TURKEY’S POSITION AND PROSPECTS.

Globe, Volume IX, Issue 1221, 1 February 1878, Page 3

TURKEY’S POSITION AND PROSPECTS.

In the latest number to hand by the San Francisco mail, dated December ]3th, the London “ Times ” concludes an article on the Turkish position after the fall of Plevna with the following rather unfavorable and unflattering suggestions : The Turks may still think, that Europe will

help them at the eleventh hour. That is what they have been told by those Englishmen whom they believe to be friends. But they will commit a fatal mistake if they listen to those counsellors. We might almost be tempted to suspect that a distinct intention to ruin Turkey lies at the root of the foreign appeals to her fanaticism, for they are leading her swiftly to ruin. Indeed, now that Plevna has fallen, we shall probably hear from these advisers that it is necessary to seize some part of Ottoman territory, such as Egypt, in order to guard the interests of England. Tims friendship for Turkey is shown by proposals to break up her Empire in the first hour of her adversity. She may be assured that the fanaticism of British interests will show no tenderness to the interests of Ottoman rule. It is said that if the Russians pour across the Balkaus, they will not stop at Adrianople, but will push on to the Bosphorus, and that they will thus find themselves opposed by England, if not by other Powers. But the Russians would be poor tacticians if that supposition wore true. They can exhaust the Ottoman Empire without assaulting Constantinople. They may drive (ho Ottoman armies in upon the capital and break down the Ottoman authority outside the peninsula in which Constantinople is situated. The Turks have been so long deluded by the hackneyed maxims of diplomacy as to fancy that England would forcibly prevent so great an administrative change; hub they are profoundly mistaken. No doubt very serious questions would arise if Russia herself were to begin a game of annexation in Europe; but such a danger is made impossible alike by geographical limits and political conditions. Russia could nob annex any part of Bulgaria or Eoumelia for the simple reason that the way is barred, in the first place, by Ronmimia, which attaches as high a value to its independence as the greatest of Continental States. A principality which has fought with admirable gallantry at Plevna, and made heavy sacrifices to free itself from Turkey,' would not permit itself to bsJ absorbed hj as it would bo

i if the Czar were to seize any territory on the southern side of the Danube. Nor, even if Roumania were inclined to commit national suicide, would Austria permit Russia to extend her limits further towards the Balkan Peninsula, Hence there was little merit in the Czar’s pledge that he would annex no territory in European Turkey. He could not even if he were willing. A slight study of that fact would show the futility of some arguments which are drawn from the recently published comments of the late Prince Consort on the Crimean War. They are marked by his usual thoughtfulness, and they admirably expressed the sentiments of the nation when they were written. But the circumstances of Turkey and of Europe have undergone a mighty change since the Crimean War, which gave the Ottoman Empire its final chance of renovation. Were the Prince still alive, his thoughtful spirit would rebuke the warlike counsels which are drawn from his words. We can afford to be tranquil because British interests are not in danger, and we shall not defend Turkey, because we are not in the habit of embarking in enterprises which cannot succeed. If the Turks would study the temper of the Continent and the remaining measure of their own strength, they would see that to continue the war is to court the all but complete destruction of their power in Europe.