THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1879.

Globe, Volume XXI, Issue 1788, 13 November 1879, Page 2

THE GLOBE. THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1879.

Lokd Beaconfield’s cheery method of treating affairs in general is certainly one of his loading characteristics. He never appears in the slightest disheartened, and is always willing to make an epigram or draw a comforting moral from any given sot of circumstances. He is over ready to discount his own good luck. Ho has invariably been so fortunate that be feels that he can draw with confidence on the future. The airy way, in which, in his Mansion House speech, the summary of which is to bo found in another column, ho has prophesied a prolonged peace throughout Europo is calculated to confirm tho wavering, and astonish those who have not pinned their faith on the Government policy. Ho draws comfort even from the result of tho Zulu war. One result, he tells us, has been that tho colonists have been taught self-reliance. At first sight it may be difficult to understand this. The Zulus have boon conquered by Imperial troops—although assisted indeed by tho colonists and Native levies—and it is somewhat of an enigma to state that ■when Natal has boon saved almost entirely by aid from without, tho colonists have learnt therefrom a lesson of selfreliance. Indeed Lord Beaconsfield has probably drawn somewhat on his imagination with regard to tho effect that tho campaign may have had on tho Natal colonists. There have not boon wanting critics, however, who have mado thoir own deductions from tho events which have passed in South Africa. Tho Germans, who have first right to pass judgment on military matters, have been somewhat candid in thoir remarks. With regard to tho disaster of Isandula and tho subsequent victory of Ulundi, tho German press gave full credit to tho bravery of the British troops. It did not make much of the defeat, nor, indeed, did it place such a high value on the victory that followed. It stated its belief that with the splendid material out of which British troops aro formed, and with all their well known fighting qualities it was absurd for the English

latiou to become so depressed by tbo lisaster or so elated by the victory. Bat m vhat the English have to bo reproached Q l vith, says the German press, is this— w ;hat they do not maintain their military ° system in such a condition as a well jrdered State ought to maintain it. “ The t] manufacture of arms alone,” says one of n the leading journals, “by reason of its P technical character, appears to have some- “ thing attractive in it for the English E heart and in the construction of huge b guns England admittedly stands first. I But as to the actual kernel of all war * science the perfect and individual ) dovolopomont of soldier’s—the events of v 1870 and 1871, from which it might t have learnt so much and from which t other States have profited to such an c extent seem to have made as tom- ] porary an impression on the English t array as the reflection in a mirror.” j There is no doubt much truth in this ( criticism. The commissariat and similar departments in the English army have ( not kept pace with the march of modern i warfare. The technical training of the i common soldier is not carried to that j length to which it is among Continental I nations. In the Zulu war the utter want > of organization in the intelligence de- : partmont would have boon ridiculous if its consequences had not been so sad. With a view to the stand that is being taken up by the English nation in connection with foreign politics, it would bo well if more attention wore to bo paid to the organization of the British army. It is not as if the matter were hid under a bushel. Foreign critics make their comments, and the authorities will have no excuse if, when the day for action comes, they are found unprepared. Notwithstanding Lord Bcacousfiold’s pacific prophecies it is possible that England, either in Central Asia or in Europe, may have, before many years are passed, to engage in a war far differing either from the Afghan or Zulu wars. Events march rapidly in wars with countries well versed in the latest improvements in war science, and if in such a crisis an army is not moderately perfect in its organization, it faro ill with it.