RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA.

Globe, Volume IX, Issue 1286, 3 May 1878, Page 3

RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA.

The correspondent of the London " Times" writes :

Eussia is experiencing the fate of conquerors. A concert of objurgations has already arisen against her. Every one thinks himself beaten by her—the Turks by arms, the Servians by her abandoning them, the Montenegrins by her indifference, Eoumania by her broken promises, Europe by the audacious affirmations o{ her diplomatists' Amid this general clamour the voice of Eoumania is heard above the others, and there is something very curious and instructive in the situation which the events of the war have created for that little State, which calls itself a victim, but which public opinion has hitherto regarded as a voluntary accomplice of Euesian aggression. The Eoumanians warmly protest against the charge of complicity, and it must be admitted on hearing their explanation that there seems much truth in what they say ; the more so because the conduct of Eussia herself tallies with them, and because all Europe has had a presentiment of what would occur. Can the tone of the Eussian diplomacy and Press at the beginning of the war be compared with the tone assumed since the decisive Eussian victories ? Can the declarations of the Czar and of all who spoke in his name bo compared with the present conditions contemplated or stipulated by Eussia ? Why, then, not believe the Eoumanians when they affirm that they only joined Eussia after having fruitlessly sought the protection of collective Europe against the absolute will of that power ? When the war broke out the Eoumanians were perfectly aware of the dangers to which their situation exposed them. They knew that Eussia was thinking of tearing up the Treaty of Paris, and that the strip of Bessarabia therein conceded to her would be one of the chief objects of Muscovite avidity. They saw, moreover, that the day Eussia carried the war into European Turkey they would have to open a passage to the invading army. Lastly, they saw that the crossing of their country by the Eussians, whatever might have obliged Eoumania to tolerate it, would, in the eyes of Turkey, constitute connivance and aggression, and would place them in open hostility to her. It is needless to look for any advantages which could have accrued to Eoumania from this struggle, as it is now in the hour of victory that she most regrets not having been able to escape from participation in a war in which defeat would have exposed her to the greatest calamities, and in which victory threatens her integrity. The Eoumanians knew all this beforehand, and therefore it was that they addressed themselves to all the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris one after the other, asking for protection from the obligation to take part in the conflict. One after the other, however, the Powers refused, proving the truth of Count Beust's words, "There is no longer a Europe," that no agreement in Europe was possible on the Eoumanian question, that a collective protection could not be arranged, and that such a guarantee of the neutrality of Eoumania, though the only means of saving her from a forced participation in the war, could only add to the dreadful complications of the situation. Thus it was that Eoumania arrived at the belief that the only Power which could protect her against Eussia was Eussia herself; ' and thus it was that, after long pourparlers, the Convention of the 16th of April, 1877, was concluded, of which Article 2 is as follows:

" In order that no inconvenience or danger may result for Eoumania from the passage of the Eussian troops over her territory, the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russia s engages to maintain and en> force the political rights of the Roumanian

State as they result from internal laws and existing Treaties, as well as to maintain and defend the present integrity of Roumania." This article was the principal condition aimed at by Roumania, and Roumania, therefore, remained passive during the earlier part of the struggle. Then, however, came the Russian repulses at Plevna, and the day after the defeat of General Krudener's Corps the Czar, naturally much affected, asked Prince Charles ,to send his troops, all ready for the field, to the help of his army. According to some, he despatched one of his aides-de-camp on this errand; according to others believed to bo better informed, he sent an autograph letter containing the most positive assurances of the integrity of Roumanian territory. It was this urgent appeal which led two Roumanian divisions to cross the Danube, and the bravery they displayed is well known, as also the rapidity with which the fall of Plevna was followed by the irreparable defeat of the Turks. Here, perhaps, would be the moment to recall the Czar's assurance to Lord A. Loftus—- " If I am obliged to enter Bulgaria, I shall know quite well how to leave it"—an expression thus supplemented two days ago by a Russian diplomatist—" It is quite correct that the Emperor said if he entered Bulgaria he should know how to leave it, but he did not say by what outlet." However this may be, the Roumanians, irrespective of Article 2 of the Convention of the 16th of February, had tho Cz ir's express pledge, given at a moment when pledges ought to bo sacred, and when they thought themselves protected from any blow at their territorial integrity. A week or so ago, however, the Czar and Prince Gortchakoff both informed the Roumanian Government that General Ignatieff was commissioned to make overtures as to certain desires of Russia, and the General, always willing to show his disdain for any pledge, proposed the cession to Russia of the Bessarabian portion of Kiliain exchange for the Dobrudja and tho Delta of tho Danube. He put forward a sentimental reason—viz., that the Russians had erected at Ismail a memorial of a battle fought somewhere about 1780, and that the Emperor's heart could not agree to this being left in other than Russian hands. The Roumanians, less sentimental than the Russians, regarded the proposal as a menace, contrary to express pledges and as advocating a disadvantageous exchange. The Dobrudja is to tho Roumanians no tempting morsel j whereas Kilia is above both the other channels of the Danube—Sulina and St. George; and Russia, not being interested in promoting the commerce of that river to the detriment of Odessa and her other ports, might like to see the channels silted up—a result which might be attained by inconsiderable works at Kilia. The Roumanians, therefore, see a twofold disadvantage in the proposed exchange, and wish to remain as they are. Roumania's interest appears in this respect identical with those of Austria and Germany. Such is at present the position of Roumania towards Russia, and the Bucharest Chambers have shown their view of it by strongly condemning the Russian proposal. What course Russia will take at the Congress in the face of these protests and of her own pledges it is difficult to say ; for recent events have shown that her policy will not be hindered by details, and that she does not indulge in any weak heuitation between her pledges and her interests.