THE OPENING OF THE STRAITS OF THE DARDANELLES AND BOSPHORUS

Globe, Volume IX, Issue 1261, 3 April 1878, Page 3

THE OPENING OF THE STRAITS OF THE DARDANELLES AND BOSPHORUS

A writer in the " Spectator " says : The necessity for keeping closed the Straits of the Dardanelles to the armed vessels of foreign Powers has been now for so long a period aesumed, that it is very [difficult for Englishmen to contemplate the prospect of their being opened with any other feeling than that of dismay. Yet a very little reflection on the subject ought to satisfy every reasonable person that the danger to this country of such a proceeding is more imaginary than real. I propose in the present letter to try and show that while there arc very good reasons for not making futile objections to what, whether we like it or not, is very likely, and in a short time, to become an accomplished fact, there are really none worthy of much consideration, either on the score of policy or of strict right. We should bear in mind that theee straits connect the Mediterranean with the Black Sea —that two-thirds of the coast of the latter sea forms an integral portion of the Russian Empire, and that except through these straits it is impossible for Russia to send her ships-of-war thence to her northern ports, or to send her Baltic licet, or any portion of it, on any emergency, to the Black Sea. The result is that'it obliges her to maintain two fleets, neither of which can ever afford any assistance to the other. We should further recollect that it is an arbitrary abuse of power, and utterly opposed to the wise and liberal principles of the Law of Nations, for one country to arrogate to itself the right of closing straits which a wise Providence has created, with, one might almost assume, the special object of connecting such seas with each other. The right claimed, therefore, has no moral foundation, because its assertion seeks to thwart the designs of nature. Its political foundation rests solely on the continuance of the power by which it is put forward and supported, and if this power is destroyed, the right—founded solely on might —equally disappears. If this is true—and there is hardly a writer on international law who has ventured to question it—in the case of straits connecting sea? whiphare the common property of mankind, it is still more true of straits which connect one sea which is open to all with another sea two-thirds of the coast of which belong to the country other than that which possesses the land on either side of the straits. The latter country may, if it has the power, close such straits, and may justify the act by demonstrating an overwhelming necessity, springing from considerations of national safety; but the right exercised will only rest on the power to maintain it, and' it' will eyej? be a legitimate object with the country whose natural rights are invaded and prejudiced thereby to destroy that power on the first opportunity. So stands the case as between Turkey and Russia. The natural right of Russia to the full use and enjoyment of the Dardanelles and Bosphoruß is clear, the political right of Turkey to limit or destroy the rights of Russia rests simply on her ability. As between England and other European Powers and Russia the case cannot be put on higher grounds than those on which it rests as regards Turkey, nor has it been sought to rja'ce it any higher. By the Treaty of Paris thp ronditjoijS imposed were for j;he benefit of Turkey, and were assented to by Russia, but that treaty was the outcome and result of a war in which Russia had been worsted, —not by Turkey but by the allied Powers, and although it may be said that treaty is still binding as between Russia and the other Powers, it is only binding on points which do not affect Turkey, for as between Russia and Turkey the war has destroyed the treaty. This view may very much weaken the value of treaties, when concluded between several Powers, because in the event of war breaking out between any two of the signatories to them Httje ?a left binding between thp other parties and either of fhe belligerents; bu.t it is the correct view, and has been almost invariably the one acted on. Indeed, any other would involve complications and absurdities. England may regard the destruction of the treaty betweon Russia and Turkey by the act and operation of the war in which they are engaged with displeasure, but it would be waste of breath, as well as ridiculous, to tell the belligerents that no matter who comes oft victorious 'the exact •relation whjch existed between them when the war broke out, must bV resumed, and asi one consequence of such must, the Straits of the Dardanelles remain closed, when perhaps Turkey may have purchased peace and safety at the price of their being opened- If pupil waa to be the effect of treaties, the result would be that wars would never cease until one of the parties was wholly and utterly destroyed. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Turkey is obliged to yield to the will of Russia as regards the opening of the straits, how does it become England, either alone or in conjunction with the Powers of Europe, to resist ? It has been shown that the closing of them, by whatever means accomplished, was in derogation of the natural rights of Russia, 'dnd tlHit the Ouenlnj: pf rhpna, \t they are opened, will he-the reeult or the transfer of the material power whiche'ffected'their closing from Turkey to Russia. It cannot bo urged that either England or any other Power possesses or can claim any right, founded on necessity or arising out of the possession of land on either side, to close them, as against Russia; such right, therefore, must rest on treaty stipulations, which stipulations were wrung fjfftm Eu?sia as part of the price with which she purchased, 'peaot'. Ai Turkey, the stipulation of " no account;" it may, however,-be urged that it continues to endure between Russia and the other co-signatories ; but as it was introduced for" the bpnefit and safety of Turkey (the pride of the'ofch'Jr parties presenting them from saying that it was also necessary to their safety); and Turkey has been compelled to forego both, as the price of deliverance" from and 03 it was in its inpeptioii' bjit a right 'resting 'solely on might, by might alone can it be maintained, It 'becomes, tbeyefove, a question whether it is expedient to resort to might—in other words, to war—to maintain it. We know that, at least, three of the European Powers are not going to iußist on it. Is it worth our while thon to do so ? No country ha? £ greater interest in supporting the natural right or' tret, navigation than iiing'iand. With more than dhe country she has insisted on it, and gone' to war«!o enforce'it. I Withiu a few years she forced Japan to

