THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF TURKEY.

Globe, Volume VIII, Issue 888, 30 April 1877, Page 3

THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF TURKEY.

A well-timed and instructive volume, "Russian Wars with Turkey," has lately been published by Major Russell, and lias been elaborately reviewed in two London papers. From the review in the Times we epiote passages which are particularly interesting, and all the more interesting now that war has been declared : THE RUSSIAN AND TURKISH RESOURCES. We now come down to the present time, and to the most important part of this volume, its estimate of the comparative power and resources of Russia and Turkey for war, and of the probable results of a conflict between them, taking into account, too, the relations of Europe. As to the military strength of the two nations, Major Russell's general "conclusions are, we think, trustworthy." In the first place, no doubt can exist of the superiority at present of Turkey at sea. She possesses, thanks to European loans, twenty excellent ironclads at least and a considerable fleet of steam transports ; and Russia could oppose to these only two monitors and a few frigates, in the Euxine, the only possible theatre of maritime operation's in flic supposed conflict. On the other hand, the power of Russia on land is so infinitely greater than that of the Porto, that a comparison appears to be almost idle. The armies of the Czar have not yet reached indeed the enormous dimensions they will attain when modelled from the Prussian' pattern ; and there is reason to suppose they are now suffering from the effects inseparable from a change of system. But in the event of a war with Turkey, Russia, it seems certain, can array on the Pruth 250,000 men at least, with a reserve j probably of equal strength, and can send beyond the Caucasus 150,000 men ; and these j forces would utterly surpass their antagonists in military efficiency and worth. Against this j formidable display of power it is doubtful if j the Porte could place in line 160,000 men in Europe, and 100,000 in Asia Minor; and these troops would be, in a great j measure, rude levies, ill-trained, and worse J officered, and without proper appliances for the field. Nor does even this give a true ; notion of the relative strength of the sup- < posed belligerents. The Russian armies would be probably swelled by contingents from Servia and Montenegro, and even from , the Danubian provinces ; they would be up- I held by a united Empire of from 70,000,000 j to soids, and their march on ; Turkey would be doubtless aided by a rising j among its oppressed races. On the other side the Turks could rely only on the Maho- ; inedan element in their dominions; they would depend for their resources in war on a population of 14,000,000; and, like all tyrannical castes, they will find themselves in the hour of danger exposed to the hate and vengeance of millions of injured subjects. From the narrowest military point of view, therefore, Turkey cannot on land bo a match for Russia, and if larger considerations arc borne in mind, the superiority of Russia is even more decisive. TIIK CONTINGENCIES OF AN INVASION. Looking at, these facts simply, we might imagine that a Avar between these long hostile Powers could at present have one result only —the speedy conquest of the weaker belligerent. But Major Russell shows, on the whole, cleai-ly that even at this time a Russian invasion of Turkey is a critical matter, by no means promising a complete success; and, though his conclusions might be more distinct, this is one of the most useful pacts of his work. In the first place, the command of the sea by the Turks woidd prevent a descent on the shores of the Bosphorus, their most serious danger, Von Mollke thought,; it would protect Constantinople for a considerable time ; it would, to a certain extent, impede a Muscovite advance in Asia Minor, especially as the Straits were approached. It would probably confine the main attack therefore to the

