THE AFGHAN WAR.
DISPOSITION OE Till! FOBCES AND TUEIB DESTINATION. Tho correspondent of the " London Times" telegraphs from Darjecling on October 4th as follows : Reports are current; that a body ot the Ameer's soldiers, consisting of four regiments :md fix. guns, have advanced to the mouth of the Khyber Pass. A bazaar rumour states that the Ameer is massing troops and lias no | intention of submitting. Tho neighboring \ tribes are perfectly quiet. Tho latest Tress news from Lahore states > that the advance on Oabul has for the present been abandoned. The armed demonstration 1 on tho frontier is intended to coerce the ■ Ameer to accept our terms without compelling 1 us to go to war. The Ist Sikhs and the Ist : Mountain Battery will march, immediately ' from Kohat to Peahawur. Colonel \ilhers, , the Viceroy's military secretary, accompanies . the Jamrood Expedition. Grave complaints <: are made of the commissariat arrangements e with reference to crritiire for troops. i ft is reported from Umballa that tho 2fstb t Regiment of Xiif.iv.- Infantry had arrived ; t and the 70l h and 59th Foot proceed forthwith 0 to Moaltan ; and that a detachment of the y 18th Royal Irish left Rnivind by special 1 train for Mooltan. The Indus Valley Railway is preparing for the carriage of the It Bombay column to Sukhur. The loth Sikhs . c have marohed from Sealkototo join the forces
assembling at Mooltan. The 23rd Pioneers havo marched from Simla en route for the frontier. General Biddulph and Maj .r Worsley loft Nynee Tal for Qucttah on Friday. Ihe troops will consist of two divisions. The 2nd Division will hi divi led into two columns, one and".- General Rob rta moving up the Kuronn Valley; the eecond column joining at Dara Ghazi-Khan, will reinforce the Pioneers at Quettah. The ])ivision will for tho present remain in support. Colonel Hills proceeds at once to Dera-Ghazi-
i K■ .!■ i. 1. st.n the advance of the troops to Q.iii-Mah. There is considerable delay consequent on defective carriage. Colonel Lane h«s been ordered to Mooltan to superintend and expedite the commissariat arrangements for the Qucttah force, carriage being again the difficulty. It is reported that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederic Haines, will command in person should an expedition against Cabul be determined upon. Tl is stated from Lahore that according to influential native opinion the mere entry of British troops into Afghanistan would lead to the deposition and possibly the assassination of tho Ame■'!■ ' y iiia subjects, with whom he is very unpopular. The Government aro very reticont as to the ulterior destination of tho troops, but as far as any conclusion can be drawn from the movements of troops and other indicia of military policy, the Viceroy's plan of operation would appear to be to endeavor to coerce tho Ameer to yield an unqualified submission by a strong military demonstration on his frontier, and so prove to him that the Government have both the power and the will to occupy, and if necessary to annex, his territory in the event of his proving unsubmissive. It is hoped, in addition, that when once the Afghanß have tangible proof that the Government are determined to insist upon absolute compliance with its demands, they themselves will impose great pressure upon the Ameer, and that should this pressure not prove successful, tho Ameer will probably be dethroned, as it is believed that the people would be most unwilling to dnw upon themselves the inevitable alternative of an armed occupation in order to further the Ameer's individual proclivities in favor of a Russian alliance. In order effectually to carry out this policy it will be necessary to occupy in force the debouches of both the Bolan and the Khyber Passes. This is with the twofold object of preparing against active aggressive measures by the Ameer and of being prepared afc the commencement of the spring for an immediate march upon Cabul and Candahar. Should the present measures prove barren of successful results, there can bo little doubt that the Government will use eve"y endeavor to avoid a winter campaign, and, unless driven to adopt offensivo operations by aggressive military movements on the part of the Ameer, they will in all probability rest content until the winter is over with consolidating tho necessary military and commissariat preparations for the very serious undertaking of a prolonged Afghan war. Possibly if a favorable chance should h.ippcn a seizure of Candahar by a coup dc main might be attempted; but this is not thought a very probable occurrence, more especially as the Ameer has been long forewarned by our occupation of Quettah and is fcaid to have greatly strengthened the fortifications and to have adopted other precautionary measures to guard against both surprise and attack. ALI MUHJID. The following in reference to this fortress, of the capture of which by the British