THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 1924, 24 April 1880, Page 3

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN.

["lndian Daily News," February 28 J Having seen what the Afghan leaders have before them, and how the preparations for defence made by Sir P. Robert s govern the movements and objects of Mahomed Jan, we have now to glance briefly at the work before the English Government. We shall accept it as settled that the offences of the Wuzeeria will be allowed to sleep for a little longer, and that the more recent trespasses of the Mohmunds will not receive the full attention they would otherwise demand at the hands of the generals commanding at Jellalabad, Lundi Kotal, and Peshawur. Naturally the first end to be accomplished must be not merely the breaking up of resistance at G-huzni, but the stamping out of the movement headed by Sirdar Mahomed Jan and Musk-i-Alam. To accomplish this end, General Roberts is placed at Cabul, supported at Jellalabad by General Bright, who in turn is supported by General Boss. Their forces maintain the hold of the Government upon the Cabul district. The force in the Kurrum accomplishes a double purpose. The fact that it could give off a powerful column capable of travwrsing the Zaimusht country in any direction, accounts in no small meaauee for the peaceful behaviour of the Afridi tribes, who find themselves threatened from Balesh Khoyl, as well as from Lundi Kotal. But in the operations against Ghuzni the Kurrum force threatens Kushi, a point about half way between Ghuzni and Cabul by the Logar and Zurimat route, and having easy communication with the Ghuzni road at Shekhoabad by the valley of the Logar river. Any force marching from the Kurrum on Kushi threatens the rear of a force acting against Cabul, and might by a forced march block the Ghuzni road at Shekhoabad against its retreat. If, then, tho Afghans do not attack before the road over the Shutergurduh is possible, the Government might by pushing forward General Watson into the Logar Valley render an attack upon Cabul impossible to any army having its base at Ghuzni.

Again, should Sir F. Roberts take the field a c ilumn from Kurrum Blight advanci parallel with the main column, and dear at Zsrmat, and unite with the General in front of Ghuzni after cutting off all retreat of the Afghan army eastwards. Or if it be not considered advisable that the Kurrum force should co-operate with Sir E. Roberts there is still plenty of work for it to do. Whether or not it ought to be concentrated, and mobilised so as to threaten the Ghilzais and Mangals, and at the same time paralyse any movement in Khost or marching from Baleen Kheyl on Matun, the capital of Khost, it might turn westwards and descend upon Ghuzni, effeotually breaking up any attempt of the eastern tribes to combine in force, and wholly preventing them from sending recruits to Mahomed Jan. Even if the column under Brigadier Watson be not employed at. all, it still exercises a valuable political influence protective of the line of communication through the Khyber. Turning to the south, General Stewart holds Candahar, with an outpost at Kbelat-i-Ghizai. Candahar is 227 miles from Ghuzni, against 88 miles, the distance from Cabul. The Candahar column is, moreover, especially strong in guns ; it may, therefore, be considered certain that General Stewart will detach a force with a battering train to act against Ghuzni. But for this purpose lie will have to gather up a powerful transport train, since for some distance beyond Khelat-i-Ghilzai he will have to trust to his own resources as to supplies. This general has, moreover, the duty of watching Herat, and must be maintained in a position to advance and restore order at Herat. We see then that the campaign is likely to be an extended one, and that the very distances to be traversed put out of the question the idea of rapid marches to attack and swift withdrawals. It is no fencing match, but serious war, in which combination is required, and a careful and honest working together of all the commanders. The results may then be such as England may fairly congratulate herßelf upon, and such as may advance the solution of the Afghan difficulty, by rendering it plain to our rivals that that difficulty is no longer a drag upon our exertions. But our readers may fairly ask what number of troops will be required for such extended operations ? Taking Candahar, we find two brigades holding the line of communication—one at Dadur, and one at Quetta. But as the railway advances, the Government may supply the place of soldiers by a well-trained military police, and set free its regiments for their proper work at Candahar. To hold Candahar will require, say 4000 men ; a column for Ghuzni will absorb COOO more ; the communications 3000 ; and for Herat fully 10,000 would be required, so as to allow of Eurra and Girishk being held by 2000 men each. In this direction, therefore, the eventualities of the position opening with the spring will require about 23,000 to 25,000 men, and this supposes that the forces advancing on Ghuzni will cut itself clear of Candahar as soon as it passes Khelat-i-Gbilzai.

