BRITISH PROTECTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

Globe, Volume VIII, Issue 984, 21 August 1877, Page 3

BRITISH PROTECTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

Lord Derby's despatch to Lord Lyons on the subject of the Suez Canal, says the London ''Times " oi' June Bth, has given much satisfaction to the owners of that international highway. The shareholders of the. company held their annual meeting in Paris on Wednesday, and M. Do Lesseps mid the declaration of Her Majesty's Grovermnent that it would regard " an attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its approaches " as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. M. De Lesseps had made the less stringent suggestions that national ships should, in passing through the Canal, be subject to such measures as the territorial authority might adopt to prevent them from landing troops or munitions , oi

war. But he was much better pleased by Lord Derby's emphatic statement that the freedom of the Canal would be guarded with all the strength of the British Empire. The shareholders testified by their general applause that they were of the same opinion ; and well they might be, for Lord Derby has given a better guarantee than a score of international agreements. Were the ships of every belligerent free to enter the Canal, the interests of the Company would be at the mercy of such accidents as are commonplaces of war. But the interests of the owners are identical with those of tins country, three-fourths of the ships which use the passage being English, and 176,602 shares in the Company being held by our own Grovernment. M. de Lesseps and his fellow owners may, therefore, keep their minds as easy as they would do if the Canal lay in Kent. The energy of Lord Derby's declaration may tend to hide the fact that it records the tritest of diplomatic commonplaces. Everybody knows that England has a greater stake in the Suez Canal than all other states put together. The Power which holds India must have an unimpeded road to the East; the nation which possesses the carrying trade of the world must keep open the shortest way between Asia and Europe : and that fact is as well known in all the Cabinets of the Continent as the number of ironclads in the British fleet. They might, no doubt, suggest various ways of guarding the Canal, and among others they might propose to place it under an international commission. But such a body would be open to many objections. The mere existence of it would be an assumption that in all matters relating to the navigation of the Canal the vote of a country like Spain, for example, should count for as much as the vote of England. Such a supposition, however, would flagrantly contradict the most obvious of commercial and political facts. It would be a diplomatic fiction, compared with which the Treaty of Paris itself would seem a reality; and if recent events have taught one lesson more forcibly than another, it is that diplomatic fictions do not stand the friction of competing interests. An international agreement to respect the neutrality of the Canal at all times and seasons would fare badly if any of the parties to it were to go to war with each other, and if it were for the interest of one to keep the passage absolutely free, and of another to restrict the use of its facilities. All kinds of " accidents," as we have said, would be apt to stop the way. A merchant ship might sink at an inconvenient spot, or an ironclad might decline to move on, or it might feel bound by some mysterious necessity to land troops for the protection of its own interests. JN T o International Commission could prevent mishaps which, as Lord Derby says, would do grave injury to the commerce of the whole world. The only effective system of police woidd be the guardianship of some Power which has interests in the Canal identical with those of the whole world. To seek such security from the nominal Sovereign of the territory woidd be absurd. To demand it from any of the Continental Powers would sound like a sarcasm. But England would afford the requisite safety by virtue of her stake in India, of her commerce, her freedom from aggressive designs, and her maritime strength. Her own vital interests would oblige her to keep the canal open to the legitimate trade of the whole world, and to defend it against obstruction with the whole of her power. Other States need not be asked to admit that England has any para- , mount right of control in Egypt; all she need assert is an obvious geographical, commercial, and political fact. All she need say is that, as she has a greater stake in the Suez Canal than the other countries combined, she must, in moments of emergency, put forth the whole of her strength to prevent that stake from being sacrificed. No State can be alarmed by so harmless a proposition.

The mere statement of it at such a moment as the present is apt to make timid people imagine, however, that the Canal must be exposed to some danger. In reality there is no cause for alarm. No power would seek to interfere with the freedom of the passage, unless it absolutely wished to pick a quarrel with this country and all neutral Europe. It is absurd to suppose that Russia is anxious to multiply her risks tenfold, and she does not need to be informed that the Isthmus of Suez is to England incomparably the most important part of the Ottoman Empire. Count Schouvaloff is expected to give a diplomatic assurance that his Government will not interfere with the Canal; but, in truth, such a declaration is unnecessary. That Russia would blockade the Canal lias no more entered into the head even of alarmists than that she would bombard Bombay. Nor, in truth, could she do so even if she were suddenly to be seized with a mad desire to put herself in a state of war not only with England, but with the whole world. It may be said, however, that the navigation of the Canal might be impeded by one of those "accidents" to which we have referred. But it seems to be forgotten that such a mishap would put this country merely in the same position for a few days, as it occupied before the construction ofjthe Canal, and as Lord Palmerston held to be more consistent with national safety than the present facilities of transport. The sinking of a ship might block up the Canal, but it woidd not block up the Isthmus. We should hold the sea at both ends of the passage, as we do now; and we should send troops and stores by the overland route. A little time would be lost, but that would be all. There might be a delay of twenty-four or even forty-eight hours, and it might last for a week ; but at the end of the time the Canal would be opened again. In the interval we should have been put to a great deal of trouble and expense, but the increase of danger woidd scarcely have been appreciable. it is not the Canal that is the chief link in our connexion with India; it is the Isthmus, and so long as we command the sea we need not make ourselves uneasy about the possibilities of a temporary stoppage in the convenient water-way. Our fleet is, after all, the main protection of the route to India. So long as it is strong enough to protect the Mediterranean outlet and to block the Red Sea, we may keep our minds easy respecting the Canal. If we retain our supremacy at sea, wo shall be in no worse position than we were a dozen years ag<», when we were perfectly well able to guard the roud to India against all comers.