ACTION AGAINST THE BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES.

Globe, Volume XXI, Issue 1654, 9 June 1879, Page 4

ACTION AGAINST THE BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES.

The judicial committee of the Privy Council have given judgment in tin appeal trom the Supreme Court of New South Wales in an action brought against the Bank of NewSouth Wales for malicious prosecution The respondent, Mr William Owston, a merchant at Sydney, brought an notion against the Bank of New South Wale* for having maliciously and without reasonable o • probable cause charged him with stealing a draft for 61500, the property of the bank. The draft had'been drawn by Messrs Morgan, Conner, and Clyde, of Adelaide, upon the respondent’s firm, against a consignment of wheat, and had been gent to the bank for presentation. In cmsequence, however, of a telegram announcing the return to port of the ship containing the wheat, Mr Owston contingently declined acceptance until he could reeei <o a further telegram from Adelaide; and thereupon the draft was sent by the bill clerk to the bank’s ordinary solicitors and notaries for the purpose of being noted. By the following morning telegrams had been received both by the bank and Mr Owston authorising a change of the draft from thirty days’ to sixty days’ eight, upon which Mr Owston called at the bank and informed the bill clerk of his readiness to accept On the sxme morning the draft was presented to Mr Owston in its original state by a young clerk from the office of the solicitors (who had not been informed of the new arrangement), with the view of noting for non-acceptance; and Mr Owston, supposing it to be sent by the bank for acceptance, as u sixty days’ draft, kept it for that purpose. Shortly afterwards another clerk of the solicitors called for the draft, and thereupon a misunderstanding arose between Mr Owston and this clerk, the former intending to send the draft accepted at sixty days’ to the bank, and the latter conceiving that he was withholding it dishonestly. Mr Owston presently afterwards altered the draft to sixty days’, and sent it to the bank duly accepted. This fact, however, was not conununicited Tby the bill clerk to the bank’s manager, nor by the bank to his solicitors ; and in consequence of such want of intercommunication, and of the misunderstanding between the solicitors’ second clerk and Mr Owston, the solicitors became impressed with the idea that Mr O wston meant neither to accept nor to return the draft, but to purloin it. While, as would seem, under this impression, they had an interview on tt>o subject with Mr Wilkinson, the Bank’s Sydney manager, who happened to come to their offices on other business. Later in the day, and two or three hours after the draft had been received at the Bank, but in ignorance of that fact, and under further misapprehension, the charge of Stealing was preferred before the Water Police magistrate upon the sworn information of the young clerk already mentioned; and the second clerk, who was preoont, pressed the magistrate to grant a warrant of apprehension and a search warrant on the allegation of danger that the draft would be destroyed if not at once recovered by those means. The magistrate refused the application, but issued a summons for Mr Owston’s appearance on the following morning to answer the charge next day. Mr Owston appeared at the police court in obedience to the summons. The Bank’s solicitor then wished to withdraw the charge, but the Justices refused to allow it to be done. No evidence was tendered, and the Magistrates dismissed the charge. Tne action for malicious prosecution was tried before Mr Justice Manning and a jury, and a verdict was found for Mr Owston, with £SOO damages. The Bank then obtained a rule for a new trial on the grounds, among others, that the proceedings were not authorized by the Bank, or by any person having permission to act for them, and that there was no evidence of malice. The rule was discharged by a majority of the Court, and from their decision the appeal was instituted. Their Lordships, in the result, reversed the decision of the Court below, and allowed the appeal, with costs. The rule for a new trial was thus made absolute.