In the north, Sir F. Roberts cannot move without a garrison for Oabul, not merely strong enough to hold the city, but to overawe any movement from Kobistan or Turkestan. Five thousand men will be none too many for such work, and considering that the General will have to march eighty-eight miles through a hostile country and secure his communication, he ought to move out of Cabul with a division of 10,000 fighting men. Then the line of communication with India through Jellalabad has to be maintained, and this will occupy another division of 10,000 men, of whom not more than a brigade of 2,500 men could be spared, if need be to support Cabiil, should that point be threatened. We will not add a man to the 6000 in tho Kurrum. The calculations set out above gave us 31,000 men for employment in the northern theatre. If we add 1000 men for Tnull-Ohotiali, and 3000 to watch Tonk and the Wuzeeri country, we have a force of about 60,000 men required for the work that mußt be done, if India is to retain her reputation amongst Asiatics as a military power. This force of 60,000 men, if properly equipped with artillery, will require some 212 or 220 guns, and oughttou.. able to thoroughly pacify and conquer all Afghanistan. Resistance will cease as soon as the Afghan leaders and tribesmen comprehend that the force at Cabul is only the advance of a powerful army. But to supply such a force for the field, the Government had been obliged to indent upon the armies of all the Presidencies to an extent altogether unprecedented. We shall endeavor to show roughly what the demand has been, and what the forces left to garrison each Presidency. In making our calculations, we have considered the Hyderabad contingent as froperly belonging to the Madras Presidency, ts duty is in that Presidency, for it is a duty the contingent shares with the Madras troops. The Aden garrison we have taken as troops on service from Madras. The Naga outbreak we have taken as locking up only two battalions of Bengal Infantry, though we might have taken it as commanding the services of four infantry regiments. In giving the figures we have not separated European from Native regiments. Our fiigures, too, are more in the nature of an approximation than figures whose absolute correctness we are prepared to vouch for : Bengal.

On Left as Total. Service. Garrison. Artillery ... 52 Battalions ... 18 ... 34 Cavalry ... 34 Regiments ... 19 ... 15 Infantry ... 100 Battalions ... 49 ... 51 Sappers ... 10 Companies ... 9 ... 1 This, however, does not represent the full garrison of Bengal, under whioh term we include the Central Provinces, for it has the aid of two regiments of cavalry and fifteen and a-half regiments of infantry from Madras. The actual garrison then, of Bengal, Bajpootana, the, North-West, the Punjab, and Central India may be put down as : Sappera 1 Company. Artillery 34 Batteries. Cavalry 17 Regiments. Infantry 66ir Battalions. Bombay. On Left as Total. Service. Garrison. Artillery... 21 Batteries 8 ... 13 Cavalry ... 8 Begiments... 6 ... 2 Infantry... 39 Battalions ... 17 ... 22 Sappers ... 5 Companies ... 5 ... 0 Madras. Including Contingent Left as Hyderabad. on Service. Garrison. Total. Artillery... 23 Bittories 7 ... 16 Cavalry ... 10 Regiments ... 2 ... 8 Infantry... 56 Battalions ... 31£ ... 24J Now, if we take the batteries at a uniform strength of 150, the cavalry at 450, and the infantry at 750 men, which is by no means under-estimating their average strength, we have for the garrison of the Bengal Presidency and Central India 62,525 men, for Bombay 19,350 mpji, and for Madras 24,275 men. But from the Bengal force must be deducted at least 10,000 men for the Peshawur, Bawal Pindi, and Lahore divisions, leaving the actual garrison between the Nerbudda, the Sutlej, and the sea, about 52,000 men.