REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS’ ACT.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 1926, 27 April 1880, Page 3

REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS’ ACT.

Monday, Apeid 26. [Before GK L. Mellish, Esq, R.M.] 0, B. BEIQQ3 (APPENDANT) V. G. D. DBE (ebspondbnt). This was a teat case brought under the Registration of Electors’ Act, in which the ruling of the Resident Magistrate was sought. The appellant claimed to have his name inserted on the roll of electors for Christchurch City in respect to premises owned and occupied by the Peess Company, Limited, in Cashel street, under the following circumstances. The. Board of Directors of the company had passed a resolution empowering the appellant, while he should continue to hold the position of managing director of ‘ the company, to exorcise all electoral privileges connected with the property of the said company situated as aforesaid. This resolution, together with a claim to vote in nspeot thereto, was forwarded to the respondent as Registration Officer under the Act for the City of Christchurch, who, however, refused to receive the same. Hence the present proceedings, the Act providing that the Resident Magistrate should act as a Court of Appeal in all cases of disputed claims to vote. His Worship having called the case, The appellant said he came there for the decision of the Resident Magistrate under the Act, as to his right to be placed on the roll in respect to property owned in Christchurch by the Pbebs Company, Limited. |He based his claim on the resolution of the Board of Directors of that company, authorising him, so long as he should continue the managing director thereof, to exercise any electoral privileges in connection with the property of tbe company. If ho (the appellant) could not vote for the property no one else could, and if his Worship decided this case against nim no Joint Stock Company in Christchurch would be entitled to vote in respect of property held by them as such company. Mr Lee pointed out that the section of the Act provided that the claimant, if claiming on a freehold qualification, must be a freeholder in possession. Mr [Briggs said that the Banks and all Joint Stock Companies were in the same position, and as this was a point of very great public importance, he had arranged with Mr Lee to bring this as a test ease. Mr Lee said he was very desirous to get his Worship’s ruling on the point so as to form a guide for future cases of a similar nature.

His Worship inquired what the appellant claimed as. The appellant said under the resolution of the Board of Directors of the Pbess Company he claimed to be registered as having a freehold qualification for town section 356. His Worship understood that the appellant desired to stand on the roll as the representative of the PuBSS Company. It would, perhaps, bo as well to examine the appellant on oath. The appellant having been sworn. His Worship asked the appellant whether he had in his own right, and not as a trustee, a freehold estate in possession having reference to the premises in question. The appellant said not as a trustee, but he was in possession, and a large sharoj holder in the company, far above the £25 value fixed by the Act. He was also the person to sue and be sued. This was the only answer ho could give.

Mr Lee said the other side of the question was this, that if the appellant was allowed tc , vote on this ground all the shareholders in the > company could claim also. I The appellant pointed out that the share- : holders were not in possession as he was, so i long as he remained managing director. Mr Lee did not see that being managing director conferred any right to vote any more i than any shareholder. i The appellant enquired how it would be with regard to a partnership ? Mr Leo pointed out that in regard to purt- ' nerehips a name was registered. His Worship said it struck him that the meaning of the clause, when it spoke of “freeholder in possession,” was that it should be one entitled to deal with the property. Now the appellant was not entitled, he presumed, to deal with the property. The appellant replied that it could only be dealt with by a resolution of the Board, of which he was only one. His Worship said the clause appeared to be very strictly drawn. It distinctly said that the person claiming must do so in his own right, and not as a trustee, though a trustee, of course, must have considerable interest in a properly, and though the appellant was a shareholder in the company, far above the limit fixed by the Act, he did not think he could be considered the freeholder of the property belonging to the company. Ths Registration Officer had, ho understood, refused to admit the claim. Mr Lee replied in the affirmative, and expressed the desire he felt to have the matter set'led by his Worship, for which reason the test case had been brought. His Worship asked the appellant if he was prepared with any authorities to support his claim ? The appellant replied in the negative, beyond looking at the law as laid down by the Act. His Worship said he should like to consider the matter as to the status of freeholders in this matter. Mr Leo said that this was not the first occasion on which this question had been tried. Some time ago a number of the proprietors of the Ohristchuroh Olub, who were, as his Worship would see, interested in the property more than the appellant was, endeavored to obtained registration. The revising officer of that time however declined to accept the claims, and they were refused. His Worship, after carefully considering the clause in the Act, was inclined to think tha the appellant was not entitled to be put on the roll as claimed by him. Was there any provision in the Act for taking the appeal further ? Mr Leo replied in the negative. It was provided that the decision of the Resident Magistrate should be final. Mr Briggs thought that on matters of fact the ruling of his Worship would be final, but in matters of law there was, ho believed, means for proceeding further. His Worship said this was essentially a question of law as to what was the construction of the words “ freeholders in possession,” and whether the appellant had a “ freehold estate in possession” as being managing director of the Peess Company, which company hold property in Ohristchuroh. He did not see how the appellant was entitled to deal with the property. The property was registered in the name of the company and not in the name of the appellant. The property would remain the same if the appellant sold his shares to-morrow, Mr Briggs said the whole question was whether the property was to be represented or not. His Worship said this was a case which did not appear to have been provided for by the Act. Mr Lee said it was provided for in the Rating Act. His Worship said that was an Act in which property voted on account of the valuation being made. He thought he must decide against tha appellant, because the property would still remain in the company, although the appellant might not have any interest in it. Besides, it was proved that the appellant had no power of dealing with the property. Mr Briggs said he could not deal with it either by way of mortgage or in any other manner.

His Worship said that under this Act the man, and not the property, voted. Under these circumstanoea he should dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.