intelligence was telegraphed on Sunday last, is from the " Times" of October 3rd : We learn that the Ameer has brought down a corsiderablo body of men to the mouth of the Kyber, and to prevent these troops debouching into our plains and destroying our villages is all important. As to the plan of moving on to Ali Musjid with the intention of remaii ing there during the winter, the following sketch of the part this little fort played from 1839 to 1842 may not bo uninteresting. It takes its name from the ruins of a small Mahommedan mosque in its vicinity, and is situated midway between Peshawur and Dhaka, about eight miles from the eastern, twenty-six from tho western end of the Kyber Pass, and seventy from Jelalabad. It stands on the south side of tl>e Pass, on the summit of beetling crags which tower perpendicularly above the roadway. The crests of the hills at this spot are barely 150 yards from each other, and as on the northern slopes a smaller masonry blockhouse is constructed, a very effective cross-fire can be poured on troops advancing through tie defile. Fortunately the fort is commanded both from the south and from the west, and it was on these faces that Colonel Wade delivered his attack in 1839. Although he commenced his operations on the 25'h of July, and was enabled in a few hours to drive the defenders from their outworks by the accuracy of his shell fire, they only being armed with matchlocks, itwas not until three days later that the place surrendered. Its garrison was under 1000 strong, of whom 500 were Irregular Jezailchees, the remainder levies from the Afridi and Shinwarri tribes. Wade's loss was over 150 killed and wounded. As the occupation of the place was absolutely necessary in order to keep open free communication with our forces in Jelalabad and Cabul, a garrison of Yusufzae Pathans wa3 placed in it. In November, 1841, a desperate attack was made on the fort by a body of about 2000 men belonging to the neighboring Afghan tribes. They cut off the water supply and reduced the place to dreadful straits ; but Mackeson, ever fertile of resource, bought, them off. A force under Colonel Moseley, consisting of 2500 men, was then sent to hold it, but owing to insufficiency of provisions that officer was compelled to retire in eight days, with a loss of 180 killed and wounded. Sir George Pollock on his advance through the Khyber left a garrison in Ali Musjid, and on evacuating Afghanistan in November, 1842, he destroyed the works, but they were speedily reconstructed by the orders of Dost Mahomed. The great drawback to Ali Mu'jid is its insalubrity. In 1839 the mortality in the British detachment holding it under Colonel Wade was somsthing terrible. In less than eight weeks there were 250 deaths out of a strength of a little over 2400 men. This was mainly owing to the water, which is strongly impregnated with antimony, and even this supply is only obtained from the Khyber striata below, so that the place can easily be fowed into capitulation, should timo bo no object with the advancing army. TUB KYBKIt FASB. The Kyb<r Pass is a mountain defile twentyeight miles In length, in which there are few places where an army could find oover. In April, 1842, however, General Pollock, with a force Iwhica comprised onlv one European battalion, seven native battalions, three regiments of cavalry, and fourteen guns, succeeded in forcing his vay through it, with but comparatively smsil losses, although the enemy had assemble! in greit numbers to oppose him, and hxi fortified with redoubts tho heights whichcommandod not only tlio approaches to tl; entrance, but also the pass itself, tho moith of which they had barricaded by a sVpng breastwork of stonea and bushes. Th manner in winch General I Pollock achiyed, this difficult enterprise was I so admivabb that in tho standard English I work on mine tactics the attack is described in detail as a example of forcing a mountain defile dofened at the entrance. Broadly speaking, theplan adopted for forcing the pass was fiit to clear tho heights of the enemy and thn advance against the entrance. i Accordingly, he greater part of the attacking i force was foricd into two columns, ono ot • which was totorm thehcights en the rights, the ; other those n the left; whilst fcho remaining
Droops wore kept in 'scservo to advance against the cntre of tho enemy's position bo soon m theittacks on his Hanks should be sufficiently eveloped. Both right and left columns adinced simultaneously, the front
of each cowed by a lino of skirmishers followed by spports. At iirst the enemy offered a d ermincd resistance, but on both (lanks tho d'Vndere were gradually forced Up the hills ad finally driven, in ali points. As soon as the Ranking columns had thus
