THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

Globe, Volume VIII, Issue 889, 1 May 1877, Page 3

THE WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

THE .RUSSIAN ARMY. The Daily News has despatched a special correspondent to the head-quarters of the troops at Kischeneif. He writes that " all the reports about officers and men being discontented are the purest nonsense. The soldiers have good quarters, often among friends and relations, plenty to eat, and generally too much to drink. The roads have been frozen hard, enabling the whole armyinfantry, artillery, and cavalry to exercise for health regularly." He does not sec how the army can reach the Danube under a month from declaration of war. But in another letter he states that everything is ready for the army to take the field at a moment's notice. "A thousand horses have been bought for the train, a bridge for crossing the Danube, boats, barges, steam-launches, and torpedo boats to operate against the Turkish gunboats have been provided. Masses of ammunition of all kinds are heaped up. Long trains of railway waggons are standing in sidings at every station as well as here, awaiting the word which shall set them all moving. Nothing, in short, seems wanting. The bridge lying here is capable of passing the whole army over the Danube in one day. There are enough boats to put a small army over the Danube. There arc thirteen enormous steam launches large enough to cross the Atlantic, two large barges, seven smaller boats, five torpedo boats, and masses of other things, showing that everything is looked after, to the smallest detail." As regards the numbers of the army, the same authority gives the following particulars : —" Six corps have been mobilised, besides the army of the Caucasus, numbering 65,000 men. This makes altogether about 275,000 men, with 900 guns. Of this force, two corps (the 7th and 12th) are at Odessa and at Sebastopol; four, viz., the Bth, 9th, 10th, and 11th, are in Bessarabia. The army, therefore, which would be the first to move against the Turks numbers 120,000 men with 8000 cavalry, 72 batteries of artillery, and 720 guns ready for action in European Turkey, without counting the army of the Caucasus, which would probably operate against Asiatic Turkey. The Grand Duke Nicholas is still unable to return to his duties as Commander-in-Chief." THE DEFENCES OF THE DANUBE. The right bank of the Danube, from the confluence of the Tirnok to Euschuk, forms a continuous terrace, without any great undulations, only parted by water channels from the Balkan. The terrace is often terminated by deep slopes, washed at their feet by the Danube. The Roumanian bank is a low plain of meadow land, which is submerged during floods, by serpentine streams running through it. Widin is the first fortified town met with in descending the Danube. It has 30,000 inhabitants, and is situated on low and marshy soil. It commands the river and adjacent islands, but is itself commanded by high positions on the right and left banks of the river. On the land side, Widin is surrounded by two concentric fortified enceintes. The first is only simple earthwork parapet, which is flanked by eleven redoubts, each armed with six guns. At either extremity of this line are strong redoubts. There is a second and inner line of defence, in the form of a half circle, composed of seven bastioned fronts, and on the river side, of two parallel walls. There are posterns for sorties. The castle of Widin, formerly a strong fortress, is now used as a magazine. The armament of Widin, in last July was 120 Paixhan cannons of 9, 11, and 17 inches ; 13 Krupp field guns, of 12£ inches, 16 mortars, of which two are 26 inches. They were to be reinforced by 24 Krupp guns. A correspondent of the National Zeitung says _ this armament had a little different composition, viz., 62 large Krupp guns, and 85 other pieces, total, 147. Widin is considered on all sides as one of the bulwarks of the Turkish Empire, able to offer some resistance ; but likely to be destroyed by batteries established on the other bank of the river at Kulafat. Widin, without Kulafat, is like a body without a head. Fifteen miles south-east of Widin, near where the Lorn river flows into the Danube, is Lorn Palanka, on the heights commanding the course of the river. It has a castle occupied by a Turkish garrison. The work is square, with flanking towers, armed with artillery at each angle. The Turks have also erected three works for batteries to defend the river, and to cover the postal roads. Kulafat is now occupied by 4000 Roumanian troops, who are engaged in placing it in a state of defence. Lower down the river, opposite the confluence of the Schyl, is Rahooa (36,000 inhabitants), a place formerly fortified. A little further down is Ostrowa, where the Russian army crossed in 1810. The Turks are said to be fortifying this position. Nicopolis, lower down the valley of the Danube, has 8000 inhabitants, it was dismantled by the Russians in 1811. It is principally built on heights. The breadth of the stream is less than in any other part of its course, and it woidd form an excellent passage for an army. From Nicopolis to Ruschuk, the left bank of the Danube is a vast marsh, and the Russians would have great diflieulty in crossing these marshes, especially with the fortress of Ruschuk in close proximity. Ruschuk forms part of the famous quadrilateral, Silistria, Varna, Schumla, against which, four times in one century — 1810, 1811, 1828, 1853—the Russian efforts

