THE RUSSIAN OPERATIONS IN TURKISH ASIA.

Globe, Volume VIII, Issue 916, 1 June 1877, Page 3

THE RUSSIAN OPERATIONS IN TURKISH ASIA.

(From the Melbourne Argus.)

At the close of his speech on the address at the opening of the Imperial Parliament, the leader of the Opposition, when speaking of the probabilities of' war, said : —" Perhaps we are trusting to the attitude of Germany and Austria. Perhaps we are supposing that German and Austrian interests will put the statesmen of those countries on the alert, and that Russia, knowing she has no material advantages to gain from war, will shrink from it. But it may be that neither Germany nor Austria has any interest in Asia, and that the Asiatic provinces of Turkey are also open to attack. England has great interest in these Asiatic provinces. They same day may become the most direct route to India." Read by the light of subsequent events, this sagacious forecast is worthy of serious consideration, and helps us to obtain the key to the present situation in Europe. Eor some months past, it has been ostentatiously announced by the inspired press of the Continent that the concert of the three Emperors remained unbroken, and that nothing had occurred to separate their aims and interests. Now, it is absolutely certain that if the Czar contemplated the acquisition of any territory in European Turkey, so as to give him the control of the Danube, neither Austria nor Germany could regard such a step with feelings other than those of alarm and hostility. Indeed, it may be taken for granted that Russia would not be allowed to annex either Roumania or Bulgaria. But it is not unreasonable to conclude that a large army is now threatening the Dobrudscha, and that offensive operations have been commenced by Russia all along the north bank of the Danube, from Kalafat to Reni, chiefly, if not solely, for the purpose of compelling Turkey to divide her army, and to occupy some-

thing like 200,000 men in the defence of that portion of her dominions, while the real theatre of war will be Armenia. There Russia has everything to gain, while the other Emperors have nothing to lose. Neither Germany nor Austria is an Asiatic power. If the Cxar should become master of the whole of Asia Minor, and should shift the boundaries of his empire from Poti to Scutari, so as to give him the command of the whole of the southern shores of the Black Sea, no interests of the other two Emperors would be jeopardised. On the contrary, Germany would feel that her hands were free to carry out those designs against France which were peremptorily checked, nearly two years ago, by the firm interposition of England and Russia; while Austria desires nothing so much as to be let alone, and to escape being driven into a war on the Eastern question, in which all the sympathies of her Slav subjects —numbering 4,700,000 —would be enlisted on one side, and all those of the Magyars—numbering 6,200,000 —would be accorded to the other.

The scene of conflict, then, and the prize of victory, must be looked for, we believe, in Asia Minor; upon the plains of which, we have good reason for estimating, something like a quarter of a million of soldiers will be, or have been already, poured through the pass of Kasbec injUie Caucasus on the one hand, and from Baku, in the Caspian, on the other. Of that sea she is absolutely mistress. She has a powerful fleet of steamers plying on it, besides three hundred smaller craft; so that a regular communication is kept up between Baku and Astrakan, at the months of the Yolga. Upon this great artery, whicli is navigable for large steamers as high as Nishni Novgorod, in the very heart of Russia, and by barges to its sotu'ees, while it is connected by canals with the Baltic and the Polar Sea, upwards of 500 steamers are engaged in conducting the traffic of a tract of country 400,000 square miles in extent. Therefore unlimited supplies can be brought down to the Caspian for the trans-Caucasian army, while a good military road has been constructed from Baku to Tiflis, where it meets the railway constructed from thence to Poti on the Black Sea; so that, assuming the latter port to have been blockaded by Turkey, as late telegrams lead us to infer, and that no supplies should be able to reach the Russian army from Kherson, Odessa, and Taganrog, by way of the Black Sea, the Caspian will still be open for that purpose, unless Turkey should be assisted by a rising of the Circassians, between 50,000 and 60,000 of whom still nurse a sullen hatred of their conquerors among the fastnesses of the Western Caucasus, and who, especially if assisted by the fierce fanatics of Daghestan, might fall upon the Russian base, and thus seriously embarrass the transport of supplies. In this juncture, the attitude of Persia is a matter of supreme importance, and it would be useless to conceal the fact that the Shah is a mere cat's paw in the hands of Russia, not voluntarily, but upon compulsion. For that potentate knows full well that the same military Colossus which has already robbed Persia of Mingrelia, Immeritia, Georgia, and the whole of the territory north of the river Aras, will devour the rest of the empire piecemeal so soon as it has masticated Armenia and Kurdistan. But the Shah is impotent to resist; he can only submit. There was a time—■ before England was governed by public meetings, and before far-seeing statesmanship was paralysed by the passionate and fanatical outcries of uninformed mobs, well-dressed and otherwise when the mother country subsidised Persia, and sent English officers to lead her troops. And at that time Persia succeeded in holding the Muscovite in check, and in guarding the gate of India. But whether England will once more encourage Persia to renounce his vassalage to Russia, and to make common cause with Turkey, is, we fear, somewhat dubious. She may resolve to hold the Suez Canal against all comers,and to preserve Constantinople from the hand of the spoiler; but what if Turkey is beaten in Armenia, and should not only cede that province to Russia, but should consent t© allow the free passage of Russian ships of war through the Dardanelles, and perhaps hand over some of the Turkish ironclads in lieu of an indemnity? Apart from the inevitable advances of Russia towards the Gulf of Oman, can we be blind to the effect which the collapse of the Moslem power in Asia Minor and the growing vastness of the Russian dominion would have upon the minds of the Mohammedan population subject to our rule in British India, especially as England is looked upon as the natural guardian of the recognised head of those who profess the faith oL' Islam ?