ARE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS A FAILURE?

Globe, Volume XX, Issue 1382, 20 July 1878, Page 3

ARE REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS A FAILURE?

The following is part of a vigorous and suggestive essay which lately appeared in the Melbourne “ Argus”: —Eepresentative institutions are said to be on their trial. As they have them in this colony, and as they are likely to be in Great Britain, they are quite a new development of democracy, and have to stand the test of time and change. Clearly they do not produce what some of the early reformers expected of them. They do not encourage the best ability of a country to come forward and devote itself to the service of the people, secure that earnest and disinterested actions will bo rewarded by public respect. The theory was, that the man of ability would teach the people, and that every election would be a school of instruction in public affairs. Here and there, at rare intervals and under peculiar circumstances, this may be the case, but in these colonies as well as in the United States the practical outcome is a party vote, given for purely party reasons, and argument is resented as an insult. Indeed, matters have been carried so far in some parts of t his colony as that no one is permitted to say a word which does not agree with the opinions held by the majority, and consequently instruction is impossible, because a candidate can only say what is already known and accepted. The majority is not only all-powerful, but assumes to be allwise, Tbe consequence is, that we come back to what Louis Blanc calls the blow of a club, only opinions arc knocked down instead of men. This very unjust and discreditable state of affairs arises, undoubtedly, from the fact that the superiority of numbers is felt to be overwhelming, and to be a power which may be properly exercised for the suppression of the other side. It is the direct outcome of the theory, essentially false, that public opinion can bo represented by taking the majorities in particular districts, and assuming that they constitute the wisdom of the nation. From this principle it is but one step to the other, not yet formulated, but acted upon here and in many other parts of the world, that the platform belongs to the majority, and is not the place for discussion, but for the strong statement of tilings already known and received. Public affairs are not to be considered, but to be decided. In the United States, and in this colony at times also, a caucus settles the ticket, and a party vote settles the election. This is not a process of reasoning, but a process of calculation, by which public affairs arc reduced to the capacity of small minds, and intrigue becomes statesmanship. There appears to be no help for this, so long as the present methods of election prevail, for all parties will always do all that is in their power. What can bo worked will be worked; what can bo done will bo done. For this reason, mechanical checks are sure to fail, as what is intended to he the exception is sure to become the rule. We have to come back to first principles, and only by a return to them can there bo any hope for true democracy and representative institutions. The fact must-be made to correspond with the theory. The ideal of free government is the setting of all questions in the light of many minds to close the interests of all and it is really, I think, worth while to consider whether the ideal is not, after all, the one thing which it should bo our business to convert into the fact. Are we to believe that there is no firm footing anywhere ? Is nothing real, nothing true, nothing certain, but that everything is uncerlah.V Has genius ro mission in the world, and is a statesman what Adam Smith describes him to be “an insidious and crafty auimal, whose councils are directed

by the momentary fluctuations of affairs ?” Or, is it true, as Walter Savage Landor says, that “the prime movers of those actions which appal and shake the world are generally the vilest things in it.” In short, wo have to ask ourselves seriously the question, whether we have faith in the good and the noble, and believe that with fair play they will prevail, or whether public life is devoid of high motives, and that the conditions of success are such as cannot bo accepted by honorable men. As matters stand, public life is not tine carrihr ouvrvte avx talents but. une caeriere open only to those who are prepared to accept certain not always creditable conditions. In all cases and under all cirsumstances, the man who insists upon absolutely telling the truth must bo very unpleasant company, and will not possess so much power as he who only says agreeable things; but we may wonderingly ask, how does it come about that so many men of admittedly inferior powers can got so much power, and are so often the leaders of a popular party ? I think that this fact —for fact it is—may be traced back to the system by which members of Parliament are chosen, which docs not result in a representation of public opinion, but mainly of one side of public opinion only. If wo could bring: together the actual opinions of the people of any country, and get them represented accurately in any assembly of legislators, we should find a very different state of affairs from that which generally prevails. The standard of influence would be at once raised, and passion, to say nothing of trickery, would bo held in check by the force of opinion. One side would not rejoice in the power of brute force, and would have to depend upon reason instead of the mere act of voting, and we should at least have the benefit of such wisdom as would be found available for public work. No doubt, truth is great and will prevail, if truth gets a fair chance, but experience tells us that truth will not prevail unless it is heard very often, and put very plainly. What we require, if the theory of democracy be true, is to give truth a fair chance, and this it never can get so long as we decide to let the dominant side be practically the onlv side.