gained pessssion of the heights, the portion of tho lore kept in reserve advanced to the mouth of lb pass and destroyed the barrier, which the uemy had abandoned on finding his position turned ; and as the crowning parties on ach side gained ground, so the central coluin proceeded, until, finally, driven back frotuhelght to height, the defender, seeing his positions in the pass thui successively olilanked, ab?.ndcnaa any further opposition. OQHTiUEhAIi INTEUKST IN AKdIIAXISTAN. In G .i'!..ny and Austria the course of events in ndia is watched with increasing interest. 1 Germany, wo arc told, it is considered ahost inevitable that the British invasion ofAighaniatan will finally end in an
Anglo-Russian war in Central Asia. Everybody takes it for granted tVat Shere Ali would never have dared to affront England had he not been instigated to ao so by Human agents. In Vienna (tho " Times " correspondent says) the difficulty with Afghanistan is followed with close interest day by day. All the leading newspapers, both Austrian and Hungarian, give copious extracts from the articles in tho chief English journals, accompanying them frequently with their own comments, which leave no doubt that the seriousness of the conflict is thoroughly understood, as well as the complications which it may possibly lead to. It i» seen that these might eventually affect the Eastern Question nearer homo, and, therefore, the interests of Austria, which have by the Bosnian occupation become even more closely bound up with it than before. In Italy the action of the Ameer is openly attributed to Russian influence. In France the matter does not attract very much attention. BUSSIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
The St, Petersburg correspondent of the Berlin Ministerial "Norddeufsehe Zeitung," who reflects the views prevailing in Governmental circles on tho Neva, says : "In the event of an Anglo-Russian war in Europe, General von Kaufmann would have occupied Merve and Herat. Russia, regarding Afghanistan as a good buffer between England and herself, has always kept on friendly terms with the Ameer, but never committed the mistake of subsidising an Oriental who deems it an honor to break his word to an infidel. If Shere Ali selected this moment for the beginning of the long-planned war, he was probably actuated by the belief that the Indian semi-independent Princes, exasperated by the English demand of a reduction of their troops, will mutiny in the rear of the expeditionary corps. Should Shere Ali be beaten and his territory be annexed, Russia will occupy Merve and Balkh, when the fiction of a neutral country intervening between the Russian and British sentinels will cease to exist. To support the mutiny of tho Indian Princes would be contrary to the principles of Russia, who never encourages rebellion, and, moreover, has had quite enough of the one sentimental war in Turkey; while should England be defeated, Russia would require her central Asiatic troops to prevent a Mahomedan revival in her own dominions."
The same subject is treated with less reserve in r< leader of tho St. Petersburg "Golos," which savs :
" England evidently aims at occupying a few positions in the hills to frighten the Ameer into concessions. But as it is equally obvious that Shere Ali has long planned this campaign, he is not likely to be coerced by mere demonstrations. The Ameer may count upon the friendly neutrality of both Russia and Persia, as well as upon the sympathies and possible 00-operation of the Indian semiindependent Princes. With these points in his favor, he can quietly await an attack, which must begin by the forcing of formidable passes. The British Press evidently endeavours to persuade its readers that the Afghan war would be a mere local and unimportant aliair. Notwithstanding tho affront sustained, tho caution displayed by people and politicians and their unwillingness to embark in the venture are a characteristic sign of the time-i."
Improving upon this, the Russian " Telegraph " says : "Russia and England require a definite delimitation of their respective spheres of influence. An arrangement must, be come to, whether in peace or by force of arms. Russia sent an embassy to the Ameer to inquire whether she might count upon him in the coming crisis, and Russia, if the Ameer deems it expedient, to side with her, will have to protect him. Relying upon the accession of strength he has gained by joining Russia, the Ameer has thrown down the gauntlet to England. Whatever may happen, Russia will never permit the incorporation of Afghanistan by the English. They may punish tho Anver; but if they attempt to do away with him, an Anglo-Russian war is sure to ensue."
Similar language is held by more papers than one. The elation at the embarrassment experienced by England is universal.
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Bibliographic details
Globe, Volume XX, Issue 1493, 28 November 1878, Page 3
Word Count
2,413THE AFGHAN WAR. Globe, Volume XX, Issue 1493, 28 November 1878, Page 3
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