were foiled. The town of Ruschuk has 40,000 inhabitants, and is situated at the confluence of the Lorn with the Danube. Last summer the Turks commenced constructing a polygon fort on the road to Schumla, armed the Western front with two large Xrupp guns, and erected other defences. Totrokau is the next point of passage, at a point where the Danube is separated by an island two miles long. The place is only jn'acticable for a pontoon bridge in summer. The place is too much commanded by heights to be capable of offering a prolonged resistance, but the Turks are reconstructing a battery to command the left flank. The next fortress is Silistria, which is a strongly fortified Turkish town. The river is here nearly a quarter of a mile wide. The population is between 20,000 and 30,000. It is a convenient point. The walls of Silistria are of solid masonry, surrounded by a ditch and many detached works. It has been rendered almost impregnable. On the outbreak of the Crimean war, the Russians besieged it with an army of 60,000 or 80,000 men, while the Turkish garrison was only 15,000. After a vigorous and well-sustained attack, the Russians retreated with a loss of 12,000 men. Rassooa is about thirty miles further down the river, from which a fortified barrier constructed by the Emperor Trajan, extends to Kustendji, on the coast of the Black Sea, a distance of thirty-seven miles. THE PROBABLE LINES OF OPERATION. The probable plan of the campaign on the part of Russia is thus discussed by the Army and Nary Gazette : Colonel Evelyn Wood " considers that a careful review of the circumstances tends to create a belief that the Russians will meet with no insuperable difficulties in their march to the neighborhood of Constantinople, but that there they will be brought to a standstill by the lines planned for the defence ef the capital—that is to say, if these lines are constructed in time. He asserts, however, that as yet not a spadeful of earth has been removed. In our opinion, his views of the probable success of the invaders are somewhat too sanguine. But let us examine his facts and speculations. He asserts that the Russian army at Kischeneff numbers 274,600 infantry, 12,330 cavalry, and 215 guns. This may be" the authorised establishment of the corps assembled, but from the information which wo have gathered from various sources we are disposed to believe that, though such j a force exists on paper, its efficient strength ! did not, up to a week ago, exceed 200,000 of all ranks, including non-combatants We do not, however, deny that, though large bodies of troops must be left in the Caucasus, in Poland, and as garrisons of the Black Sea fortresses, it would be quite impossible to mass on the Pruth an army as strong as that which Colonel Vincent asserts is there assembled. Enormous deductions must be made. In the first place, in the march to the Danube a large number will be removed by sickness, for the waste of a Russian army is notoriously great. In the second place, the left flank, at all events must be guarded, for the Roumanian army would have quite enough to do to protect the right flank. The Dobrudscha forms a salient point from which a small body of men coidd inflict considerable damage on the Russian communications, and especially that portion of the railway which runs from Gralatz for several miles parallel and close to the Danube. Mr Vincent says that the Turks have no pontoons or other means of crossing the river; hut it is inconceivable that there should not be fishing boats, and matci-ials for making rafts, or flying bridges. It is very possible that the Turks would be unable to pass over a large army. But a large army would not be needed to cut the communications. Even half a dozen men could, during a few hours of the night, temporarily interrupt the railway traffic, and a hundred horsemen would hamper the passage of provision trains moving by road. Besides, there are seven Turkish gunboats in the Danube, and there is no reason to doubt that an enterprising naval officer coidd, in spite of torpedoes and batteries, run up with a flotilla of other gunboats and small steamers. Colonel Vincent says that the gunboats now in the river would soon be destroyed by the Eussian artillery, since