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THE HERREGOYINA.

(From the Spectate/'.') There can be no doubt that the fighting in the Herzegovina has turned out, as it was sure to turn out, while the insurgents remained without regularly organised suppoit from Servia and Bosnia, very unfavourably to the insurgents. Of course the brave and disciplined army of a great Power, recruited from a people essentially military in genius, has easily overcome the incoherent levies of a petty, weak, and divided population. No one in his senses would have anticipated anything else. But the real hope for the insurgents 3 never was in themselves, but rather in the sympathies of their neighbours, small and great,—in the passionate enthusiasm of Servians and Bosnians for their cause, in the sober convictions of Austrian statesmen that they could not afford to let the discontent of neighbouring Slavs rise to too high a point, in the traditional policy of Russia, which has always led her to pass as the Protector of the Christian subjects of Turkey, and in the sagacity of the German Chancellor, who is by no means disposed to let the chaos of European Turkey shape itself into a new order, without contributing a few enlightened German ideas to control or counterbalance the barbarous benevolence of Russia. These were the elements of hope for the Herzegovina, and what we have to ask ourselves is not, what liberties can the insurgents win for themselves, but what chance is there that these elements can be so far combined as to compel Turkey, even in victory, to yield to her powerful neighbors what she is certainly not in a position to refuse them ? Now, few thoughtful men will deny that what we have advocated as the true solution of this question—namely, a qualified independence for the Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Bosnia in domestic affairs, under a Hospodar of their own—is the only solution which is in any way consistent with a postponement of the final liquidation of Turkey’s affairs, on the one hand, and a termination to these chronic rebellions of the subject Christian race, on the other. If the great Powers who are now so strenuously holdingin Servia, Bosnia, and Montenegro could agree on that solution, it would be adopted ; and nobody can help desiring that they should thus agree. Nevertheless, it is impossible to study carefully the information daily received from Constantinople, St Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin, without feeling a good deal of anxiety as to the issue. There is some danger that amidst the very conflicting objects which the great powers have at heart, a satisfactory, if only temporary, solution of the difficulty, seems to most of them of much less importance than the wish not to be outwitted by their diplomatic

competitors. And even if, as we suspect, Germany furnishes an exception to this rule, and would very willingly use her great influence so as to heal the mischief without regarding too prominently her own interest in the matter, yet she has so much weightier affairs on hand, and it would be so utterly quixotic for her to quarrel with Russia on so small a question, in the present critical situation of European affairs, that we cannot expect any very strenuous line to be taken by Germany without some new mol ive for active steps. England might perhaps furnish such a motive, for a cordial understanding with England on the Kastern question cannot be a matter indifferent to Germany. But Lord Derby has, we fear, neither the courage nor the wish to take a leading part in remodelling the traditional policy of England on the Turkish question; and without his urgent intervention we can hardly expect Prince Bismarck to risk giving grave offence to Russia, only in order to please Austria and to allay the anarchy and temper the misgovernraent of a few wretched and somewhat barbarous provinces. We fear, then, that the real prospect of any immediate result to come from the Consular Commission which is now inquiring into the grievances of the Herzegovinians at Mostar depends on the attitude of the Russian and Austrian Governments, and we cannot deny that the news ,of the past week fills us with anxiety lest the mutual jealousies of these two Governments should ultimately prevent anything like the application of a serious remedy, Russia’s object is of course to foster Panslavic dreams, and to hasten the euthanasia of the power of Turkey in Europe, under the auspices of her own benevolent supervision. Austria’s, on the contrary, is to discourage all Panslavic dreams, which are as odious to the Magyars, as they are menacing to the German hegemony in the reconstruction of European Turkey. What Austria would like would be the repetition, in some form or other, of the Roumanian precedent, which nibbles away at the barbarous rule of Turkey, without stimulating the passion of Slavonic nationalism, or lending any new lever to the Czar. Austria is probably more jealous of Servian and Bosnian sympathy with the insurgents, than of any other influence which is at work in the matter. The statement that she has told Servia that any active help to the insurgents will be followed by an Austrian occupation of Servia is now denied, and probably rather represents the tendency of her representations than the diplomatic fact. But it can hardly be doubted that what Austria most fears, is the creation of homogeneous atoms of Slavonic power which may one day aspire to run together into a powerful SouthSlavonic State. That, on the other hand, is precisely what Russia would best like. She evidently wishes not to interfere at all, unless she can interfere with such effect as to gain fresh prestige with all the Christian populations of Turkey by her action, and this cannot be effected without giving a distinct impetus to the national hopes of the Slavic people. If the statement in the telegrams that shcHiad mobilised her cavalry and horse artillery be true, she has unquestionably convinced herself that there is a danger of some gravity to guard against, and we cannot help suspecting that what she fears is some new move like that which gave Germany a fresh centre of influence in the Bast by securing Prince Charles of Hoheuzollern for the Roumanian Hospodarate. On the whole, what we seriously fear, is that the jealousy of Russia and Austria may be so keen in this matter, that Turkey, especially after she has put down the insurrection by her own army, will [be able to play off the one against the other, and to refuse any substantial concession to the insurgents of the Herzegovina.

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GLOBE18751117.2.14

Bibliographic details

Globe, Volume IV, Issue 445, 17 November 1875, Page 3

Word Count
1,097

THE HERREGOYINA. Globe, Volume IV, Issue 445, 17 November 1875, Page 3

THE HERREGOYINA. Globe, Volume IV, Issue 445, 17 November 1875, Page 3

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