vast,, difficult, and perilous theatre which extends from the Danube south of the Balkans. But if Russia wero obliged to select this line, Austria, as Major Russell correctly points out, could interpose with decisive effect;; having the means of throwing a powerful force on the flank and rear of the Russian armies, she holds, it lias been aptly said, " the key of the chest;" and no matter what treaties were made, Russia, in an advance from the Pruth to the Balkans, would probably find it expedient to place a strong detachment along the Austrian frontier, which would "reatly reduce her powers for invasion. Let us assume, however, that Russia is able to break up from the Pruth with 250,000 men, supported by imposing reserves, and resolves to cross the Danube and assail Turkey, Constantinople being her real object; for no other prize, Major Russell insists, would compensate her for the cost of the effort, and otherwise, iu fact, the war would be aimless. Two modes of operating would be then open to her ; in all probability, in the case supposed, lier army might pass the river at several points, concentrating at or near Ilirsova, or it might unite its chief mass near Giurgevo ; the advance being in cither instance connected, perhaps, with a diversion from the Servian and the Montenegrin frontier. The main body would then make directly for Shumla and the Balkans, while the auxiliary would march on Sophia and descend the valley of the ancient Hebrus; the two columns effecting their junction at a point to the north of Adrianople, and moving thence through the Roumelian plains, backed perhaps by a Christian Insurrection, towards the Imperial city which would lie before them. Major Russell evidently thinks that the Turks would scarcely be; able unaided to offer an effectual resistance to such an invasion. The line of the Danube, he plainly assumes, would have to be given up at once; indeed, otherwise, the proposed plan of assembling divided corps at Ilirsova would be obviously contrary to sound principles. The Turks, he believes, would attempt, a stand at Shumla, but he does not augur success from the effort; for, besides that the defensive power of Shumla and its intrenched camp has greatly diminished, he lias no faith in the Ottoman Army, or in its ability to fight a well-ap-pointed enemy. The barrier of the Balkans, too, he considers, would not be very formidable ; the passes are by no means difficult. To make a proper use of these as an obstacle requires a force of a very different kind from the sluggish and feeble Turkish levies, and the range would be almost certainly traversed or turned before long by the hostile mass, which would, it is assumed, advance from Sophia. The celebrated positions on the narrow isthmus at the Chekmedgcs, near the shores of the Bosphorus, which, it is said, twice saved the Empire of the East, would, no doubt, still afford a line of defence that might be made enormously strong ; but if the question depended only on the unsupported power of the Turkish Army, Major Russell does not conceal his opinion that they, too, would at last be carried. THE TIME AND LINE OF ATTACK. It does not, however, follow from this that the conquest of Turkey woidd be easy, still less that Russia would succeed in bringing the city of Constantinople within her grasp. Notwithstanding the recent construction of railways —these lines, according to Major Russell, are ill-laid, ill-furnished, and badly designed—the gathering together of the Russian host must be an affair of several months ; space and distance still weaken the hostile movements and retard the strokes of the Colossus of the Xorth. It is scarcely probable that the 250,000 men required for an invasion of Turkey in Europe could be on the Pruth prepared for the field before the month of April or May, and weeks woidd be still needed to bring up the reserves and other appliances for a trying campaign. Should the first line be ready by the Ist of May, it 'would take seven weeks in attaining Shumla should Ilirsova be the point of assembly, and about a week more in the case of Griurgevo ; and this, too, on tho assumption only that the Turks would not defend the Danube, or even attempt to retard the invaders. Major Russell calculates that less than a month would then see the Russians across the Balkans, and the junction effected with the column from the West; but even supposing no battle was fought, this time seems to us much too short, if we assign any value to the Turkish Army, and the operation woidd probably take six weeks. Allowing a fortnight for the advance from Adrianople to the neck of land on the Bosphorus, it would not be far from the end of August; before the invaders woidd touch the last line of defence behind which Constantinople stands, and where, we may assume, the Ottoman Power woidd collect itself for a final effort. Now, during the three months, or three months and three weeks, that would be occupied by this prolonged advance, even on the most favorable supposition for it, the Russian Army would be exposed to the climate that ruined the force of Diebitch; it would find great difficulties in obtaining the means of subsistence in various parts of the country ; it would be compelled to make large detachments to cover its communications,*and to mask the fortresses which it would have found on its way to the Danube : and, accordingly, it woidd be greatly reduced in numbers and really effective power before it attained the scene of the decisive struggle. Making every allowance for reserves and supports, Major Russell appears to be of opinion that about 150,000 men might be expected to reach the Chekmedgcs, and from what we know of the campaign of Torres Vedras, and, still more, of the march on Moscow, which this invasion would greatly resemble, we believe this would be a high estimate. TFKKEY'S DEFENCE. Can we suppose that during the many weeks which would have elapsed since the war had begun the Turks would have been so fatuous as not to have fortified these iiitrcnehments, which can be rendered wellnigh impregnable, and, if so, would the Muscovite force be sufficient to carry them by assault, the only operation possible to it ? If the Turkish levies were the only defenders, we might conceive that it probably would — the point, however, is very doubtful —but the Turkish fleet, it must bo borne in mind —a fact which Major Russcd omits —could here certainly play an important part, by harassing and vexing the assailant's Hanks ; and the Turkish papulation of the threatened city — a power by no means to be despised in the case of holding an intrenched assuredly oiler a. savage resistance, which, with other aids, might not prove fruitless. Even if the Chekmedgcs, too, were forced, Constantinople would be still untaken, and no one can read 'Von Mollke's work and not see that this celebrated place, if the Ottoman Government were not overthrown and the inhabitants showed resource and spirit, could still make a protracted defence against an army not prepared for a siege.

POSSIBLE END OF THE WAR. On the whole, then, an invasion of Turkey by tho Danube is a critical movement, and we are far from satisfied that, (though unaided, the Turks could not even now hold Constan - tinoplc against a Russian attack. Major Russell however does not dwell on what, in the existing state of Europe, is the most important element in this question ; we shall say only a word on it. If Constantinople, and nothing else, was to be the object of Russia in a campaign, she would most assuredly fail in her purpose ; the Groat Powers would not allow the Imperial City to be in her hands, and, of all places, it is the most capable of a successful defence against Russian aggression. We have not space to comment on this; it is only necessary to read the masterly chapter of Von Moltkc upon the subject, and we should add the improvements in modern ordnance would be here all in the defender's favor, in the case of a Power that should command the sea. To sum up the conclusions, therefore, that are suggested by this great question:—The military superiority of Russia is so vast as compared with Turkey, that in the event of a war between them the Porte, humanly speaking, must be worsted. To invade the Empire, however, even in its decay, especially by the line of the Danube, the only way now open for a real attack, is an operation of extreme difficulty ; the jealousies of Europe, space, and climate would combine to check the assailant's progress ; they would perhaps render it wholly nugatory. That Russia could conquer Turkey, even if she had no ally, appears, on the whole, to be very doubtful; and it is far from certain, as affairs now stand, that Constantinople would fall before a Russian arm) 7 , even wero the Turk its only defender. But if the city were threatened by Russia, the Great Powers would at once interfere ; and their interference would, beyond question, preserve the place from any real danger, and probably send the invaders behind the Balkans. In any case, therefore, a war with Turkey must, as far as we can see, be for the Czar a dangerous and unprofitable affair; and the grand prize, which only would repay his efforts, would assuredly never come into his hands.