there are absolutely no creeks in which vessels could be sheltered from guns placed on the northern banks. It is not, however, to be imagined that the gunboats would remain stationary to be fired at, and the northern bank is in many places so marshy that guns could not be placed in position, even if it were granted that the Russians could spare a sufficient number of batteries to line the entire length of the river. If the Turkish gunboat s be properly handled, we believe that they will play an important part, both in obstructing the passage of the Danube by the Russians, and in facilitating the crossing of small bodies of Turks destined to operate against the invaders' communications. Everything, indeed, will be against the Russians when they seek to pass into Bulgaria, for the southern is higher than the northern bank, and there is an utter lack of lateral communications on the latter. Nevertheless, we should ignore all the teachings of history if we believed the Russians would not eventually cioss the river. Befoi-e, however, that operation can be attempted, it will be necessary, first, to move a large army through Roumania, and this process, we imagine, will be more difficult J than Mr Vincent anticipates. Ho says that the railway which runs from Odessa via Kischeneff, Jassy, and Bucharest, to Giurgevo, will be able to move the invading army, keep it supplied with food, stores, and reinforcements, and carry back the sick and wounded. He considers that the narrowing of the gauge at Jassy is a fact of no importance, for the Rounianias rollingstock is abundant, good, and specially constructed for the transport of troops; moreover, the space between the wheels of the Russian carriages coidd be soon and easily narrowed. This operation would however, diminish greatly the means of moving men and stores as far as Jassy. We have read that the Roumanian rolling-stock, too, is by no means abundant and good. Making, however, every concession to Colonel Vincent, we feel convinced from the experience of the Prussians in 1870-71, that a siugle railway would be taxed beyond its capabilities, were it required to transport fighting men as well as stores and sick. We agree with Mr Vincent in thinking that the direction of the railway indicates the points of passage, and that, probably, the latter will be attempted at points opposite to Rustchuk, Turkestan, and Silistria. These fortresses are, we are told by Mr Vincent, in a very inefficient state, and weakly garrisoned, but it is probable that during the last few weeks these defects have been partially remedied. It must be also borne in mind that in Turkish fortresses not only is

there a numerous Artillery Militia, but that every adult male may be viewed as a fighting man. The towns in question would, no doubt, be idtimatcly taken, but the sieges of Turin's 1 ] fortresses are generally costly and slow and their resistance would not only delay an advance but help to diminish the strength of (lie invaders. As to the subsequent operations, it iobvious that the passage of the Balkan oould not be attempted till both Varna and Solium la had either been taken or blockaded. We shall, therefore, bo astonished if the Russians iind themselves in a position to cross the Balkan before the commencement of the second campaign. As to the passes, they are, some of them, traversed by different roads, are easy to defend, and would undoubtedly be strongly fortified. But here, again, we believe that the Russians, if victorious iii the open field, would eventually succeed in accomplishing a passage. "We however, ground our belief on the prolonged, if not eventually successful, resistance of the Turks, on the difficulties of supplying and finding transport for even 100,000 men in the Balkan peninsula, and on the fact that the Turks possess, and are likely to retain, the mastery of the Black Sea. As long as they are superior in naval power any chance of a eovj> de main against, or even a rapid advance to, Constantinople is, in our opinion, out of the question. After all, however, the chief reliance of the Sultan must be on his army, and, if that is badly handled, it is tolerably certain that Adrianople will once again be occupied by the legions of the Czar."