The Globe. SATURDAY, MAY 11, 1878.

Globe, Volume IX, Issue 1293, 11 May 1878, Page 2

The Globe. SATURDAY, MAY 11, 1878.

We have already shown that the present mode of electing members of the House : o£ Representatives is wrong in principle, and, in practice, frequently results in doing an injustice to a largo body of the people. The next point to be considered is, what means is there at our disposal to remedy these ill effects. The system which would provide the means of equitable representation to the whole body of the electors, has already been briefly discussed in these columns —we refer to Hare's system of Representation. His plan is as follows: —Every candidate has to communicate with a central officer informing him which district he wishes to represent. When the names of all the candidates are received, the list is published. The election, of course, takes place all over the country on the same day. Each elector, on the day of polling, hands to the local Returning Officer a paper having the name of the C&ndidate he wishes to represent him written upon it. But he is also at liberty to add, jn order, the names of other candidates yfhm to woM like io m Munwdl M

the end of the day the Returning Officers send in to the Central Office the number of votes recorded in their districts for each candidate. Whon the results from all parts of the country are received, the total number of votes recorded are added together, and so the number of electors who voted is ascertained, for under this system a man has one vote only. This total is divided by the number of members to bo returned to the House, and so what Mr. Hare calls tho Quota is ascertained. For example, were this law in force in Now Zealand, and tho number of members fixed at 80, and it.was ascertained that 80,000 votes were recordod on the first election, the Quota in this case would be 1000. Any candidate receiving 1000 votes would be {returned, but as many would receivo far more than tho requisite numbor, it is provided that, however many votes a candidate may obtain, no more than his Quota shall be counted for him. In tho case we have just mentioned 1000 votes would secure any candidate's return. A plan by which to determine which should be used for a particular candidate, and which sot free, is laid down by Mr. Hare, into tho details of which it is not necessary to enter. When a candidate is returned, the voters whose papers contained his name, but have not been used for him, will have their papers used for another candidate. For example, John Brown might send in a voting paper headed with Major Atkinson, whom ho would thus desiro to see returned. In addition, howovor, to the above name, lie might have on his paper, in order, E. C. J. Stevens, C. C. Bowon, and W. Bolleston. If his paper was used for tho return of Major Atkinson, it would be sealed up. If, however, according to the plan laid down in the law, Major Atkinson received his Quota before his paper was reached, Major Atkinson's name would be scratched out of it, Mr. Stevens's name woidd then appear first, and, if employed in returning him, the paper would then be laid aside, and so on. It will thus be seen that John Brown is not disfranchised because his paper was not used for Major Atkinson. Although his candidate was returned without his aid, his vote was not rendered useless. By an exhaustive process, all those candidates who obtain the necessary Quota of votes are thus returned. If, when this work is completed, it is found that all the seats are not filled, then those candidates who ha-\e tho "comparative majority" of votes are returned. It would be out of place to enter more into tho details of the scheme — a scheme which Mill states has "tho almost unparalled merit of carrying out a great principlo of Government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other ends, of scarcely inferior importance." We do not intend, in this article, to dwell on the many advantages of the scheme. We wish however to point out, that were it adopted in New Zealand, the effect would be to send many men to the House of Representatives who have no chance under the present law of obtaining seats. For example, the Friendly Societies of the colony comprise a large number of members. These men are deeply interested in the legislation of Parliament which deals with thoir interests. Under our present system those societies have little chance of returning a representative who would specially attend to their interests, because the elections in each district turn upon some great question which divides the constituency. But were Hare's system in force, the Friendly Societies throughout the colony could combine and return a special representative, whose opinions on certain subjects would receive the utmost consideration at the hands of his follow members. Tho same course could be pursued with other interests, and so the House would be a truly Representative one. In a future article wo hopo to point out the many other advantages derivable from the scheme we havo been advocating.