day. A spirit of enthusiasm will not guide to victory, and it will bo well if the citizens in our principal towns, while recognising the necessity of the steps taken by the Government, will, nevertheless, determine to do their utmost towards maintaining such a force as may deal with the small, but highly disciplined body of men that may, should war break out between England and another great power, be landed on the shores of New Zealand.

With regard to bombarding the towns from the sea and blockading the ports, it is evident that the principal reliance would have to be laid on naval means, that is, the possible presence of English cruisers in the vicinity. But, in the event of none of these being at hand, the towns are uot altogether defenceless. "It may beobserved," suggests Colonel Seratchley, " that the possession of the torpedo boats which I have recommended, would probably afford a simple way of counteracting the bombardment from the open sea —and even the blockade of the port—if the boats were made of such a size as to admit of their being conveyed, on board of a powerful steamer, to a convenient point, from which to launch them against the enemy's vessels." With regard to the special defence of Lyttelton the report states that, owing to the land on both sides of the entrance being high, it is impossible to find suitable sites for batteries for the purpose of keeping the enemy outside the heads. Sites have, therefore, been selected on the spur of a hill, west of Camp Bay, and on two points on the opposite shore, to the west of Gollan's Bay. Owing to the expense and difficulty which might be experienced in rapidly reinforcing the garrison on the south side, it is recommended that the battery on the north side be, for the present, only constructed and armed and Colonel Seratchley reckons that moro than forty shots could be fired at an enemy's ship before - she came abreast of the works. The remainder of the dofence would be entrusted to the torpedo boats, and, in the event of a landing being effected, to the local forces. There are a number of other suggestions contained in the report with respect to the lighting of the harbours by electric light, in case the enemy attempted to pass in at night, with regard to the removal of buoys and beacons, and generally with regard to the forces required for the proposed defences, the JSTaval Brigades, the constitution and strength of field forces, mounted rifles, &c, &c.; but space does not permit of our commenting on these topics. Colonel Whitmore, according to our contemporary, the "Lyttelton Times," has delivered himself on the report. Ho is stated to have said that it does not take into consideration sufficiently the financial condition of the colony, and that some simpler and equally efficient plan might have been devised. To the ordinary observer the contrary would appear to be the case. Colonel Scratchley's suggestions do not advocate a complicated system, and he has apparently reduced the means of defence to a minimum on pure grounds of economy. ' But Colonel Whitmore, if he indeed happens to be an authority on general military holds poculiar views on bombardments. " Grin and bear it, and you will get to liko it, and finally the enemy, ploased with your good nature, will retire."' Such has boon tho advice he has given before now. Tho plan is marvellously simple, but not in accord with the general run of modorn warfare. To bo comprehensive it requires on the one hand a population with an enormous capacity of seeing latent fun in a disagreeable crisis, and on the other an enemy with a corresponding lovo of a full-flavored joke.