concede the opening of the Inland Sea, a broad strait, tying between two of the three islands forming the Empire of Japan ; and she also insisted and obtained the opening of ♦he northern strait -which connects the Corean Sea with the Pacific. The opening of neither of these straits was neces3«ry to her, in the sen*e in which the opening of the Straits of the Dardanelles is necessary to Russia. England is also insisting that the Suez Canal—which is an artificial and not a natural strait, and therefore stands on quite a different footing—shall be kept open for the benefit of all nations, but notably in her own interest, even in time of war, and she has been and still is endeavoring to procure its neutralisation in such time. Whether she is wise in taking the latter step is questionable, but it bears with some force on the position she has assumed, or it is feared may assume, on this question of the opening of the Dardanelles If England means by it that the C mal shall be open to belligerents in the sense in which the sea is open and neutral ground, without its use by either or any belligerent forming any ground of complaint against Egypt, within whose territory it is situated, the wisdom of her endeavors is not so particularly open to objection ; but if she means that neither belligerent shall use it, then, indeed, she is forging a weapon which will inevitably strike her with greater force than any enemy with whom she may be engaged. If she seeks now to confine the southern licet of Russia within the Black Sea, or its northern fleet—should it ever happen to be in the Mediterranean—from fleeing to it as a harbor of refuge, she may, indeed, be cutting off her nose to spite her face. Let us suppose that England, having obtained the neutralisation of the Canal in the sense last explained, is engaged in a struggle in the Mediterranean, and that it is expedient that she should without delay summon that portion of her fleet which is in the Indian or China Seas to her assistance in the shortest space of time, or that she should without delay call to her assistance a portion of her Indian army, how bitterly would she regret that by her own act she had closed the Suez Canal against herself? But a step further. If the exigency of her position required it, how long would slie regard the paper contract that forbid her ships and troops from coming to her assistance ? She might, indeed, invoke, in extenuation of her conduct, "dire necessity," and trust to the verdict of posterity and' to the impartial pen of the historian for acquittal ; but the bare possibility that she might be so situated as to regret her want of foresight, or be compelled to avoid ruin by disregarding her plighted word, should at least cause her to pause before she forces or aids in forcing another, and at this moment a friendly Power, to adhere to conditions and stipulations which in their nature are an improper and unnatural limitation of natural rights. If it is unwise to insist on Egypt closing the Sueis Canal to belligerents, and if, as it has been suggested, it would be far better to give to it the character of the sea, open to all, and subject only to the condition —which in the case of ports has been universally imposed and respected—that it should not he made the theatre of war, or bo wilfully damaged eithe by obstruction to its current, or by injury to its banks or the country on either side of it, it is equally unwise to insist on the Dardanelles being closed in the event of war breaking out between other countries, in which Turkey itself takea no part. To do so would be simply to force her against her will and interest into a position in which she might become a victim, for of a surety the belligerent whose interests the closing of the Dardanelles prejudiced would look to her for an indemnity, which, rightly or wrongly claimed, would, as soon as the power and opportunity to exact it were sufficient, be demanded and obtained. It would not only then be inexpedient for England to support Turkey in refusing |o open or keep open the straits, but iy would also be impolitic to offer any impediment to an agreement by which they should be opened. That Russia will insist is evident. That her right to insist is r,Q violation of the Law of Nations is at least an open question, in which the preponderance of authority is in her favor; and that she is not debarred from so insisting by any stipulation in the Treaty of Paris, if she succeeds in her struggle with Turkey, is certainly clear, so far, at least, as any determination to prevent her would plunge Europe into war. Under theso cir- I cumstances, and in the face of the fact that the damnge likely to accrue to England from the opening of the straits 'is— for generations, at ant rate'—relegated to the realms of imagination, it is sincerely to be hoped that England will, following the example of one of her wisest Sovereigns, retire from a doubtful position with a good grace, since the probabilities of succeeding in maintaining it are about as visionary as the injury to her material interest.